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Chapter 1 
 
ONCE UPON A TIME when the world was young there was a Martian named Smith.  
Valentine Michael Smith was as real as taxes but he was a race of one. 
 
Thus begins Robert Heinlein’s 1961 award winning science fiction classic Stranger in 
a Strange Land.  The story is of a human raised by Martians on a far away planet and 
his eventual return to Earth.  Neither fully human nor fully Martian in his orientation 
to the universe, Smith’s return to Earth serves as the genesis for the transformation of 
both cultures.  Heinlein’s title is an allusion to the Biblical story of Exodus and speaks 
to the longings of those who exist at the tense intersection between two worlds.  The 
gap between Earth and Mars is no wider than a gap of modern-day Smiths operating in 
the world of international relations.  Specifically, the State Department of the United 
States employs foreign nationals at its diplomatic and consular posts throughout the 
world.  And like Smith, they exist as both members of their home culture but work in 
an environment that is ostensibly American.  Undoubtedly the cultural orientation of 
some makes the transition relatively painless.  For others, the peculiarities of American 
cultural generally and the State Department specifically will likely produce palpable 
dissonance.  But for all, the experience of being a foreigner in the space of home and 
interacting with foreigners who have constructed that space as their own will create an 
awkward sense of strangeness that is familiar and familiarity that becomes strange.  As 
Heinlein’s text argues, the dialogue between cultures has enormous transformative 
power.  The purpose of this research is to better understand this intersection of culture 
and institution and to consider how the management of this dialectic is acting for or 
against the interests of both. 
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1.1 Research Synopsis 
Foreign Service Nationals (FSN’s) are typically non-American, locally hired 
employees at American diplomatic and consular posts.  It should be noted that 
American family members of State Department Officers sometimes hold positions 
nominally designated as being “FSN.”  The functional use of the term and 
organizational perception is that FSN’s are non-American (Dorman, 2005) and this 
research will be focused on that population.  FSN’s occupy a unique organizational 
position as liaisons between American staff and host nations; they are invaluable in 
ensuring that American diplomatic posts are functional.  “America's Foreign Service 
Nationals comprise the bulk of the 42,000 locally employed staff members working at 
more than 250 U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide[...] America's Foreign 
Service Nationals are the glue that holds our embassies together” (Foreign Service 
Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007).  Foreign Service Nationals account for 32% of the 
positions at U.S. State Department international posts (U.S. Department of State, 
2005).  As the “glue” of the State Department, FSN’s provide logistical bridges 
between the embassy and the host country as many officers lack the cultural and 
linguistic skills to function in the country in which they are posted (Asthana, 2006, 
August 11).  The effectiveness of FSN’s in providing this support, consequently, 
accounts for the ability of the U.S. State Department to conduct foreign policy and 
operations through diplomatic and consular posts.  An important measure that can 
forecast the effectiveness of employees is their level of commitment (Cohen, 2007).  
Commitment levels of employees to the organizations for which they work have been 
linked to a range of performance related variables (Cohen, 2003) including the rate of 
turnover, withdrawal, absenteeism, tardiness, and success in completing and managing 
tasks (Randall/Cote, 1991; Blau, 1986).  Cultural variables have been found to 
significantly affect commitment levels in the workplace (Randall, 1993) with further 
documentation and exploration of this theme to be found in the second chapter of this 
research.  Structurally, the State Department precludes FSN input in many important 
decisions and the performance evaluation and primarily Americans conduct 
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supervision of FSN’s.  This structure is consistent with a high power distance 
organization (Wanek, 2005), where a group has power based on status or affiliation 
that is unavailable to other groups within the organization with structural barriers 
inhibiting advancement and empowerment.  Hofstede (2001) identifies cultures as 
varying according to their acceptance of high power distance, with some cultures 
comfortable with top-down hierarchies and others preferring participatory and 
egalitarian leadership structures.  As cultural orientation affects organizational 
commitment, this research investigates the extent to which the high-power distance 
structure of the State Department is accepted by FSN’s emerging from varying cultural 
backgrounds and the corresponding effect this has on commitment which has profound 
implications for the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic and consular posts.  Public diplomacy 
(detailed in subsequent chapters) is particularly affected by FSN input as it attempts to 
bring attractive aspects of American culture to worldwide populations.  Necessarily, 
the attitudes of this important population (FSN’s) will profoundly impact any attempt 
to speak to the community in which a U.S. diplomatic post operates (especially 
considering the gaps in cultural and linguistic ability on the part of many officers).  
Considering that worldwide sentiment towards the United States has become 
increasingly acrimonious, the engagement of FSN’s can be in important part of 
international outreach, thus further validating the need for this study in the context of 
international relations.       
 
1.2 Locally Employed Staff and the U.S. State Department 
 
The designation of FSN is still used in many State Department documents and by 
Foreign Service Officers.  Throughout the late 90’s and early 2000’s, different names 
have been given to the FSN position to minimize the “foreign” aspect of their job title.  
Some changes have included calling people in this position “Locally Engaged Staff,” 
“LES” (producing an unfortunate acronym that phonetically sounds like “less”), and 
“LE Staff.”  As of 2007, the State Department itself used a variety of terms such as 
these (along with the FSN moniker) ubiquitously in their documentation (Foreign 
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Service Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007).   Despite these changes, the FSN 
designation is still operationally used by State Department officers and locally hired 
employees themselves (Dorman, 2005).  For purposes of clarity and to be consistent 
with the language generally used by the State Department, “FSN” will be the term that 
is operationally used in this research.  
 
The role of Foreign Service Nationals is that of support for organizational decisions 
made almost exclusively by Americans (General Accounting Office, 1996).   Due to 
heightened fears related to terrorism, the State Department has also increased oversight 
of FSN work activity (Office of Inspector General: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2004).  For instance, the monitoring of work has been increased along with a 
reduction in the decision making power of FSN’s.  The access to “sensitive 
information” has been more intensively scrutinized and entry/exit of U.S. Posts by 
FSN’s is more thoroughly screened (decreasing the work flexibility and office access 
for FSN’s).  Cumulatively, the role of the FSN is clearly differentiated from the role of 
Foreign Service Officers, in terms of their operational and security status.  The 
recruitment website emphasizes the importance of FSN roles but furthers this 
differentiation (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007): 
 
(FSN’s) provide unique services in support of foreign policy at nearly 265 posts worldwide. (They) are an 
integral part of the team dedicated to representing America's interests to other countries (Retrieved 
October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html).  
 
Furthering this “important but other” status, the website goes on to indicate the 
following: 
 
(FSN’s) are the continuity staff of our Missions abroad. Our Locally Employed Staff (FSN’s) abroad 
provide the institutional knowledge and professional contacts that are so important to the embassy. LE 
Staff perform vital mission program and support functions. All USG agencies under Chief of Mission 
authority depend heavily on their continuity staff, frequently delegating to them significant management 
roles and program functions (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-
employment/index.html).   
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The status of Foreign Service Nationals in the U.S. State Department clearly identifies 
their foundational role.  Correspondingly, the structure of the State Department 
precludes advancement of FSN’s to the level of State Department Officers.  The role 
of FSN’s is to implement initiatives created by Americans within the State 
Department, not create the policy of the U.S. State Department (Dorman, 2005).   
 
Despite their separate status, FSN’s receive consideration and work protection that is 
consistent with the protection available for U.S. workers in terms of diversity 
protection (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007): 
 
It is the policy of the Department of State to provide equal opportunity and equitable treatment in 
employment to all persons without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, 
political affiliation, marital status, or sexual orientation (Retrieved October 26, 2009 from 
http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html). 
 
Salary and benefits, however, are derived from the prevailing practices of the host 
country (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 2007): 
 
Section 408 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 prescribes the basis for setting Locally Employed Staff 
compensation and benefits. To the extent that it is consistent with the U.S. public interest, U.S. missions 
compensate Locally Employed Staff based upon prevailing practice in country. This means that total 
compensation (salary and benefits such as health insurance, life insurance, and allowances) is based upon 
what local comparable employers are providing to their employees in jobs that have similar levels of 
complexity and responsibility. As a result, Locally Employed Staff should normally receive a package of 
pay and benefits competitive with that paid by other employers. Locally Employed Staff are paid in host 
country currency unless local prevailing practice is to compensate all LE Staff in US dollar (Retrieved 
October 26, 2009 from http://careers.state.gov/local-employment/index.html). 
 
The physical space of an embassy or consulate is also in a unique territory.  While 
present in the host nation, they are, in principle, not governed by the legal rules and 
prevailing practices of that nation (Congressional Quarterly, 2000).  Additionally, the 
stated mission of the U.S. State Department is that its diplomatic and consular posts 
should reflect American values, standards, and practices (U.S. Department of State: 
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Careers Representing America, 2007).  Within the space of a U.S. post, English is the 
dominant language.  Communication with those visiting or receiving services is 
expected to be consistent with American practices.  According to the State 
Department, the relationship between supervisors and employees (in many cases, 
FSN’s) should meet American standards of collegiality and professionalism; 
regardless of the standards of the host country, the policies and procedures inside an 
American diplomatic or consular post operate independently from the territory and 
should (in theory) be based on the values, standards, and regulations derived from the 
United States as it relates to employment and legal rules. The space of the embassy or 
consulate is U.S. space regardless of the country it is operating in (Retrieved June 8, 
2009 from http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_678.htmlextraterritoriality).   
When an FSN arrives for work at a State Department post, they are (at least in theory) 
working in America (Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965).  In sum, FSN’s serve an important 
position in serving U.S. Foreign policy.  They also, however, exist in a divergent 
position where the State Department both depends on their status as non-Americans, 
and requires that their work practices reflect those of an American institution.  
 
1.3 Power Distance Perceptions and State Department Structure 
 
Power distance refers to the extent to which power and prestige are evenly or unevenly 
distributed in a culture.  Hofstede (1980) created the Power Distance Index (PDI) 
based survey analysis of employees in a number of countries where power had 
different implications for organizational structures.  High PDI cultures tend accept 
inequality as inevitable or the natural human condition and tend to have power 
concentrated in the hands of a few.  In high power distance cultures, employees do not 
expect supervisors to negotiate work assignments or solicit input from employees on 
the advisable course of action (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004).  People who are culturally 
oriented towards high power distance were found to accept a hierarchical distribution 
of power in an organization and as a result perform their obligations without 
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questioning them (Cohen, 2007).  In recent years, serious criticism of Hofstede’s work 
has emerged, including methodological and application questions.  Specifically, Clark 
(2003) cites a growing body of scholarship that finds fault with his research including 
the fact that Hofstede's analyses focused on face-to-face interactions in organizational 
contexts in the attempt to appeal to the notion of a presumably homogenous national 
culture.  This could represent a simplification in explaining problems in organizational 
communication through such relatively simple dichotomies (high/low power distance, 
for example).  Such essentializing may be too simple for dealing with the real-world 
complexities of culture (Ess and Sudweeks, 2005).  These criticisms, however, do not 
mitigate the clear insights and advantages his work offers (for more extensive details 
regarding these advantages, please refer to chapter 2 of this research).  Despite 
concerns about utilizing Hofstede for a macro analysis of generalized cultural 
epistemologies, his work has been shown to be the most effective and practical 
instrument available when applied to cultural variables as they specifically relate the 
problems of intercultural institutions (Dorfman and Howell, 1988; Cohen, 2007).  To 
mitigate concerns about generalizing heterogeneous cultures into to discrete 
categories, researchers have revised Hofstede’s work for application at the individual 
(rather than national) level (Dorfman and Howell, 1988) and have found it to be a 
valid and reliable method in looking at cultural orientation, specifically at an 
individual’s acceptance of power distance.         
  
Relating to the concept of power distance, U.S. Foreign Missions have a built-in 
structural inequality between foreign local staff and American officers.  FSN’s are 
accountable to and evaluated by American staff.  They are responsible for the 
implementation of American policies.  Although they may have autonomy in the 
method of carrying out these policies, at the larger policy-making level of the State 
Department, they are excluded from setting institutional goals by the structure of the 
organization (Dorman, 2005).  Individuals culturally oriented towards high power 
distance find work-related power disparity more acceptable than those with a low 
power distance orientation (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004).  In high power distance 
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cultures, the concept of someone holding a position of power without ascension from a 
lower position tends to be viewed as normal with stratification accepted.  Conversely, 
individuals culturally oriented towards reduced power distance view the power granted 
based on status with concern, trepidation, and a generalized dissatisfaction with the 
structure of the institution (Cohen, 2007).  This structural dissatisfaction could be 
negatively correlated to the ‘Organizational Commitment’ of Foreign Service 
Nationals. 
 
1.4 Organizational Commitment 
 
Commitment is defined as a psychological attachment to social or nonsocial foci and 
to courses of action relevant to those foci (Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004) and 
is a crucial part of the role FSN’s play in preserving the continuity of Embassy work at 
U.S. international posts (U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America, 
2007).  U.S. Foreign Service Officers are rotated regularly between international 
postings to prevent clientism- the excessive identification with the country in which 
officers reside rather than with the United States (Perle, 1999).  With regular and fixed 
management turnover, officers are profoundly dependent on the work of FSN’s to 
maintain U.S. post operations.  Considering the significant role FSN’s play in the 
institution of the State Department, the factors contributing to or limiting their 
organizational commitment merit significant consideration.  As the structure of the 
State Department is hierarchical, power distance provides a compelling factor in 
understanding the acceptance or rejection of that structure by individuals with varying 
cultural orientations. 
 
1.5 General Hypotheses Discussion 
 
Full, descriptive and predictive hypotheses are more fully outlined in chapter two of 
this research.  In this overview, however, several expectations of this research emerge.  
Given the structure of State Department posts, it is expected that individuals who are 
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culturally comfortable with defined and (principally) non-negotiable hierarchies will 
be more comfortable working for an institution in which their position requires 
accountability to a specific group.  This comfort level will, in turn, lead to acceptance 
of the power distance intrinsic for FSN’s working for the U.S. State Department.  
From this, organizational commitment will be higher as there will be greater 
acceptance of an institution that structurally limits their authority and empowerment.    
Additionally, those individuals reporting lower levels of power distance in their 
cultural orientation are expected to be less likely to accept institutionally created 
authority as a basis for hierarchy.  FSN’s oriented towards more collaborative and less 
hierarchical organizations should be less inclined to offer full organizational 
commitment.  Previous research dealing with culture and its relationship to 
organizational commitment demonstrates that a similar relationship exists in other 
multi-cultural organizations (Cohen, 2003; Cohen, 2007; etc.).  This exploration has 
direct implications on U.S. foreign policy as the effectiveness with which FSN’s do 
their jobs affects the perception local populations have on the U.S. as a whole (see 
subsequent content in this research related to “public diplomacy”).  Embassies serve 
the logistical needs of individuals traveling and doing business in the U.S., but they 
serve a public diplomacy function, as well.  The engagement and investment that 
FSN’s have in making America accessible and telling the American “story” has played 
and continues to play a significant role in local populations perceptions of the U.S.  At 
a larger level, the ability of the U.S. effectively manage cultural issues in its 
international missions could speak to a more generalized ability (or inability) to 
consider culture as a part of its international decision-making calculus.   
 
1.6 Method Overview 
 
Through web-based survey collection and anonymous survey distribution to posts 
throughout the State Department, FSN’s will have the chance to complete the survey 
honestly, with the fear of consequence greatly reduced.  The survey itself consists of 
items from Dorfman and Howell (1988) that deal with an individual’s cultural 
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tendencies (specifically the conception of power).  Porter et al. (1974) items will be 
used to identify organizational commitment with the Meyer and Allen (1984) survey 
identifying affective commitment.  Several questions that may influence the results of 
the rest of the survey (employment tenure, contact with Americans, etc.) will be 
included for further clarification of the results, along with an open narrative question 
that allows free response regarding perception of the State Department as a whole.  
The sum of these results should offer insight into the relationship between power 
conception and commitment to the State Department (with mitigating factors and 
explanatory questions offering further insight).  To see the full survey, please refer to 
Appendix 1.  A more detailed description of the methodological considerations follows 
in chapter two.   
 
1.7 Research Structure 
 
This research is divided into six chapters.  The first chapter serves as an introductory 
overview to outline the project and provides background information regarding 
relevant issues (note that all items mentioned are covered in detail in subsequent 
chapters).  This section includes information about the structure of the State 
Department as it relates to the relationship between FSN’s and American officers.  It 
also outlines the relationship of power distance to culture and its implications for 
attitudes resulting from organizational structure.  Finally, this chapter looks at the 
general results of previous research on organizational commitment as it relates to both 
power distance and the distribution of power in an organization.  Using these elements 
as a basis, an overview of the hypotheses are developed and justified as being 
grounded in previous scholarship in this area. 
 
Chapter 2 
The section reviews the relevant literature related to cultural orientation and 
commitment.  This section gives insight into the construction and meaning of the 
survey questions.  Competing theoretical views, the evolution of culture and 
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commitment, as conceptual frameworks, and the utility of the survey construction are 
all explored.  The sum result of this review is that a more meaningful understanding of 
the instruments and their theoretical basis emerges.  With an eye to this theoretical 
model, State Department structures and the role of FSN’s are also considered and 
reviewed.  The conclusion of this chapter articulates a) what answers can emerge from 
this exploration and b) the larger meaning of the results of this research. 
 
Chapter 3 
This chapter analyzes the results of the survey responses.  Standard tests for reliability 
and validity of the relationships between variables are applied. Emerging relationships 
between the variables of power distance orientation, organizational commitment, role 
negotiation, and role acceptance are identified.  A narrative content analysis further 
clarifies the “stories” coming from the responses to the open-ended question included 
at the conclusion of the survey.  Hypotheses are applied to these results and tested for 
their accuracy.   
 
Chapter 4    
This chapter will summarize the research results and offer analysis based on the data in 
relation to both research questions and hypotheses.  Specifically, the results are 
considered in terms of their context for policy at State Department posts.  For example, 
the misunderstanding that could result from the dissent that comes from low power 
distance cultures and the agreeability that comes from high power distance cultures is 
discussed as a possible cause for misinterpretation in the context of research results.  
The various factors of commitment (maintenance, investment, etc.) are evaluated in 
light of this unique and important population for U.S. public diplomacy.  Considering 
this research inherently evaluates the harmony between two distinct groups (FSN’s 
and American Officers), the potential for the creation of what Allen and Pilnik (1973) 
called a “shadow institution” (where subordinates create a separate, largely non-
scrutinized organization) certainly exists.  As the State Department ostensibly seeks to 
build an institution that tells a coherent and consistent story relating to U.S. interests, 
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such an “off the radar” set of decision-making and organizational culture would 
certainly give pause.  This chapter affords an opportunity to look at the results in the 
context of their relation to U.S. foreign policy.  .   
 
Chapter 5   
This chapter identifies the possible consequences and effects suggested by the results 
of this research.  The orientation of the American relationship to the world and 
perceptions of the United States are considered in the context of the attitudes and 
values of FSN’s.  While the extent and meaningfulness of the relationship between 
FSN and international attitudes is not considered (this would be quite hard to measure 
and would not likely produce any direct relationship with world attitudes), the results 
appear to be both informative and instructive.      
 
Chapter 6 
This application chapter utilizes the results and analysis of chapters three and four to 
make recommendations for changes in the State Department that could improve the 
organizational structure and culture, with a particular eye how these changes could 
offer a window to a more fully realized public diplomacy that better leverages the 
unique expertise of the FSN population.  As people who both directly promote U.S. 
interests (often to skeptical populations) and serve unofficially as “citizen diplomats” 
for the U.S. to their home community, improving the organizational climate has 
implications towards world perception of the U.S.  Considering the current uncertainty 
much of the world has about U.S. leadership (despite a spike in optimism created by 
the 2008 elections), the need for effective utilization of 30,000+ potential foreign 
advocates cannot be dismissed.  These changes could also prove instructive for 
American foreign policy overall, as the lack of understanding of cultural nuance and 
the valuation of world opinion has plagued a number of U.S. decisions after the Cold 
War.  Additionally, the Foreign Services of many states and numerous international 
organizations regularly rely on the efforts of foreign nationals at diplomatic posts in 
many different countries and in a variety of cultural settings.  Clearer insight into the 
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structure and potential drawbacks of the American system for utilizing FSN’s creates a 
useful framework for comparison and provides a foundation for improved utilization 
of multi-national workforces.  Finally, recent events have provided the U.S. with a 
stark demonstration of the dangers of forcing institutions and structures on countries 
without consideration of the cultural environment present within those countries.  The 
results of the research are considered in each of these contexts.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Here, by the grace of God and an inside straight, we have a personality untouched by 
the psychotic taboos of our tribe — and you want to turn him into a carbon copy of 
every fourth-rate conformist in this frightened land! 
 
Raised by Martians prior to his return to Earth, Smith’s identity is fully unique from 
human culture.  His status of being both “with us” and “separated from us” is greeted 
with both interest and suspicion by his fellow humans upon his “homecoming.”  For 
FSN’s, this dichotomy between union and separation is just as much a part of their 
experience.  As the Martian-Human Smith attempted to make sense of how to navigate 
both parts of his cultural self, FSN’s must consider their cultural orientation as it 
relates to the State Department.  In an institution that is structured by power, the 
conception of power on the part of an FSN will undoubtedly affect the conception of 
the organization.  For Smith, sacred trust was earned through the Martian ritual of 
simply sharing water with another person.  His discovery of the duplicitous and 
deceitful nature of human relationships served to further alienate him from humans 
who were both “same” and “other.”  The potential gap in understanding between 
FSN’s and the State Department has profound implications for the United States as it 
seeks to directly address the world community through public diplomacy.  Smith’s 
honest and open articulation of Martian culture fundamentally transformed the 
arrogance of the human race.  For the United States to shed world perception of 
aloofness and arrogance, more meaningful dialogue with the world must begin.  That 
is not to say that agreement and understanding will be the result (it rarely is between 
Martians and Earthlings).  The world may not agree with the U.S., but they should be 
able to understand, assess, and reasonably predict the decisions of the U.S.  This can 
only begin with dialogue.  That dialogue can begin with a more complete 
understanding of Foreign Service Nationals and it can continue when that 
understanding creates opportunities for engagement with host countries.     
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2.1 Cultural Dimensions 
 
Any discussion of cultural dimensions typically begins with the work of Geehrt 
Hofstede.  For nearly 30 years, his investigation into the values and work attitudes of 
varying cultural groups has been a foundational element to cultural research.  
Specifically, Hofstede’s (1980) study is regularly one of the most referenced pieces of 
research on the relationship between culture and that attitudes and actions of 
employees in an organization (Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982). His research has been 
instrumental in furthering an understanding of cross-cultural management theory and 
practice, revealing that members of different societies hold divergent values 
concerning the nature of organizations and interpersonal relationships within them 
(Fernandez et al., 1997). In his seminal work beginning with 116,000 questionnaires 
completed by IBM employees from 50 countries (Bing, 2004), Hofstede researched 
how cultures differ across nations.  IBM was selected based on the assumption that 
rigid corporate structure would ensure worldwide workplace homogeneity in all areas 
except culture. He outlined key cross-cultural dimensions capable of affecting the 
conception and epistemological underpinnings of work orientation (Friedman, 2007). 
 
Follow-up research in the U.S. and internationally has established value and belief 
components of organizational culture/cultural systems (Cavenaugh, 1990; Chatman, 
1989; Conner & Becker, 1975; Louis, 1983). Comparative values relating to 
management have been studied in a variety of international contexts (Carlson, 
Fernandez, & Stepina, 1996; Dorfman & Howell, 1988; England, 1978; Hofstede, 
1980; Ronen & Kraut, 1977; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). 
 
Values are regularly operationalized as the central tenets of a society's culture. 
According to Fernandez, et al. (1997): 
 
Values are believed to influence the interpretation of response outcomes of work, causing some outcomes to 
be positive reinforcements and others negative. Understanding variations in multiple cultures and the 
differences in work-related values that MNEs deal with across the globe is a necessary… Inadequate 
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awareness of international variations in cultural systems, including values, can exacerbate expatriate failure 
(p. 44). 
 
The key values examined initially by Hofstede included power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism, and masculinity.  His research on fifty-three national 
cultures argues that a culture can be ranked according to its corresponding score in 
each area (Nielson and Gannon, 2006). Each element in his initial research produced a 
sort of continuum along which the basic problem-solving mechanisms of a culture 
could be revealed.  A culture with a high power distance, for example, might be 
inclined to defer to authority for guidance and direction.  A culture with a low power 
distance may seek multi-level discussion and consensus.  Such distinctions between 
cultures have enormous implications for the values, attitudes, procedures, and policies 
of the workplace.  In fact, variance in cultures may moderate the relationship between 
managerial practices and organizational effectiveness; that is, cultural differences may 
enhance or diminish the impact of managerial practices as they bear on job attitudes 
(Hofstede, 1991). Research into these value dimensions has produced some of the 
most extensive and significant implications into the study of culture in the workplace 
(Triandis, 2004).  On the significance of his research, Hofstede (2006) writes: 
 
My 1980 book introduced the 'dimensions' paradigm, showing that cultural differences between modern 
nations could be meaningfully measured and ordered along a discrete set of dimensions, representing 
different answers to universal problems of human societies. I had empirically derived four such 
dimensions: Power Distance (related to the problem of inequality), Uncertainty Avoidance (related to the 
problem of dealing with the unknown and unfamiliar), Individualism-Collectivism (related to the problem 
of interpersonal ties) and Masculinity-Femininity (related to emotional gender roles)… the dimensions 
paradigm since the 1990s has become the 'normal science' approach to cross-cultural business studies (p. 
884). 
 
Bing (2004) recounts a number of anecdotal examples in which the validity of 
Hofstede’s work was shown in a real-world context. On a trip to Austria, Bing 
observed that farmers kept their woodpiles in precise and orderly stacks (Austria 
scores low on uncertainty avoidance). On the subway in Austria, people are expected 
to purchase and hold tickets on their own (Austria scores low on power distance). 
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Contrast this to the American train system in which large gates and officials police 
passenger traffic.  The easy application and empirical validation of Hofstede has 
continued to give his work traction. Writing on the profound influence of Hofstede on 
both practice and scholarship, Bing (2004) contends: 
 
Hofstede's study was groundbreaking in other ways as well. Survey research had been used before, in fields 
such as sociology, political science, and business studies, but had not been significantly employed in cross-
cultural comparisons, certainly not across a large number of countries. It is no exaggeration to say that 
Hofstede helped to create the field of comparative intercultural research. From its original publication date 
in 1980, Culture's Consequences sold steadily over a twenty-year period. In 1988, citations referencing 
Culture's Consequences jumped. From that time, Hofstede's influence has grown steadily (p. 86). 
 
An understanding of the value dimensions has been shown to be a necessary 
component of the effective adaptation of organizational policy for multi-national 
organizations (Friedman, 2007).  The dual nature of institutions require organizations 
to balance creating standard practices that are globally effective with the need to 
localize workplace policy to the practices of the community in which the organization 
operates (Kostova and Roth 2002). Empirical application has shown that there will 
consistently be a gap between the efficacy of standardized policy and their application 
to divergent cultural contexts. There will consistently be a tension between local 
practices and standardized institutional policy (Poutsma et al. 2006). As organizations 
expand globally, the number of variables that must align for new organizational 
initiatives increases exponentially, and that makes mastery of change management 
more challenging (Friedman, 2007).  Increasing the challenging aspects of this sort of 
change management is the ethereal nature of Hofstede’s value dimensions.  Hofstede 
(2006) argues: 
 
The (value dimensions) do not 'exist' in a tangible sense. They are constructs, not directly accessible to 
observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors and useful in predicting still other 
observable and measurable verbal and nonverbal behavior. If they exist, it is in our minds - we have defined 
them into existence. They should help us in understanding and handling the complex reality of our social 
world (p. 885). 
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An example of the intangible nature of Hofstede’s value dimensions can be found in 
how each area cannot be essentialized to stable a hypothesis about interacting with a 
culture.  High power distance in a culture, for example, can be expected to mean that 
people adhere to leadership with fewer questions or criticism. There will also be fewer 
visible indications of dissent between subordinates and superiors. It would seem to 
follow that people from a high power distance culture would be less inclined towards 
revolt, revolution, or subterfuge; however the opposite was found (Peterson, 2003). 
Perhaps the lack of critical dialogue between follower and leader creates a climate in 
which the mitigating effects of argument (Infante, 1987) are not present, because in 
low power distance cultures there is much more upward vertical criticism yet a higher 
degree of adherence to agreed upon policy (Peterson, 2003).  
 
Another challenge is the fact that culture is best studied in terms of values (what 
people believe) when looking at the national level, yet culture is best studied in terms 
of practice (what people do) at the organizational level (Muijen and Koopman, 1994).  
These challenges have led to a number of serious critiques of  Hofstede’s 
methodology, application, and practical applicability of value dimensions in terms of 
academic research and as a basis for policy in multi-cultural organizations. 
 
2.2 Criticism and Response: Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
 
Hofsede’s framework for understanding national differences has been among the most 
influential works in intercultural communication, however (in recent decades) it has 
also been one of the most highly criticized (Clark, 2003).  One of the most debated 
aspects of Hofstede’s research is the extent to which it can be applied in a specific 
context.  When countries share similar attributes according to Hofstede’s dimensions, 
internal consistency would suggest that management styles could easily be 
transplanted- though validation of this is lacking. His typology has been applied to 
cross-cultural reward management  (Chiang, 2005) and to issues of motivation in an 
organization (Hofstede, 1980).  Most of these application studies have not been 
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empirical (Chiang, 2005) and the focus of the orientation of the research has 
predominantly been filtered through a distinctly Western lens (Gerhart and Milkovich, 
1990). 
 
Concerns also exist regarding the generalizability of Hofestede’s research based on the 
fact that his initial pool was uniformly drawn from IBM employees.  Given that 
management and hiring standards explicitly and implicitly draw upon individuals with 
specific characteristics, a range of research suggests that generalizing to groups outside 
of this population may be problematic (Sondergaard, 1994; McSweeney 2003).  
Peterson (2003) voices concern based on personal experience about Hofstede’s 
characterization of Japan having a “low power distance.” Unless IBM systematically 
attracts Japanese employees who would have been misfits in other Japanese 
companies, Peterson would argue that the Japanese workplace (by experience and 
research) actually has a substantial power distance. A strong organizational culture is 
believed to dilute the scores on the dimensions (Smircich, 1983). Bias is also 
suspected in the samples’ gender (mostly male respondents) (Merker, 1982) and 
orientation to career/professional life (Kidd, 1982).  Similarly, Hofstede’s 
identification of cultural dimensions based on nationality has proven potentially 
problematic.  Regional differences within countries and increasing globalization may 
limit the utility of suggesting a person’s country of birth or residence has predictive 
power on her/his organizational behavior.  It is also crucial to consider the issue of 
sub-cultures within a larger cultural frame. Looking at culture as a national aggregate 
may obfuscate distinctions across subcultures. Internal differences between groups in a 
national culture may flourish (Martin, 1992).  Summation of these objections is further 
articulated by McSweeney (2003) who states that other than a priori belief, we have 
little evidence that national borders have any influence on defining a discrete cultural 
group.  
 
The dichotomized representation of cultural values has led to criticism that the 
framework leads to unjustifiable and incoherent perceptions of specific cultures 
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(Clark, 2003).  Nielson and Gannon (2006) offer a brief example to show placing 
culture on a linear continuum (as Hofstede does) ignores the nuances that shape the 
dimensions of a culture.  Hofstede’s perspective (according to Nielson and Gannon) 
holds that Sweden cannot be both feminine and masculine; that is, the country’s 
culture can only be defined in terms of a continuum trending (with varying intensity, 
depending on the study) towards masculinity OR femininity. However, close 
observation of Swedish values and behaviors indicates that the Swedes are 
simultaneously masculine and feminine. Viewing a culture in terms of its linear place 
on Hofstede’s dimensions increases the probability of inaccurate stereotyping. Also, 
evidence suggests that cultures frequently manifest seemingly paradoxical values and 
behaviors.  Iran, for example, trends towards fiercely masculine values while, at the 
same time, Tehran has a number of women serving in significant political positions.  
Smesler (1992) argues that other such contradictions exist in every culture and gives 
the examples of the Anglo proverbs of "look before you leap" existing alongside the 
competing proverb "he who hesitates is lost."  Additionally, U.S. negotiators 
frequently complain that Chinese negotiators are both sincere and deceptive (Fang 
1999).  For a richer and more complete conception of a culture, it may be necessary to 
look at frameworks beyond Hofstede’s value dimensions. 
 
A deeper epistemological question related to the very concept of culture has 
increasingly been put to Hofstede’s work.  Hofstede (1980, 1991) has contended that 
cultural dimensions represent deeply rooted “software of the mind” and are principally 
fixed.  While not contending that culture is fully static, Hofstede’s work suggests that 
there are root orientations that are unlikely to dramatically change over time.  
Contending scholarship suggests that culture may, in fact, be far more malleable than 
Hofstede suggests (Sondergaard, 1994).  International migration, globalization, 
historical events, economic changes, as well as a range of other occurrences have 
undoubtedly had an effect on many cultures.  For example, Hofstede’s work explores 
the religious tendency of a country like Spain and the irreligiosity of the Russians.  
Historically, however, in the post-Franco era, church attendance has dwindled in Spain 
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and swelled in post-Communist Russia.  This is to say nothing of the dividing and re-
unification of nations. Hofstede’s research treats Hong Kong as separate from China 
and Yugoslavia as holistic group, leaving contemporary researchers to wonder which 
value dimensions remain valid and how to interpret the new national borders.  To state 
that the value dimensions of culture X are Y should, perhaps, not be viewed as an 
axiomatic statement.  Rather, such statements could alternatively be seen as a snapshot 
from a specific historical, economic, and social period rather than something that 
provides an enduring heuristic into the expected behavior of a national group.   
 
Wallerstein (1990) states that he is “skeptical that we can operationalize the concept of 
culture [...] in any way that enables us to use it for statements that are more than trivial 
(p. 34).”  It is agreed that culture exists, but like putting an ocean in a teacup, defining 
culture into a convenient category may be futile.  Similarly, there is concern that 
Hofstede overstates his framework’s role in shaping historical, economic, and social 
periods.  McSweeney (2003) argues that Hofstede discounts and discards non-cultural 
explanations for the actions of nations, groups, and individuals.  Clark (2004) writes: 
 
Hofstede cites archaeological evidence that 4000 years ago there were centralized governments in the 
Middle East and democracies in Scandinavia to support the view that the power distance variable has 
been at work for millennia. It would appear that Hofstede subscribes to the view that all historical, 
political, economic, and social (or any other) events that have ever happened throughout history, in the 
present or in the future, are related to and can be explained by his national culture dimensions. Although 
his framework may be appropriate for accounting for certain observable behaviors (i.e., the differences in 
rates of eating out in various countries), most business and cultural researchers would hardly buy into the 
argument that his framework of values can account for all world occurrences (p. 69). 
 
Chiang (2005) tested the concerns regarding Hofstede’s work by studying the work 
reward preferences of a diverse group of countries.  These countries represented (in 
some cases) polar opposites in Hofstede’s framework.  Several countries in the study 
were, for example, strongly masculine while others were strongly feminine.  
Hofstede’s dimensions would suggest that individuals in masculine countries should 
elicit a stronger preference for financial rewards and individual-based performance 
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reward systems than those in feminine cultures. The results showed strong validity for 
Hofstede’s thesis, but also suggested that many of the previously cited limitations have 
merit. Chiang writes: 
 
Cultural differences clearly offer insight into reward preferences, although the findings are not 
straightforward. This study demonstrated that reward preferences might not be conditioned solely by 
cultural influences (cultural determinism), but also by a multiplicity of other contextual factors (e.g. 
economic conditions) (p. 1561). 
 
The transmission of culture adds to its complication as a construct along with the 
challenge of defining divergent dimensions of it.  Sharing cultural meanings (for 
instance, from parents to children) within a society may be imperfect, so that over time 
the cultural definitions evolve. Earley (2006) contends that cultural meanings are 
typically not shared uniformly by an entire society, and they are not shared precisely. 
Any two individuals from a given culture may hold slightly different meanings for the 
same event or construct, and these two individuals may have shared meanings with 
other parties in the society but not with one another (Rohner, 1984). Earley (2006) 
sums up the challenges faced by Hofestede by describing the “trap” his research falls 
into and stating “(Hofstede’s) trap is inevitable if one uses values measured by 
individual perception as an indicant of collective culture (p. 928).” 
 
In addition to global concerns about Hofstede’s research orientation, methodological 
concerns have also emerged. Dorfman, Howell, and Bautista (1986) examined the 
uncertainty avoidance value dimension and found significant inconsistency. 
Cumulatively, they build a strong case that the questions Hofstede selected for this 
portion of the survey reflect the researcher’s own perceptions of measuring the 
concept- rather than being based on questions that establish valid responses. A single 
(presumably unique) item was also shown to have been used on different scales 
creating further validity questions.  Additional evidence of the “stacked deck” 
criticisms of Hofstede’s framework can be found in the fact that his literature reviews 
(in his initial and subsequent work on the value dimensions of cultures) tends to be 
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drawn from authors agreeing with his thesis and (in some cases) close associates 
(Clark, 2004).  Further methodological concerns are articulated by McSweeney (2003) 
who points out that Great Britain is composed of at least three nations (England, 
Scotland and Wales), yet Hofstede treats it as a single entity with a single “national” 
culture.  Such methodological problems could very well point to substantial 
weaknesses at the foundation of Hofstede’s thesis.  
 
Validation of these concerns is shown in the work of Fernandez et al (1997). 
Duplicating Hofstede’s research in 1997 (albeit in a more limited sample size and less 
homogenous corporate population), they found significant shifts from the previous 
rankings of countries based on earlier studies of their value dimensions.  This may 
reflect the sorts of previously noted trends that cause shifts in the values of a country.  
These results may also point to the difficulties of establishing a reliable scale for a 
culture based on national borders.  Further reliability issues may be based on the fact 
that Hofstede’s research may only be duplicatable in homogenous systems based on a 
uniform corporate culture (with differing national cultures), thus greatly limiting its 
explanatory power in an increasing diverse and evolving word.  If Fernandez et al’s 
research suggests any or all of these factors, treating national origin/habitation as a 
reliable indicator of an individual’s values would prove folly.  Hofstede himself has 
said that a litany of misapplication has plagued the perceived reliability of his theory 
(Bing, 2004).  Specifically, Hofstede has stated that the most common misapplication 
of his theory is that individual cultural preferences can be inferred from the score of 
that individual’s country.  Referred to as the “ecological fallacy,” this occurs when 
data collected at a countrywide level is used to predict individual behavior (Clark, 
2004).  If a normal curve is assumed, individuals will fall into a range of areas outlying 
their country’s score.  The goal of Hofstede’s research was never intended to account 
for the behavior and values of individuals, but, rather, to offer global insight into the 
behavior and values of a national group (Bing, 2004).  Similarly, the so-called “reverse 
ecological fallacy” occurs when the behavior of an individual is used to explain the 
values and actions of a nation (in terms of Hofstede’s data).  This occurs less 
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frequently than the former, though it represents, again, a strong misuse of Hofstede’s 
thesis (Clark, 2004).  Stated in a polemic fashion by Slater (1970): 
 
An individual, like a group, is a motley collection of ambivalent feelings, contradictory needs and values, 
and antithetical ideas. He is not, and cannot be, a monolithic totality, and the modern effort to bring this 
myth to life is[…] delusional and ridiculous (p. 27). 
 
Having established several key methodological concerns about Hofstede’s work, it is 
important to carefully consider the response to these charges from Hofstede and 
advocates for the validity of his research.  On the issue of the reliability of Hofstede’s 
value dimensions over time, Smith (1996) presents a range of studies to show that the 
fundamental country scores remain principally valid.  In duplicating Hofstede’s 
research, Chiang (2005) used data collected from four countries, representing over  
120 companies with over 1,000 respondents from diverse backgrounds, using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  Despite these potential “improvements” on 
Hofstede’s research methodology, Chiang found that Hofstede’s framework still 
provides a cogent explanation for variations in national culture.  In attempting to 
overcome potential limitations in the framework, the research found that the 
proposition of that culture influences values in predictable and measurable ways holds 
true.  
 
Other researchers have suggested that there are cultural values that merit study that 
were overlooked by Hofstede.  For example, Hunt (1981) suggests there should be a 
value dimension related to “shame and guilt.”  Dorfman and Howell (1988) contend 
that paternalism should be part of an expanded Hofstede methodology.  Others have 
suggested entirely new typologies of cultural values (Hampden-Turner  and  
Trompenaars,  1993).  While these works have (to varying degrees) criticized 
Hofstede’s framework, they implicitly validate his methodology (Adler, 1997).  
Hofstede (2006) himself notes that proposed revisions to his work have tended to 
validate the fundamental principles of his framework.  GLOBE (Global Leadership 
and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) attempted to create a more comprehensive 
and exhaustive exploration of culture and its implications.  Seen by many in the field 
  
 28
as a rebuttal to Hofstede’s work, he viewed it as a rejoinder noting “GLOBE not only 
adopted the dimensions paradigm, they also started from my choice of five” (p. 883). 
Such research begs for modification of the value dimensions, but validates the 
principle concept of value dimensions being a foundational element of culture. 
 
Certain critics of Hofstede have made quasi-Marxist arguments that imply 
wealth/power distribution provides a better framework for understanding the attitudes 
and values of a culture (House et al, 2004).  Hofstede counters this by stating that 
identifying the causation of cultural values is beyond the scope of his work.  Hofstede 
(2006) writes: 
 
 
I have argued that differences in values that can be accounted for by economic factors do not need to be 
explained by cultural factors. Therefore, in all my validations of the culture dimensions against external 
data, wealth has been controlled for, often by analyzing separately data from poor and from wealthy 
countries. From the original four IBM dimensions, Individualism and Power Distance were both strongly 
correlated with national wealth, and therefore (negatively) with each other, but after controlling for wealth 
their intercorrelation all but disappeared. Uncertainty Avoidance was weakly correlated with wealth; only 
Masculinity was entirely unrelated to wealth and therefore purely cultural (p. 888). 
 
As an anecdote, Hofstede routinely used to begin the courses he taught by writing the 
provocative statement on the blackboard that “CULTURE DOES NOT EXIST.”  
Upon clarification, he explained to the class that culture (like values, ethics, morals, 
etc.) are constructs.  Once they no longer have utility in explaining or predicting 
behavior, they need to be discarded. Culture, according to Hofstede, should never be 
the summative explanation of an event.  Culture can play a role both in cause and 
effect.  While important for study, culture should never be construed as a “divining 
rod” capable of showing the truths of a society and the actions of an individual 
(Hofstede, 2006).  Russia may have re-discovered religious tradition because of the 
economic uncertainty caused in a post-Communist society.  Russia may also have had 
a strong, but dormant religious tradition that remained hidden during the pre-Glasnost 
era of Communism.  Hofstede’s work doesn’t attempt to enter into the chicken/egg 
aspect of this debate.  It only seeks to answer the is portion of the cultural question 
(Hofstede, 2006). 
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Peterson (2003) summarizes the criticism against Hofstede and offers a succinct reply- 
instead of claiming that Hofstede’s dimensions are in any way sufficient to explain 
individuals or cultures, future researchers need to view them as an initial orientation to 
divergent cultural values.  Other forms of research (ethnography, open-ended surveys, 
etc.) need to be used as a balance against making unsupported assumptions.  
Developing future cultural research can employ Hofstede’s work as a framework, but 
an open exploration of the beliefs and values of individuals must also be a part of any 
exploration.  
 
In sum, Hofstede’s value dimensions represent a significant part of the foundation of 
modern cultural research.  These dimensions offer a clear perspective on the 
epistemology of various cultural groups.  However, significant concerns about his 
methodology, assertions, and the generalizability of his research give pause to anyone 
looking to use Hofstede’s work as the exclusive method for understanding the 
orientation of individuals.  This is especially true when looking at a population where 
people have been selected and self-selected to work for the interests of another 
(perhaps radically different) culture.  To simply state that a Foreign Service National 
comes from X country and will likely have Y values is such a gross oversimplification 
that the results of any such study would be utterly baseless.  To ignore the role of value 
dimensions in people working for an organization like the U.S. State Department 
would also overlook important aspects of culture that may play a role in productivity, 
job engagement, organizational identification, and commitment.  Thus, there is a need 
for a middle ground that incorporates the most relevant aspects of Hofstede’s work, 
while acknowledging the reality that individuals are unique from their culture. 
 
FSN’s working for the State Department have made a conscious choice to work in an 
environment that will assuredly be distinct from their own cultural experience.  In 
countries hostile to the U.S. (for varying reasons), this decision may even point to a 
job applicant being an outlier from the local culture.  As U.S. diplomatic posts are, in 
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principle, American workplaces, the impact of organizational culture (as noted 
previously) will be profound.  It is simply not possible to work for a U.S. government 
institution abroad and expect it to function in a way consistent with the national 
culture.  Even the issue of language cannot be overlooked as English is both the 
operational and relational method of communication on the job.  Over time, it can be 
expected that all of this will influence the work values and behaviors of FSN 
employees.  It is also likely that many FSN’s have been educated in the English 
language and may have even studied at American institutions.  Such individuals would 
likely be more attractive candidates for positions at diplomatic posts, as they would 
more easily integrate into the linguistic and cultural environment.  The State 
Department also has a policy of providing employee training, which is exclusively 
presented in English and often from American contractors.  The Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) in Washington provides training programs for FSN’s as well as 
American officers.  It is beyond the scope of this research to suggest the extent to 
which any or all of these areas will affect the value dimensions of individuals.  
Fortunately, the scales used by Hofstede to study national culture have been 
operationalized to the individual level.   
 
Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) work utilizes Hofstede’s value dimensions for a scale 
that would be applicable at the individual level.  Utilizing Hofstede’s four value 
dimensions, Dorfman and Howell created a 22 question survey to measure an 
individual’s value orientation. The scale was empirically tested at international firms 
from countries with divergent scores in terms of value dimensions. After performing a 
confirmatory factor analysis, correlation analyses, ANOVA procedures, and tests for 
moderation, the scale was found to be valid and reliable (Hoffman and Robertson, 
2000).  That is to say, individuals tended to score in line with the value dimensions for 
their country based on Hofstede’s (1980) initial studies.   Further research validates 
this as Smith et al., (1996) showed that individual reports about their personal power 
distance preferences tended to strongly correlate with the self-identified nationality of 
the individual. In reference to Dorfman and Howell’s instrument’s ability to measure 
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individual value dimensions without pigeon-holing people into fixed cultural groups, 
“the most notable trend was that while scores on Dorfman and Howell's scale were 
consistent with Hofstede's dimension scores, there was extensive variation within each 
national group” (Hoffman and Robertson, 2000, p. 36).  The implication of this work 
is that the scale can be used to measure an individual’s value dimensions.  The strong 
correlation with national culture shows the influence of culture on individual 
epistemology, but the survey allows individuals to demonstrate their personal variation 
from their culture.  In a population such as Foreign Service Nationals, this distinction 
is ideal.  It allows for culture to be studied at the individual level.  It also allows for 
variations stemming from exposure to U.S. culture and individual values to be 
accounted for in the research.  Used in conjunction with specifically chosen, open-
ended questions, this method allows for exploring the differences in the FSN 
population without assuming that national origin or residence are the exclusive cause 
of those differences. 
 
2.3 Power Distance 
 
Given the stratified structure of the U.S. State Department in terms of FSN roles, the 
most compelling value dimension for study is that of Power Distance.  As this research 
posits the idea that a cultural acceptance of stark hierarchy will lead to greater 
acceptance of State Department structure, understanding this value dimension is an 
ideal starting point for this research. 
 
Power distance refers to the extent to which there is unequal power distribution in a 
society. This is organizational, social, and societal. High power distance societies see 
this unequal distribution of power as natural and acceptable.  The unequal distribution 
of power, according to many in such societies, creates a defined and predictable 
hierarchy.  High power distance implies a sharp distinction between superiors whose 
role is to 'think' and subordinates whose role is to 'do' (Miles, 1975).  From this there is 
order and accountability at each stratum that ensures protection of the whole (De Jong, 
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et al. 2006).  Low power distance societies work to reduce inequality and see the 
uneven distribution of power as indicative of injustice. Despite this cultural preference, 
hierarchy persists in low power distance cultures, however those in power attempt to 
conceal or redistribute their status i.e. “without all the team’s hard work, I could have 
never won this award” (Hofstede, 2001).  This is part of a general discomfort found in 
low power distance cultures with status and power (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, et al. 
1995; Triandis, 1995).  Beyond status differences, a generalized sense of “otherness” 
between power levels has been found in high power distance cultures.  Differences 
between superiors and subordinates are viewed as distinct.  That is to say, those with 
power view those without power as being “not like us” (Friedman, 2007).  In low 
power distance cultures, there is a view that people are essentially the same (at least in 
terms of rights and responsibilities) at all levels of an organization.  This notion of 
shared responsibility in low power distance cultures creates an interesting relationship.  
It is possible in high power distance cultures that people will ostensibly support the 
leadership role of those with power, but have little investment in the policies 
advocated by the powerful  (outside of respecting their status).  Thus, it would be a 
mistake to construe the acceptance of hierarchy as an engagement in policies emerging 
from that hierarchy (Peterson, 2003).  The old joke from workers in the Soviet Union 
was that “we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.”  The result should not be 
seen as subterfuge from the underlings with low power distance societies and efficient 
implementation of ‘the plan’ in high power distance societies.  Alvez et al. (2006) 
found that in high power distance cultures, ‘the leader’ makes most overt decisions but 
‘the followers’ routinely make covert decisions on their own.  The orientation suggests 
a far more complex relationship in the very conception of power across cultures.  
 
Equally important is the conception of the meaning of power across different cultures.  
In many high power distance countries, power is viewed through a familial metaphor.  
A leader or supervisor is expected to give guidance, protection, nurturance, and care to 
the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, loyalty, deference, and 
appreciation (Aycan et al., 2000). Far from the more brutal connotations associated 
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with “autocratic” power that many low power distance countries would ascribe to such 
a relationship, high power distance countries tend to view power as a protective (rather 
than coercive) force (Sagie and Aycan, 2003). In a “father/child” view of 
organizational power, it is expected that the “father” knows what’s best for his 
“family” and trust in “his” decisions is at the heart of the organizational structure.  The 
exploitive character many Western societies ascribe to the “power hungry” tends to be 
absent in this view of power.  If it is to be accepted, this familial view of power also 
explains Peterson’s (2003) concept of rebellion and subterfuge in high power distance 
structures- the most brutal fights in families are often those that occur when a child 
believes s/he knows better than the parent.  Also telling in this metaphor is the 
affection many high power distance countries have shown to “autocratic” leaders who 
loudly profess to only being interested in taking care of “their people.”  In contrast, a 
Swedish (low power distance culture) proverb holds “be but do not be seen!” 
(Huberman and Loch, 2004). 
 
From a leadership perspective, Hofstede (1984; 2001) identified connections between 
power distance and the process of an organization making a decision.  Not 
surprisingly, low power distance decision-making tended to be more democratic and 
participatory with leaders serving as facilitators for a group buy-in.  High power 
distance cultures expected unilateral (perhaps paternalistic) decisions to come from 
superiors.  Delegation is shown to be avoided high power distance cultures (Sagie & 
Koslowsky, 2000).  Hackman and Johnson (1996) identified that autocratic leadership 
is more common in high power distance cultures.  Wu and Stewart (2005) create a 
clear delineation based on decision making between low and high power distance 
cultures.  Decisions coming from high power distance cultures are defined as 
“directive decisions” whereas decisions coming from low power distance cultures are 
defined as “participative decisions.”  Their survey analysis comparing university 
employees in Taiwan vs. the United States showed that power distance and democratic 
leadership style were significantly correlated with each other.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, tasks coming from places of authority in the Department of State are 
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typically referred to as “directives.”  Sagie and Aycan (2003) sum up the decision-
making differences between low and high power distance cultures by stating: 
 
By contrast, in low power distant cultures, everyone is perceived to have the potential to contribute to the 
decision-making process; in fact, interdependence between the superior and the subordinate(s) is valued. 
Second, in high power distant cultures, decision-making is perceived as a privilege of management, and 
participation is considered as an infringement to management prerogatives. In contrast, in low power 
distant cultures, everyone is assumed to have equal rights. As such, employees consider it their right to 
participate in decisions that concern them. Finally, in high power distant cultures, the 'inequality' belief 
creates not only dependency of subordinates in their superiors, but also fear of punishment if employees 
question, challenge, or disagree with their management's decisions. This fear is much smaller in the low 
power distant cultures; in fact, participation here is frequently encouraged and may even be rewarded (p. 
453).    
 
In a culture with high power distance, employment is often based on strict status 
relationships (Hoon Nam and Wie Han, 2005). Supervisors tell employees both what 
and how a task should be accomplished. The role of the employee is to act on the 
initiatives put forth by management, not to question them.  If this is consistent with 
cultural values, this arrangement serves both the superior and the subordinate in the 
hierarchy.  Leaders validate their position by being the (almost wholly) responsible 
and accountable agent of action.  Employees don’t face questions of accountability for 
organizational decisions.  The outcome of this model is that supervisors have tight 
control over employees, while employees are free from burdens of responsibility.  
However, when there is a multi-cultural organization where co-workers have different 
perceptions of the appropriate power distance, there will be unique challenges.  In an 
organization with both low power distance cultures and high power distance cultures 
present, Gouttefarde (1996) interviewed a number of employees about their 
perceptions.  An individual in the low power distance camp comments about his high 
power distance organization by stating "the decision-making process is so 
hierarchical[…] Here everything is so boxed I can just do a few things[. . .] carry out 
my defined responsibility and then pass the project on. No one is individually 
responsible. Your project could die in the next person's hands” (p. 62).   Another low 
power distance employee “enthusiastically described the efforts of his home office's 
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CEO (who has a low power distance view of hierarchy), such as lunching with people 
much lower on the corporate totem pole, in order to communicate better with his 
staff… in contrast, (his new high power distance manager) had lost visibility since 
becoming a member of the upper echelons” (p. 62).  Huberman and Loch (2004) found 
the value of status in a culture to be strongly correlated to power distance.  Thus, not 
surprisingly, high power distance has been correlated to a reduction in openness (De 
Jong, et al. 2006).  The basis for this issue of “openness” can be seen in the work of 
Hartzing (1999) who found that people in low power distance cultures tended to be 
more comfortable providing information to people in an organization regardless of 
status or rank.  High power distance cultures tended to place rank as a determinant for 
whom should receive information in an organization.  
 
Kirkman et al. (2001) identified examples of this phenomenon during investigations of 
several organizations operating in high power distance countries.  In each country 
surveyed, new positions were created that called for creative, self-governing employee 
teams without a “leader” as defined by custom and tradition.  Employees in these 
organizations “recalled feeling baffled when it was first explained to them that they 
would be making decisions more autonomously in a new work system” (p. 19).  Even 
after the teams were created and implemented, team members expressed discomfort 
with self-governance items such as giving performance feedback to peers and 
assessing work processes.  Not surprisingly, a greater comfort was expressed towards 
an organizational structure in which a defined leader oversees such items.  Kirkman et 
al. (2001) go on to suggest a relationship between power distance and a culture’s 
acceptance of determinism.  In high power distance cultures, a belief persists that a 
larger authority, entity, or force controls both human and organizational outcomes.  An 
example of this can be found in the (largely high power distance) worldview of many 
Muslim countries.  Instead of making a statement about what will happen, the caveat 
of “Inshallah” (God-willing) is given.  This suggests a belief that human action is not 
intrinsically autonomous and that outside (and more powerful) forces will ultimately 
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bear on any plan.  Thus, autonomous, egalitarian organizational structures are not only 
at odds with tradition; they may be viewed as an affront to it.    
 
An example of the challenge of disparate cultural values in terms of power distance is 
explored in Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) analysis of an international corporate 
merger over cultural lines.  Specifically, their work explored a merger between a 
Canadian and Korean firm.  One of the sharpest distinctions between the two 
companies was the orientation to power distance.  Their research extensively analyzed 
the challenges faced by Canadian expatriate managers (characterized by their emphasis 
on low power distance) and their Korean employees (characterized by expecting high 
power distance from supervisors).  The new organizational vision was to transition 
from “control and command” to “lead and support,” transparently showing the move 
of the organization to the Canadian low power distance structure.  The results, not 
surprisingly, were mixed.  One Canadian manager stated "the Korean employees could 
not 'get out of their boxes,' because they were so used to being told how to do things 
from their managers" (p. 42).  Many senior level employees in Korea could not adapt 
to a new organizational orientation that held “leadership” as a reciprocal process 
between people rather than a hierarchical structure of power and responsibility.  
Younger employees expressed some enthusiasm for the opportunity afforded by a less 
hierarchical structure, but there was still a lack of trust in the new concept of reducing 
power distance.  This lack of trust is based on what Kirkman et al. (2001) described as 
the fear of self-management found in many high power distance cultures.  They 
elaborate that people from high power distance cultures tend to behave submissively in 
the presence of managers, avoid disagreements, and believe that bypassing their bosses 
is insubordination.  Not surprisingly, the discomfort created by a change in power 
distance can be profound. Ultimately, positive outcomes in organizational 
communication followed the merger, however the growing pains created by changing 
the value of hierarchy in an organization show the importance of the concept of power 
distance in workplace culture.     
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Similar research was conducted to identify the extent to which employees accepted or 
rejected leadership based on an alternative perception of power (i.e. low/high power 
distance relationships).  Robert and Prost (2000) studied cultures with different 
dimensions of power distance and the effect supervisors with competing views of 
hierarchy had on organizational effectiveness, job commitment, and communication.  
Their results showed that Mexican workers (lower power distance) may tolerate strong 
hierarchy but would prefer a less autocratic system (consistent with Page and 
Wiseman, 1993).  Poland (a high power distance country in Hofstede’s initial research) 
was found to now reject high power distance leadership.  Nasierowski and Mikula 
(1998) contend that Poles may now see hierarchy with suspicion due to its possible 
connection to the failed Soviet regime.  This research cumulatively suggests the 
challenge an organization faces when its perception of power distance is out of step 
with the culture in which it operates.  It also suggests the ancillary challenges of 
adapting to rapidly changing and evolving cultures.  Summing up the dangers 
associated with inverted value dimensions between organizational and national culture, 
Robert and Prost (2000) argue, “(our) results go beyond providing support for the 
contention that some practices may be ineffectual in some cultures. Indeed, our results 
suggest that some practices may in fact be harmful (in relation to power distance)” (p. 
655). 
 
Shipper et al. (2003) go on to argue that the basis of many of these outcomes is the fact 
that an entirely different skill set is needed for management in low vs. high power 
distance cultures.  Based on survey research from firms operating in cultures with 
varying levels of power distance, they contend “self-awareness of interactive skills” 
that foster discussion, group ownership of policy, and steady feedback/dialogue are 
crucial to managing in countries with a low power distance.  In high power distance 
cultures, “self-awareness of controlling skills” is the foundation of success.   That is to 
say, managers should be more adept at giving directives and keeping employees in line 
with organizational policy.  As job satisfaction on the part of employees is part of the 
foundation for effective management, Lam et al. (2002) examine the importance of 
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“organizational justice” as viewed by employees.  They found the perception of “just” 
organizational policies and management to be crucial in creating a climate where 
employees are committed to their tasks.  Procedural justice (a belief in fixed and fair 
policies that should be adhered to) was valued by many high power distance cultures, 
while distributive justice (a belief in fair outcomes based on action) was found to be 
emphasized in many lower power distance cultures.  
 
Contributing to the challenges of management across cultures is the fact that power 
distance levels tend to also relate to employee preferences regarding reward structures 
(Chiang, 2005).  Hierarchy in culture and in organizations indicates a willingness to 
accept reward differentials/inequalities derived from ‘predetermined’ non-performance 
criteria, such as status, positions, age and seniority, more so than individual effort and 
contribution (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). As authority and loyalty are valued higher 
than performance in high power distance cultures, it follows that employees will 
accept reward inequality based on status over performance (Chiang, 2005).  A reward 
system based on performance that aims to narrow the reward gap/opportunity gap 
between superiors and subordinates will be treated with suspicion in high power 
distance cultures. Chiang (2005) went on to suggest that since in high power distance 
countries, rewards are linked more to employee position and seniority than 
contribution and performance, “individuals in high power distance countries should 
elicit a stronger preference for group- and non-performance based rewards than those 
in low power distance countries” (p. 1550).  The distribution of rewards (financial, 
status, etc.) is an important component of most jobs.  An institution where the mobility 
of one group (e.g. FSN’s) is checked tightly by the group’s status is likely to be linked 
to the local culture’s acceptance of reward inequality based on power distance.  In 
sum, a person from a culture where advancement is not a core value will be more 
satisfied in a strictly stratified institution.            
  
Identifying the U.S. State Department as a high power distance institution would seem 
to be at odds with the fact that American culture was shown to score low on 
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Hofstede’s measure of power distance (Hofstede, 1980).  American supervisors tend to 
reduce the perception that they have authority and hide any of the privileges that 
power may entitle (Gouttefarde, 1996).  From U.S. Presidents trying to play up their 
working class roots to politicians showing their families are just “normal folks” to 
celebrities helping with volunteers at homeless shelters during Christmas, there is a 
near universal emphasis on creating a non-hierarchical appearance as part of American 
culture.  In the State Department, this is exemplified in Colin Powell’s initiative “One 
Team-One Mission” in 2004.  This initiative de-emphasized traditional State 
Department hierarchies and focused on increasing training and development at all 
levels (Pearson, 2004).  Despite the clear structural hierarchy that precludes FSN’s 
from many positions of organizational leadership, the initiative focused on the 
opportunities and contributions made from people at all levels of the State Department.  
This dichotomy of presenting an egalitarian structure while maintaining hierarchy is a 
systemic part of many American institutions, despite the simplistic notion that 
America is a “low power distance country.”  The need for a more complete exploration 
of American power conception is shown in Westwood and Everett  (1987) who argue 
that power distance can be an unreliable indicator of status structure. Gouttefarde 
(1996), for example, identified differences in leadership styles between American and 
French managers in a multinational organization.  While the French (high power 
distance culture) displayed their status overtly in terms office décor and setup, the 
Americans tended to have more modest and open offices.  However, Gouttefarde 
found the Americans to engage in displays and performances suggesting status 
attained.  American organizations, with their litany of Vice Presidents and Senior 
Executives, celebrate individual success less in terms of “position held” and more in 
terms of “position earned.”  Huberman and Loch (2004) describe this view of power as 
being the pursuit of a symbolic validation rather than the pursuit of resources.    
 
A cultural metaphor for this can historically be found in the work of Horatio Alger.  
Writing in late 19th century, his novels emphasized the idea that a person from a low 
status level can attain anything with hard work, dedication, and ingenuity.  The phrase 
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“Horatio Alger story” is an understood element of the American cultural lexicon.  A 
sample of the titles of his works suggest this clear message: 
 
• Abraham Lincoln: the Backwoods Boy; or, How A Young Rail-Splitter Became President (1883) 
• Adrift in the City; or, Oliver Conrad's Plucky Fight (1902) 
• Ben's Nugget; or, A Boy's Search for Fortune (1882) 
• A Debt of Honor. The Story of Gerald Lane's Success in the Far West (1900) 
• Frank's Campaign; or, What Boys can do on the Farm for the Camp (1864) 
• Mark Mason's Victory; or, The Trials and Triumphs of a Telegraph Boy (1899) 
 
While intended as popular works for a young audience, the enduring legacy of these 
books has become part of the American identity (Ziewacz, 2001).  Successful 
American films such as “Good Will Hunting,” “Pretty Woman,” “Rocky,” “Star 
Wars,” and “The Pursuit of Happyness” (though the list could go on ad nauseum) all 
suggest that those in destitute circumstances can ascend hierarchies through 
dedication, application, and talent.  Thus, the American in a position of power (SIC) 
doesn’t get respect because s/he is in that position.  Rather, s/he demands respect 
because of the fact that the position was earned.  The reality of advancement 
opportunities provides stark argument against this cultural mythos, however the 
perception remains.  And the concept of hierarchy remains legitimated.  As such, while 
America scores low on power distance and presents power gaps as surmountable, the 
want for status and power remains fully present and powerful in American culture.  
Although there is an overt emphasis on teamwork put forward by the State 
Department, a core job motivation of American Foreign Service Officers has been to 
improve career status by obtaining an important title, good assignments, frequent 
promotions, and annual bonuses (Krizay, 1988).  Understanding this duality of the 
American view of power (that it must be both completely subdued AND desperately 
earned) provides a basis for understanding a power structure such as the State 
Department’s.  While its expression may be subdued, there is a paradoxical sense of 
earned entitlement that frames the American perception of power.  For individuals not 
familiar with this duality (i.e. FSN’s with limited exposure to American culture and 
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intercultural communication perspectives), American appearance of deference while 
maintaining authority can seem, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, duplicitous.      
 
In summation, the concept of power distance initially refers to the extent a culture 
accepts stratification of power.  The concept should not be confused with the idea that 
a high power distance means the blind acceptance of mandates coming from the 
powerful.  Power distance, nevertheless, has profound implications for leadership and 
management.  Cultures with low power distance expect democratic, two-way 
communication as it relates to organizational decision-making.  Cultures with a high 
power distance accept directive communication, but expect protection and support 
from leaders.  In multi-cultural organizations, power distance can create tension if 
there are diverse conceptions of it within the organization.  The U.S., while considered 
a low power distance country, values and fosters power-seeking behaviour in ways 
that are not readily apparent to those from an outside culture.  The State Department, 
as a micro chasm of this tendency, re-enforces the notion of earned status and power 
with its rigorous and competitive system of promotion. Understanding the conception 
of power distance of FSN’s should, according to many of the previously documented 
sources, provide deeper insight into the satisfaction and commitment levels of foreign 
State Department employees as power distance strongly shapes the internal perception 
of an organization.  Utilizing Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) survey, specifically the 
section on power distance, can offer insights into FSN reaction to the obtuse and 
challenging power structure of the State Department specifically and the United States, 
as a whole. 
 
2.4 Organizational Commitment 
 
Like Hofstede’s work on culture, the concept of organizational commitment has 
become a touchstone for many investigations into organizational effectiveness (Griffin 
and Bateman, 1986).  The basis for this interest is due in no small part to the perceived 
outcomes of organizational commitment in terms of teamwork, performance, loyalty, 
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job satisfaction, etc.  Despite the conceptual interest organizational commitment has 
generated, definitions for the concept itself are decidedly varied (Cohen, 2003).  The 
definitions are closely linked to two key theoretical approaches to the concept: the 
calculative vs. moral/emotional approach to organizational commitment (McGee and 
Ford, 1987; Griffin and Bateman, 1986).  The calculative approach views 
organizational commitment in investment terms, that is to say what investments 
(personal, social, economic, opportunity cost, etc) would an individual lose if s/he 
were to leave an organization?  If the costs are too high to leave or if comparably 
valued investment opportunities in other organizations don’t exist, then the individual 
will remain committed to an organization.  The moral/emotional approach deals with 
the concept of organizational identification.  The distinction between these approaches 
can be blurred, as identification can be viewed as an investment.  In principle, the 
moral/emotional approach deals with psychological aspects of commitment.  Porter’s 
work (e.g., Porter et al., 1974; Mowday et al. 1982) has been foundational to this view 
of commitment and has been termed “affective and value commitment” (Cohen, 
2003).   
 
Porter’s work has been called “the most visible measure of affective commitment and 
has enjoyed widespread acceptance and use” (Griffin and Bateman, 1986, p. 170).  
Consisting of 15 items and utilized for the survey in this research, it reflects Porter’s 
three dimensions of commitment.  These include: 
 
• Want to continue membership within an organization 
• Acceptance of and belief in the values of an organization 
• Willingness to invest effort and energy into an organization 
 
Subsequent research testing and re-testing Porter’s seminal 1974 survey demonstrated 
its reliability and validity as well as the quality of the survey’s psychometric properties 
(Morrow, 1983; Blau, 1985; Commeiras and Fournier, 2001).  Further validating the 
wide-spread usage of the Porter’s work, Cohen (2003) argues that from the 1970’s 
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onward, much of the scholarship on organizational commitment has been based on 
results generated from Porter’s 1974 survey (or variations thereof).  Recently, 
scholarship has become more critical of this measure.  Most criticisms deal with the 
fact that the survey does not draw clear distinctions between the values and outcomes 
of an individual.  Specifically, “willingness to invest effort in an organization” is 
functionally useless without a measure of outcome based on performance.   
 
Meyer and Allen (1984, 2001) voice this need for a multidimensional conception of 
organizational commitment.  Working with a combination of the calculative approach 
and Porter’s work on attitude, their resulting measure(s) (also included in this study) 
examines “affective commitment” (positive feelings, identification, attachment, etc.), 
“continuance commitment” (the extent to which the cost of leaving an organization 
keeps an individual in place in an organization), and “normative commitment” (the 
feeling of obligation to an organization).  Subsequent follow-up on Meyer and Allen’s 
work has shown acceptable levels of validity in their instrument (Cohen, 2003; Ko et 
al. 1997). 
 
Of particular interest to this research project is the resulting of outcomes of the various 
forms of organizational commitment.  Commitment is distinguishable from other 
motivations based on the exchange of resources in that extrinsic motivation is 
noticeably less relevant (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001).  During periods of pay freezes 
and budget cuts, commitment could prove to be a factor in motivation that is 
independent from the fiscal realities of funding gaps.  Mowday et al., (1982) echo this 
by demonstrating that the core basis for productivity in an organization is the quality 
of commitment in that organization.  Validating this is the work of Sommers (1995) 
who examined commitment as it relates job withdrawal intentions, turnover and 
absenteeism. In his work, commitment emerged as the most consistent predictor of 
these outcome variables thus further validating the importance of commitment as a 
factor in measuring organizational effectiveness.  Beyond performance, the quality of 
commitment in an organization also has implications for the well-being of employees 
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(Cohen, 2003).  Particularly relevant for the State Department is the fact that 
organizational commitment has been linked to the adaptability of an organization in 
times of flux and change (Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001).   Given the inherent culture of 
change in State Department (officer rotation, new ambassadors, new administrations, 
changing political realities, etc.), the link between worker identification with an 
institution and resiliency during periods of turbulence has far-reaching consequences.  
Commitment has also been linked to cooperation between employees and acceptance 
of organizational rules/priorities (Morrow, 1993).  In an organization where policies 
ranging from security protocols to bargaining positions in negotiations require both 
adherence and discretion, this outcome (as it relates to commitment) is crucial for 
organizational success, longevity, and perhaps even safety.  
 
While the important outcomes of commitment are obvious, there are increasingly 
voices of dissent that suggest that the practicality and relevance of organizational 
commitment are waning.  In a fluid international economy, people are increasingly 
looking at jobs as temporary endeavours that lead to subsequent employment 
elsewhere (Cohen, 2003).  The concept of the “employee as self-employed” has 
emerged suggesting that people view work as primarily self-directed with long-term 
commitment to a single institution as being out of favour in a an increasingly flexible 
economy.  Despite concerns about the applicability of commitment as a relevant 
measure for effective employment, there are key distinctions between FSN’s (and all 
State Department employees) that indicate relevant differences from the private sector 
move towards employee free agency.  Initially, many cultures represented in the State 
Department still put a premium on long-term employment at a single institution (Hoon 
Nam and Wie Han, 2005).  The State Department’s hiring and contractual practices 
also seek candidates who intend to work for an extended period (U.S. Department of 
State: Careers Representing America, 2007).  At a macro-level, concerns about brand 
image and product quality also make committed employees crucial for overall 
competitiveness.  In the case of the State Department, the U.S.’s emphasis on public 
diplomacy to improve its standing in the world (Public Diplomacy Alumni 
  
 45
Association: What is Public Diplomacy, 2008), the need for engaged, enthusiastic, and 
committed staff is vital for realization of departmental goals.  When considered in the 
context of declining budgets and (thus) fewer personnel acting in strictly supervisory 
positions, the need for engaged, self-directed employees grows even stronger (Cohen, 
2003).  This will likely become even more pronounced as the available labor market 
declines in the coming decades.  In sum, for any organization (especially one that 
requires engagement as much as the State Department) understanding and improving 
commitment levels on the part of employees remains a pivotal priority.    
 
2.5 State Department: Overview and Goals 
 
To better understand the importance of an engaged FSN workforce within the State 
Department, it is crucial to examine a brief structural overview of the organization, its 
priorities, current challenges, its culture, and how it is perceived.  As part of the 
Executive Branch, the State Department provides the President with the primary input 
for the conduct of foreign affairs (at least theoretically).  In practice, the State 
Department is tasked with implementation of Presidential foreign policy goals.  A 
good deal of State Department infrastructure, however, is committed to logistical and 
bureaucratic endeavors such as serving the needs of Americans abroad in a given 
country, dealing with visa and permit requests from residents of a country, providing 
basic consular services, and organizing visits from American officials to a country or 
region.  As the instant availability of international information has become both more 
pervasive and accessible, many agencies can now work internationally without the 
State Department acting as an intermediary in the process.  The Executive Branch 
itself has increasingly begun to conduct its agenda with State largely absent from (and 
in some cases, in opposition to) the President’s agenda (Gingrich, 2003).  Criticism of 
the State Department by the Executive Branch is hardly a new phenomenon (Rubin, 
1985).  John F. Kennedy remarked “If the State Department drives you crazy you 
might calm yourself by contemplating its effect on me. The other night I woke with a 
blissful feeling and discovered I had been dreaming that the whole Goddam place 
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(Foggy Bottom) had burned down. I dozed off again hoping for a headline saying no 
survivors” (Krizay, 1988; retrieved October 26, 2009 from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/governmentreform/bg673.cfm).  The tension has 
increased in recent years with the rise of the National Security Council and the 
increasing power of teams of foreign policy advisors who work directly with the 
President.  Rubin (1985) suggests that Kissinger spawned a revolution in Presidential 
foreign policy with the conceptual creation of  “the President as self-directed (rather 
than State Department directed) foreign policy agent.”  Subsequent administrations 
have continued this legacy with State increasingly providing a service function rather 
than a policy-making function.  This decline continues leaving a demoralized and 
unenthusiastic class of diplomats who no longer feel that the State Department is 
relevant to American foreign policy (Cornwell, 2001).   
 
This decline of State Department influence comes at time when State could serve an 
important function in fostering improved attitudes about the United States through 
improved public diplomacy.  Lord (2006) contends that the greatest threat to security 
and stability in many regions of the world is the attitude of many populations towards 
the United States.  Public diplomacy with a focus on improving the American image 
through communication, aid, media, events, and economic engagement with a regional 
population is as important a military intervention and alliances (Mead, 2007).  Creative 
activities designed to build meaningful direct linkages between the U.S. and 
international populations should be a driving engine for American foreign policy 
(Lord, 2006).  Many have argued that the importance of this engagement cannot be 
overstated- in an age where war is increasingly asymmetrical and attacks emanate 
from non-state actors, the attitudes of the people in the international community carry 
more weight now than they ever have before (Telhami, 2004).  Telhami goes on to 
argue that focusing primarily on military and economic responses could further 
entrench attitudes of anti-Americanism and create a situation (unlike during the Cold 
War) where demonstration of force compromises (rather than enhances) a position of 
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safety.  Thus, the need to reflect on the importance of building bridges internationally 
(and what assets the State Department can use in that promotion) becomes paramount. 
 
While many elements of the State Department’s mission will inherently fall under the 
control of U.S. Officers, elected officials, and policymakers in Washington (i.e. 
defense strategies, political and economic stances on changing international situations, 
etc.), public diplomacy and engaging with the local population is one area in which the 
expertise and experience of FSN’s will be paramount to success.  Thus, the item of 
public diplomacy begs a deeper analysis in terms of its definition, goals, and 
significance.   
 
2.6 Public Diplomacy and Local Engagement 
 
Foreign policy was previously the space of Diplomats engaging in Important Activities 
Behind Closed Doors.  Batora (2005) argues that citizen activists, NGOs, domestic 
ministries, private enterprises, academics and other actors participate directly in 
foreign policy and frame public debates about foreign policy issues.  This engagement 
of local communities in international affairs creates a dialogue that exists in value-
based terms (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2002; Nye, 2004; Leonard, et al., 2002).  Batora goes on 
to suggest a change in thinking from the traditional concept of state actors and state 
power towards a postmodern orientation of images and influence. “Power,” he states, 
“no longer stems solely from persuasion or coercion, but increasingly from 
information sharing and attraction, which are essential for the development of soft 
power” (p. 1). Promotion of this soft power, where feelings about a country shape the 
political values of a population and, in turn, the policies of a state, is the focus of 
public diplomacy.  Traditionally, there has always been a public component of 
diplomacy.  In the Middle Ages, public ceremonies that involved an ambassador 
served as the most direct line of communication between a state and populations 
abroad (Jones, 1984).  Though not termed “public diplomacy,” Langhorne (2008) 
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notes that elements of the concept have been at play in international relations for 
centuries.  He notes the extraordinarily sharp press wars between Britain and 
Imperial Germany before the First World War and between the German and Russian 
Empires about tariffs.  Additionally, during the Reformation period, competing 
versions of Christianity and the rulers representing them certainly employed what we 
would now call public diplomacy. Campaigns in the nineteenth century in support the 
Geneva Conventions and post-war support for the League of Nations also show that 
the concept, while conceived differently, has existed for some time (Langhorne, 2008). 
In the modern sense, the soft power that serves as the basis for public diplomacy is 
“activities of multiple actors and organizations with impacts on foreign publics – 
artists, art galleries and music channels; civic activists and NGOs; politicians, political 
parties and political philosophers; writers and literary associations; journalists and 
media groups; business people, enterprises and products; academics and universities; 
religious leaders and religious groups, etc.” (Batora, 2005, p. 2).  Based on this broad 
list, one could suggest that any activity that a population engages in where an 
international audience is present is a form of public diplomacy.  In this way of 
thinking, Germans lollygagging on the beaches of Mallorca or Japanese tourists 
photographing everything that moves in New York would serve the representative 
function of the term.  However this view would be both dismissive and inaccurate.  
Utilizing Batora’s definition, public diplomacy comprises all activities by state and 
non-state actors that contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s soft 
power.  Thus, Germans drinking on the beach on Mallorca are not part of this 
definition.  A German DJ performing as part of an arts exchange for a mixed cultural 
audience on Mallorca (if such a thing exists) does. 
 
One of the key challenges of public diplomacy is the competition for the attention of 
international audiences.  Described as the challenge of “occupying the mind space” 
(Smith & Sutherland, 2002) of a constituency, religious institutions, political 
ideologies, and media messages can create barriers and/or competition for 
engagement.  A key component for success in the face of such challenge is access to 
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elements of a home culture that is/would be attractive to external populations.  For the 
full fruition of public diplomacy, network relationships between international 
populations and foreign ministries must develop that are driven by attraction.  This 
necessarily requires an understanding and developed relationship with those external 
populations to more fully understand what elements of a culture might be attractive to 
such a group.  In Germany, for example, the State Department recently hosted a 
festival and lecture series related to hip-hop music (retrieved August 12, 2009 from 
http://germany.usembassy.gov/hiphop.html).  Hip-hop (at least perceptually) is an 
American musical form that has been adopted by many populations throughout the 
world.  One such population is Turkish youth, a country (perhaps not coincidentally) 
with increasing friction towards the U.S. and a large youth population in Germany.  In 
a model of effective public diplomacy, such events will (at some level) open the minds 
of participants towards a more positive view of the country hosting the event.  Perhaps 
some participants might visit or study in the U.S.  They could serve as “citizen 
diplomats” generating increased goodwill for the U.S. in their communities.  Voting 
behavior and political decisions could be influenced.  With sustained and wide-spread 
activities such as these, an increased level of political and economic opportunities 
between the countries involved could emerge.  Diplomacy is often defined as the art of 
achieving state objectives by other means than force.  Public diplomacy should not be 
viewed as antithetical or separate from this definition, but rather as a conception of 
power based on attraction and engagement.  While Diplomacy is typically (though not 
always) thought of in terms of state leaders negotiating specific policy through official 
(but sometimes confidential) channels, Public Diplomacy typically has less specific 
policy goals and tends to focus on promoting attractive aspects of a culture to 
populations.  Diplomats can ultimately leverage the goodwill created by public 
diplomacy; these are not separate entities.  As marketers attempt to work with both 
suppliers and consumers, diplomacy can work through official channels with more 
public presentations of attractive cultural elements creating a climate that influences 
the decisions of leaders.  
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It is this emphasis on attraction that has proved troubling to some analysts.  Langhorne 
(2008) notes that the seductive and apparently mind-altering nature of public 
diplomacy may “for some, sit far too near the less acceptable idea of propaganda; for 
others it is merely a newish form of cultural diplomacy, formerly the preserve of 
distinct organizations such as the Alliance Française or the British Council” (p. 58).  
Undoubtedly, questions such as method, intent, and integrity need to be applied in 
considering the ethicality of public diplomacy and Cull (2008) recounts the constant 
struggle the U.S. Information Agency faced with politicians regularly pushing 
propagandized views over honest engagement.  Beyond questions of ethics, public 
diplomacy presents a powerful challenge to many traditional conceptions of foreign 
relations.  This challenge, of shifting from governing elites to general populations, has 
been shown to have unsettling effects on more traditionally minded foreign ministries 
and diplomatic corps that may be both unskilled and unmotivated to articulate a 
country’s message or narrative to foreign populations (Langhorne, 2008).  Melissen 
(2007) argues: 
 
Traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy run at different speeds: public diplomacy is a long-term affair 
and if it is connected too closely with the daily grind of foreign affairs, it will not flourish and will come to 
be seen and dismissed as mere propaganda. If public diplomacy is used as an immediate foreign policy tool, 
it exposes public diplomacy to the contradictions, discontinuities, fads and fancies of foreign policy. If it is 
too closely tied to foreign policy objectives, it runs the risk of becoming ... a failure when a foreign policy 
itself is perceived to be a failure (p. 15). 
 
Since World War II (and increasingly after the terrorist attacks of 2001), the concept 
of public diplomacy has gained traction in the U.S. as direct, 2-way engagement with 
the people (instead of only the leaders) of the international community is viewed as 
crucial to economic and political stability between the U.S. and the world (Tuch, 
1990).  As previously noted, the idea is that a general attraction towards the U.S. in a 
population will ultimately affect the decisions of leaders of that population; a 
population that consumes and enjoys U.S. culture might be less inclined to accept a 
leadership that favors hostility and isolation towards the United States.  Far from being 
separate from diplomacy, advocates of public diplomacy argue that its purpose is to 
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improve the effectiveness of diplomacy.  The term “public diplomacy” was first used 
in the U.S. by broadcaster Edward R. Morrow (the subject of the George Clooney film 
“Good Night and Good Luck”) in 1963 during his time as director of the U.S. 
Information Agency during the Kennedy administration (Sun, 2007).  While Morrow 
focused on the role of the media, educational programs, culture exchanges, open 
libraries, collaboration between U.S. missions and local press, TV/Radio/Online 
productions, and other areas of direct engagement with local populations can assist in 
decreasing hostility towards the U.S., reducing justification for militant action, and 
improve a climate favorable to doing economic and political business with the U.S.  
The history of American public diplomacy offers a level of instruction regarding its 
scope and power, along with the key role that local populations (i.e. FSN’s) must play 
in its effective implementation.  Present challenges regarding the state of public 
diplomacy (with the positive presentation of the U.S. image) derive in part from the 
communication vacuum created after the fall of the Soviet Union (Barron, 2007).  
According to Barron, throughout the Cold War, the United States operated a robust 
network of communication and propaganda campaigns, all “attempting to displace 
Communist-implanted anti-Americanism and install a pro-Western worldview” (p. 
30).  These campaigns included broadcast productions, educational and cultural 
programming, speaker programs, and creation of news sources designed specifically to 
counter the image of America presented by hostile regimes (Bellamy & Weinberg, 
2008).  The efficacy of these programs is often rightfully questioned.  In the case of 
the Cold War, U.S. “success” clearly was a result of economic and military advantages 
beyond providing a positive image of American values.  Despite the implication that 
soft power is rarely decisive in global conflict, Nye (2009) argues that the U.S. 
military deterred Soviet aggression, but that “when the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it 
was destroyed not by an artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by 
those who had lost faith in communism” (p. 163).  Again, the role of the presentation 
of the U.S. story in shaking that “faith” is difficult to estimate, but also unwise to 
ignore.  What is also important to note is that this engagement with populations 
through a competing U.S. sanctioned message relied heavily on understanding 
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cultures, adapting the message to appeal to those populations, and utilizing 
knowledgeable local contacts as conduits for presenting the message.  Historical 
anecdotes abound relating to this local orientation including the promotion of baseball 
in Reconstruction Japan (a sport they had historically played prior to the World War II 
and one in which they have now surpassed the U.S. in winning the last two World 
Baseball Championships) and the revival of interest in Karl May's "Winnetou" novels 
in post-War Germany.  Additionally, the Fulbright Program provides an excellent 
example of educational exchange where members of the local population are turned 
into quasi-Ambassadors for the U.S.  Research on international Fulbright participants 
found that 99 percent reported better understanding of the United States and its culture, 
96 percent shared their experiences through media or cultural activities when returning 
to their home country, and 89 percent reported that their experience allowed them to 
assume leadership positions after returning home (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008).  The 
message here is clear- it is not enough to share the American worldview; it must be 
shared in a context that effectively connects to the values and culture of the 
community engaged.     
 
After the Cold War, interest in this sort of engagement waned and funding for U.S. 
public diplomacy was reduced by some 40%, with a sharp reduction in cultural 
exchange programs and information centers (Barron, 2007).  The structure of public 
diplomacy was also dismantled, leaving only “poorly organized bureaucratic structures 
within the State Department” (p. 31).  Hughes (2007) notes that it was only after the 
September 11 attacks (and the perception of support for the attacks in the Arab world) 
that the U.S. became fully aware of the folly of disengaging from public diplomacy.  
Hughes states that the current focus and funding for public diplomacy “shrinks into 
insignificance against the vast sums spent on military operations in Iraq” (p. 9).  Not 
only has economic and political investment in public diplomacy declined, attitudinal 
barriers in understanding the values and concerns of “average folks” in other countries 
have also emerged (in contrast to the Cold War “street level” engagement of U.S. 
public diplomacy).  In the Middle East, for example, this disengagement with local 
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populations has been fully rationalized as “the opinions and views of non-elites living 
in Muslim countries have been of minimal concern to U.S. policymakers. Because of 
the autocratic nature of many Muslim governments (most are either traditional 
monarchies or single-party states) and the lack of democratic institutions, many U.S. 
policymakers and Middle East strategists have dismissed mass opinion as unimportant 
and instead have focused only on the opinions and policies of national governing 
elites” (p. 14).  The decline in investment and the decline of the want (or aptitude?) to 
create programming for local communities instead of governing elites indicates a sharp 
shift in the kind of engagement the U.S. has utilized in positioning itself in world 
affairs.  Zayani (2008) argues that recent attempts to revitalize a coherent and locally 
focused public diplomacy has been nominal in scope and primitive in its understanding 
of diverse communities, going on to suggest that it remains to be seen if recent steps 
will have any measurable effect on world opinion of the United States.      
 
The necessity of this sort of engagement, however, is fully transparent.  In their 
succinctly titled book Why Do People Hate America?, Sardar and Davies (2002) argue 
for wide-spread world animosity towards the political and economic policies of the 
United States.  In fact, they state “there are hardly any universals left in our post 
modern times, but loathing for America is about as close as we can get for a universal 
sentiment: it is the one dynamic that unites fundamentalists and liberals, Arabs and 
Latin Americans, Asians and Europeans, and even the overshadowed Canadians with 
the rest of the world” (p. 195).  A U.S. Government initiated report confirms many 
aspects of this statement with the following statistical validation: 
 
The bottom has indeed fallen out of support for the United States. In Indonesia, the country with the 
largest Muslim population in the world, only 15 percent view the United States favorably, compared 
with 61 percent in early 2002. In Saudi Arabia, according to a Gallup poll, only 7 percent had a “very 
favorable” view of the U.S. while 49 percent had a “very unfavorable” view. In Turkey, a secular 
Muslim, non-Arab democracy that is a stalwart member of NATO and a longtime supporter of 
America, favorable opinion toward the U.S. dropped from 52 percent three years ago to 15 percent in 
the spring of 2003, according to the Pew Research Center. The problem is not limited to the Arab and 
Muslim world. In Spain, an early ally in the war in Iraq, 3 percent had a very favorable view of the 
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United States while 39 percent had a very unfavorable view. (Committee on Appropriations: U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2003; p. 19).   
 
Further analysis of the worldwide trends related to this sentiment shows that over the 
last five years, the percentage of people with a favorable image of the United States 
has decreased 11 percent in Japan, 18 percent in Argentina, 30 percent in Germany, 
and currently stands at only 51 percent in the U.K. (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008). 
 
Interestingly, despite this animosity, there remains wide-spread affection towards 
many cultural aspects of the U.S. and respect for many institutions and individuals of 
American origin.  Sardar and Davies even found admiration for many U.S. institutions 
and cultural contributions in the most fervently anti-American regions.  Writing on the 
metaphor of the U.S. as “the Federation” in the popular entertainment Star Trek, 
Neumann (2001) sums this view up by stating America (“the Federation”) “should be 
loved when known, and it is only just a question of time before everybody knows it” 
(p. 619).  Public diplomacy has the potential to return American foreign affairs to its 
most basic liberal engagement of “seeking out new life and new civilizations” with a 
Prime Directive that offers instead of demands. 
 
Like “the Federation,” however, true engagement requires a prevailing interest and 
developed understanding for partnership with local populations.  Former Ambassador 
and current professor Cynthia Schneider (2007) notes a specific subset of public 
diplomacy that requires cultural engagement.  She terms it “cultural diplomacy” and 
identifies several standards for its effective realization: 
 
• Cultural diplomacy is a two-way street. 
• Cultural diplomacy operates in the long term. 
• Cultural diplomacy can increase understanding between different peoples and 
cultures. 
• Cultural diplomacy can open doors between U.S. diplomats and their host 
countries, even when relations are strained. 
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• Cultural diplomacy cannot be effectively measured; it makes a qualitative, not 
quantitative, difference in relations between nations and peoples. 
• Cultural diplomacy works best when it caters to the interests of a host country 
or region. 
 
When culture and understanding are ignored and public diplomacy is done with 
political intent and owned primarily by the U.S., there is a risk that it will be viewed as 
disingenuous.  Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) argue more directly that public diplomacy 
must be local and authentic in its orientation and must not come from sources that are 
obviously American.  Schneider (2007) recounts an example of this sort of 
duplicitousness: 
 
Discussions of the United States' declining image inevitably turn to public diplomacy. However, the 
expectation that public diplomacy can somehow repair the damage caused by unpopular policies is 
unreasonable and at odds with the fundamental long-term goals of increasing understanding and 
building relationships and trust. Experience has shown that using public diplomacy as a rapid response 
tactic tends only to alienate foreign publics even further. For example, a Southeast Asian diplomat told 
of a U.S. library that had opened six times during the 1960s, always in response to crisis. 
Each time the crisis abated, the library was shut down. According to one Egyptian diplomat, "Cultural 
diplomacy emerges at times of crisis. But this should be a process of building bridges, not a one way 
street. Developing respect for others and their way of thinking—this is what cultural diplomacy does” 
(p. 192). 
 
The success of public diplomacy (particularly in the form of culture) during the Cold 
War, Schneider argues, was that the “Ambassadors” of public diplomacy were framed 
(figuratively or literally) as non-Americans.  Jazz musicians, rock bands, and writers 
were perceived by the publics they engaged with as fully independent from and (in 
some cases) “other” than the U.S. Government.  They were separated and potentially 
disenfranchised in the case of black musicians like Louis Armstrong.  They were “the 
bad boys” such as the rock bands who played music that many in conservative 
America defined as “coming from the Devil.”  They were writers whose work was 
brandished as being “un-American,” “pornographic,” or “dangerous,” as was the case 
with Norman Cousins on a trip to the Soviet Union.  Despite their status, they still 
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were viewed as being a part of an American system (unlike that of the Soviet Union) 
that generally allowed dissent.  Schneider notes that a key part of this cultural 
diplomacy was the fact that these people typically held workshops and concerts with 
local artists where different perspectives were shared and appreciated (with interesting 
fusions between local folk music and American Jazz emerging in places like 
Armenia).  It is this authentic, two-way engagement that makes public diplomacy 
viable.  Messages clearly owned and sanctioned by the U.S. delivered in a culturally 
unengaged and monologue fashion appear destined for failure. 
 
An example of the sort of dialogue that can occur when local communities are viewed 
as equal partners and authors in creating a relationship with the United States can be 
found in the so-called “Sister Cities” program initiated by Eisenhower in 1956.  At a 
speech inaugurating the program, Eisenhower stated “if we are going to take 
advantage of the assumption that all people want peace, then the problem is for people 
to get together and to leap governments[…] to work out not one method but thousands 
of methods by which people can gradually learn a little bit more of each other” 
(Eisenhower, 1956).  Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) describe the program as being 
“highly decentralized” with local communities working with one another on a case by 
case basis creating programs for exchange that are locally appropriate and grounded in 
the cultural priorities of the communities involved.  Two rural Sister Cities might 
engage in exchanges about agriculture.  Youth from two urban Sister Cities might visit 
one another during times of cultural festivals.  The key element is that local priorities 
and sustained partnerships are the foundation of the process.  Like most other public 
diplomacy programs initiated during the Cold War, however, funding has made the 
sustainability and efficacy of the program questionable (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008). 
 
Despite funding challenges, public diplomacy programs, which promote engagement 
through local channels, appear to be the most viable option with growing international 
consensus that the U.S. Government is not an attractive agency.  In the period 
immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Council on Foreign Relations 
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convened a task force to critically examine both the potential and current shortcomings 
of U.S public diplomacy.  The most important finding, according to the task force, is 
that foreign populations will consider interlocutors coming from that population as far 
more credible and effective than messages coming directly from the U.S. Government 
(Improving U.S. Public Diplomacy, 2002).  In the context of this research, the 
separate, non-American status of FSN’s could play a vital role in allowing the U.S. to 
direct its message while ensuring that it is constructed and delivered in a culturally 
appropriate way from an agent who better relates to the population (detailed further in 
subsequent sections of this research).  Ironically, despite the clear statement from the 
task force that culture matters, they go on to argue for using “the most sophisticated 
tools that modern marketing and political campaigns have developed in pursuit of this 
critical objective (of promoting America to the world)” (p. 76).  Such statements 
suggest an American-centric approach where focus groups drive the marketing of 
American culture in much the same fashion that they sell soft drinks and luxury 
automobiles.  There is, however, a basis for this conception of “public diplomacy as 
advertising” that comes from the concept of “International Political Marketing” (Sun, 
2008).  IPM seeks to build “profitable” relationships with international partners by the 
employment of a “campaign” style model of marketing that mirrors U.S. electoral 
advertising.  To gain support through public diplomacy, a country must create the 
appropriate “mix of product, place, polling and promotion” (Sun, 2008; p. 6).  Not 
only does such a vision for public diplomacy ignore both the need for meaningful local 
involvement in the construction of messages/programs and the importance of dialogue 
and two-way engagement, it would be wholly unrealizable in many parts of the world.  
Responding to the task force, Middle East Quarterly (2002) states that this 
transactional view of marketing simply won’t work in Arab populations where 
sustained relationships with “kinsmen” are so important.  They add that considering 
the number of dictatorial regimes in the region (many supported by the U.S.), polls and 
opinion groups (the foundation of modern marketing) will be either inaccurate or 
impossible.  The most important area that was found to be lacking was the absence of 
officials who could articulate the American position in a clear way that makes sense to 
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the local population- again, the very function FSN engagement and increased cultural 
understanding on the part of State Department Officers could provide.  An almost 
comically naïve suggestion offered by the Council was that American diplomats 
should go on a “listening tour” to better understand the concerns of populations 
throughout the world.  Critics found this concept to be both patronizing and hopelessly 
infeasible, given the need for a listener to first be able to understand (Improving U.S. 
Public Diplomacy, 2002).  Peterson (2002) suggested that before any such undertaking 
can happen, a fundamental re-thinking of U.S. Foreign policy as it relates to public 
diplomacy needs to be undertaken: 
 
The purpose is not to increase U.S. popularity abroad for its own sake, but because it is in America's 
national interest to do so. This requires a deeper understanding of foreign attitudes and more effective 
communication of U.S. policies. It also means fully integrating public diplomacy needs into the very 
foundation of American foreign policies in the first place. Particularly in a period when the United 
States is fighting a war on terrorism, the country must come to understand and accept the basic notion 
that "image problems" and "foreign policy" are not things apart. They are both part of an integrated 
whole (p. 74).         
 
Public diplomacy and the importance of cultural engagement can, however, certainly 
be overstated; Saddam Hussein was an enormous Frank Sinatra fan, Kim Jong Il is 
probably the world’s foremost collector of American pornography, and Fidel Castro 
played baseball for the St. Louis Cardinals (all with little measurable effect on their 
policies).  However, to fully reject the importance of sharing the American worldview 
and perspective with the world seems dangerous.  Unfortunately, numerous 
inefficiencies of the Department make realization of a coherent public diplomacy at 
best difficult and at worst unrealizable.  The conservative American politician Newt 
Gingrich is hardly the first name that comes to mind when thinking about concepts 
such as pluralism and public engagement with hostile populations, however his 
criticisms of the State Department seem to point to such necessities.  Gingrich (2003) 
states:  
 
One of the areas most urgently in need of reform is the State Department’s global communication strategy. 
To lead the world, the United States needs to communicate effectively[… ] the State Department must learn 
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to fulfill this role. As the world’s only superpower, largest economy, and most aggressive culture, the 
United States inevitably infringes on the attention and interests of other peoples and nations. A country this 
large and powerful must work every day to communicate what it is doing (to international populations)…  
Today, the United States does not have a strategy, structure, or resource allocation capable of dealing with 
this sort of (anti-Americanism). That must change if the United States is to gain sufficient popular appeal 
with ordinary people around the world, such that their governments will in turn support U.S. policies… 
The state-to-state diplomatic system of the past simply will not survive… Such an information strategy 
must be implemented on a nonstop, worldwide basis, with some variations by region and country. The new 
systems and structures that this strategy requires will transform diplomacy permanently (retrieved October 
26, 2009 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=94).    
 
Due to the cultural and linguistic shortcomings of many Foreign Service Officers 
(Asthana, 2006, August 11), arguing for such a transformation could be untenable.  
Holt (2004) goes on to argue that the language and cultural deficiency of the State 
Department is so great, that it may be compromising American foreign policy 
initiatives and threatening the viability of many U.S. installations.  The most startling 
statistic in a time where engagement in the Middle East is of the utmost importance is 
that a government initiated report by former Syrian and Israeli Ambassador Edward 
Djerejian showed that in the entire Foreign Service, there are only 54 fluent speakers 
of Arabic, to say nothing of the cultural knowledge necessary for engagement Arab 
populations (Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003).  
The solution of “just hire more translators” has not produced the results necessary for 
true connection and increased understanding (Holt, 2004). 
 
These inefficiencies in the inability to culturally or linguistically engage with “the 
other” are compounded with an organizational structure and culture resistant 
connecting with the host culture.  The report of an independent task force cosponsored 
by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (2001) states that “the department’s professional culture is predisposed against 
public outreach and engagement, thus undercutting its effectiveness at public 
diplomacy” (p. 2). Inadequacies, such as a lack of professional development and 
training (often as it relates to culture), have created a situation in which the knowledge 
necessary for cultural engagement has not been realized.  Furthermore, a climate of 
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information policing rather than information providing pervades both the internal and 
external policies of the institution (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).  A relic of 
Cold War structures, this element of organizational culture has proven to be an 
inhibition towards communication that fosters a greater sense of understanding.  This 
has implications for both public diplomacy and the ability of the State Department to 
perform bureaucratic, consular, developmental, regulatory, and economic functions.  
Some suggest that current organizational barriers, such as those indicated, have 
contributed to an attrition rate of 38% for State Department staff (Eagleburger, 2000).  
In sum, many have pointed to a new mission for the State Department- one where 
engagement and communication with other cultures (potentially suspect ones) serves 
the foundation of U.S. foreign policy goals.  To meet this challenge and create the sort 
of organizational effectiveness necessary to meet existing demands, demonstrate 
relevance, and create the organizational success necessary to retain the best 
employees, an improvement in cultural understanding is fundamentally necessary. 
 
In the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim 
World (2003), it states:  
 
We must underscore the common ground in both our values and policies. We have failed to listen and 
failed to persuade. We have not taken the time to understand our audience, and we have not bothered to 
help them understand us. We cannot afford such shortcomings (p. 24). 
 
What could serve as the basis for this improvement?  The answer is so transparently 
obvious that it almost seems unnecessary to articulate: better utilization of FSN 
networks, cultural expertise, and knowledge of the national culture in which the State 
Department operates.  
 
  
 61
2.7 FSN Role in State Department Goals 
 
As members of the community in which U.S. diplomatic posts are located, FSN’s have 
unique access to the local population.  A small sample of the potential door-opening 
function offered by FSN’s include:  
 
• Access to the local media 
• Links to educational programs in the community 
• Understanding of how the FSN workforce will interpret U.S. directives 
• Knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of local and regional governmental institutions 
• Understanding the meaning and nuance of the local language 
• Ability to articulate and explain local culture, cultural institutions, and cultural 
expectations to an American audience 
 
This is by no means exhaustive, as there are so many potential linkages that they 
cannot reasonably be articulated in one location.  Even internal State Department 
documentation suggests that the value potentially added by FSN’s is not unknown.  In 
a statement from the State Department, the functions of FSN’s are described as 
“performing vital foreign policy program and support functions, and providing the 
unique knowledge and understanding of local culture and conditions that are so 
important to America’s transformational diplomacy (Bureau of Human Resources of 
the U.S. State Department, p. 21).”  State Department H.R. goes on to state:  
 
The FSN community is integral to America’s transformational diplomacy across the globe. Over the 
years, in many parts of the world, U.S. Embassy FSNs have helped advance the ideals and strengthen the 
institutions of democracy on every continent. Libraries and cultural centers in closed countries, for 
example, provide a refuge where readers gain free and open access to a diversity of thought and opinion. 
Local national staff of these centers regularly host democracy study groups and book debates, teach 
English and Internet-searching skills, and facilitate advanced research. FSNs work closely with clients 
ranging from university students to Supreme Court judges. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has 
stated: “There is no higher calling than to help other people fulfill their aspirations for a better life, a more 
democratic future, and a more peaceful world.” (p. 21) 
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The potential is clear- FSN’s can assist the State Department in fulfilling its 
operational functions and be the foundation of a public diplomacy that seeks to engage 
with international populations.  The viability of this asset, however, is contingent upon 
the State Department effectively harnessing it.  If an FSN population rejects the sort of 
entrepreneurial autonomy required by empowering FSN’s to assist this important 
foreign policy mission, steps must be taken to alleviate this tension.  If an FSN 
population feels that the stratified nature of the State department precludes the full 
valuation of their ability to assist in reaching out the community, steps must be taken 
to overcome this perceived barrier.  In sum, the relationship between the functional 
power that exists for American officers and the latent power that exists in the FSN 
workforce is crucial to the efficacy of the State Department and its emerging mission 
of public engagement.  If the research suggesting the power of public diplomacy is 
viewed as credible, it will be of utmost importance for the U.S. to effectively utilize a 
population that provides its greatest opportunity for success in public diplomacy. 
Echoing this institutional identity challenge, Batora (2005) writes: 
 
What does represent a substantial challenge for foreign ministries in relation to public diplomacy, 
though, is the fact that diplomats have traditionally not been used to engaging domestic actors in the 
conduct of diplomatic affairs. The need to do so constitutes an institutional crisis undermining the very 
institutional identity of foreign ministries as the exclusive agencies dealing with foreign affairs. Public 
diplomacy challenges basic notions of who is a diplomat, and indeed what is and what is not diplomacy 
(p. 15). 
 
For the State Department to succeed in this mission, the expertise of those who are a 
part of the local population (the FSN’s) will be crucial for success.  Thus, a study that 
explores this relationship is crucial to understanding the opportunities and pratfalls that 
exist in the State Department’s role in American foreign policy. 
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2.8 Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
 
Based on the outlined literature, this research would suggest that the State Department 
is a hierarchical organization.  Foreign Service Nationals have a status below 
American Officers within the organizational structure.  With this status, the gap 
between the power of Americans and the power of Foreign Service Nationals is 
pronounced.  The power distance orientation of an individual is an important part of 
her/his workplace attitude.  Individuals who accept power distance have been shown to 
have higher levels of commitment to high power distance organizations.  
Correspondingly, individuals oriented to low power distance have lower levels of 
commitment in high power distance organizations.  Thus, the following hypothesis 
emerges: 
 
Hypothesis I: Power distance scores of FSN’s will be positively correlated with 
organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department. 
 
Two measures of commitment are included in this research (Porter et al., 1974; Meyer 
& Allen, 1984).  The first focuses on attitudinal commitment while the second focuses 
on affective commitment, continuance commitment, and normative commitment.  
Existing literature notes the distinctions between each commitment type.  This 
research presents an opportunity to observe differences between both approaches in a 
relatively large sample.  The possible differences in an individual’s response to the 
various types of commitment produces a compelling research question: 
 
Research Question I: Is there a significant distinction in responses to these various 
commitment types? 
 
The research argues that the State Department has failed to sufficiently incentivize 
long-term employment.  Organizational problems and threats to the department’s 
relevancy have created (for many) what seems to be an unrewarding work 
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environment.  Specific barriers to advancement for FSN’s have also been detailed.  As 
this research pool consists of some 600 respondents from varied cultural and 
employment circumstances, the trend away from long term employment should be 
visible within this group.  The culmination of these factors forms the basis for the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis II: Duration of employment will not be significantly correlated to power 
distance.   
 
Related to this hypothesis, the negative climate of the State Department and its high 
turnover rate suggests substantial dissatisfaction on the part of employees as their 
tenure increases.  As previously noted, the experience of FSN’s compounds many of 
the organizational challenges of the State Department and the “glass ceiling” that 
prevents large-scale promotion for FSN’s would also negatively impact motivation.  
While these factors could clearly inhibit long-term employment on the part of 
employees coming from a low power distance orientation, there are expectations from 
power that are present in high power distance cultures.   Those in power are 
accountable for offering protection to those in subordinate positions (De Jong, et al. 
2006).  The expectation is for leadership to provide guidance, protection, nurturance, 
and care to the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, loyalty, 
deference, and appreciation (Aycan et al., 2000).  The portrait of the State Department 
offered by the research suggests an institution that may not be able to provide this as it 
would require engagement with a foreign population (Gingrich, 2003; Asthana, 2006, 
August 11; Holt, 2004; Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 
2003;  Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2001).  Thus, despite the expected higher levels of commitment offered by 
high power distance FSN’s, this commitment may not necessarily translate into 
extended employment duration.  These factors suggest another hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis III: Duration of employment by FSN’s working for the State Department 
will be negatively correlated to organizational commitment. 
 
Experience with another culture has been found to change the cultural perceptions of 
an individual (Storti, 1990).  As a person spends significant time with a person from 
another culture, her/his cultural perceptions will start to mirror certain aspects of the 
“other” culture (i.e. an American living in France will develop a French perspective 
over time).  The literature on the inaccessibility of the State Department to other 
cultures indicates substantial barriers for the “other” to connection to American 
culture.  Correspondingly, regardless of the amount of time FSN’s spend with their 
American colleagues, this would suggest that the cultural transference observed in 
other contexts will not be present in this environment (i.e. the core values of an FSN 
will not be affected by regular contact with American Officers).  As the State 
Department’s stratified structure could reify conception of power distance, FSN’s with 
an existing orientation towards high power distance will be unaffected by contact with 
Americans.  From this, the following hypothesis emerges: 
 
Hypothesis IV: FSN scores on the measure of power distance will not be significantly 
impacted by the frequency of contact with Americans.   
 
The open question on the survey allows for a narrative response from FSN’s.  The 
culmination of these narrative responses should produce several emergent stories 
regarding the FSN experience in the State Department.  As this question is at the 
conclusion of the survey, concepts such as organizational commitment, power, culture, 
and structure will likely feature prominently in such responses.  For purposes of better 
interpreting the survey results and better understanding the direct perceptions of FSN’s 
regarding their status, the following research question is begged: 
 
Research Question II: What emerging themes are present in FSN narrative responses 
to the open question in the survey?  
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2.9 Operational Research Method 
 
The population of the study compromises 595 Foreign Service National respondents 
from multiple countries and cultures.  The survey questions are written in English, a 
language that FSN’s are fluent in as a condition of employment.  123 hard copies of 
the survey were distributed at FSN training events held in the following locations 
during the years of 2007-2008: 
 
• Rome, Italy 
• Sofia, Bulgaria 
• Kigali, Rwanda 
• Ankara, Turkey 
• Kiev, Ukraine 
• FSN Training Center, Vienna, Austria (NOTE: two training events at this 
location brought in FSN’s from dozens of countries ranging from the 
Dominican Republic to Madagascar to Pakistan) 
 
Online distribution of the survey was handled through a State Department FSN 
training and support network.  This network informed FSN employees worldwide of 
the online survey and provided instructions on how to access it.  The announcement 
also made clear that the survey conclusions could be shared with State, but the survey 
and its results were not initiated by the Department nor would State have access to 
individual responses.  Responders from this online appeal account for the remaining 
472 responses.  Copies of both the paper and online version of the survey are included 
in the appendix section.  To maintain full anonymity and because of methodological 
concerns about presuming a cultural orientation based on nationality, respondents were 
not required to identify where they are from in the survey.     
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The survey itself is composed of five sections: power distance measures (Dorfman and 
Howell, 1988), organizational commitment measures (Porter et al. 1974), affective 
organizational commitment measures (Meyer and Allen, 1991), informational 
questions (how long they have been employed by the State Department and the 
regularity of contact with American officers), and an open ended question that allows 
for a narrative response about their perceptions of State Department.  Economic 
concerns about salary impacting survey results (i.e. a well-paid person accepts all 
aspects of her/his position, a poorly paid person rejects all aspects of her/his position) 
are largely mitigated by the fact that State Department salaries for FSN’s are 
(theoretically) fixed to be equal to or higher than comparable positions elsewhere in 
the host country (“U.S. Department of State: Careers Representing America,” 2007).    
 
Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) scale identifies Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions 
at the individual level.  Specifically, the six items related to power distance were 
included in the survey.  This approach has been shown to be valid in measuring an 
individual’s cultural orientation (Clugston et al. 2000; Cohen, 2007) and has 
significant advantages over assuming individual cultural orientations based on cultural 
membership.  Samovar and Porter (2003) argue that individuals are unique from their 
culture for a variety of reasons including familial communication, individual 
personality, exposure to other cultures, personal experience, status in a culture, and 
membership in subcultures.  Cultural membership certainly shapes individual values, 
but cannot be assumed to be the summation of an individual’s values.  In the case of 
FSN’s in the State Department, many have lived, worked, and/or studied in the United 
States.  Some have worked extensively for U.S. institutions and acculturated to State 
Department and/or American structures.  These factors, coupled with Samovar and 
Porter’s (2003) identified variables affecting cultural orientations, make classifying an 
individual’s cultural dimensions based on her/his cultural membership unreliable.  
Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) scale has shown strong correlation between cultural 
membership and cultural values, but this approach (allowing for an individual’s 
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responses to the scale to demonstrate cultural dimensions) provides a superior 
framework for viewing cultural variables at the individual level.    
 
Commitment factors are measured by the inclusion of several different items related to 
aspects of organizational commitment.  Porter et al. (1974) is “the most visible 
measure of affective commitment and has enjoyed widespread acceptance and use,” 
(Griffin and Bateman, 1986, p. 170).  It reflects on three definitions of commitment 
including (a) desire to maintain membership in the organization (b) belief in and 
acceptance of the values and goals of the organization and (c) willingness to exert 
effort on behalf of the organization.  Given that all of these definitions of commitment 
in FSN’s are crucial for the efficacy and sustainability of State Department activities 
and given the widespread validation of the soundness of this instrument (Morrow, 
1983; Blau, 1985; Commeiras and Fournier, 2001), its inclusion is highly appropriate 
for this research.  Meyer and Allen (1991) deal with the “positive feelings of 
identification with, attachment to, and involvement in the work organization” (Meyer 
and Allen, 1984, p. 375).  These areas have been linked to employment continuance 
and organizational investment.  Given the regular rotation of American officers, the 
necessity of defining the extent to which FSN’s see themselves as the embodiment of 
the organization is of clear importance.  Cumulatively, the combination of these 
measures offers insight into how people internalize, operationalize, and enact 
commitment to their jobs.   
 
An additional open question was included in the survey to allow respondents to clarify 
their perceptions and give additional feedback related to their perception of the 
organization.  The question is as follows:  
 
Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on management/supervision, your 
employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization, or your 
opinions in relation to any question in this survey. 
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To make these responses more salient and defined, a basic conceptual analysis is 
employed.  Identifying emerging themes and the frequency of their occurrence offers 
more coherent insights into the texts generated by FSN’s.  The goal of this analysis is 
not the creation statistical or scientific proof and it is (per definition) highly subjective.  
Given that the survey preceding the open-ended question dealt with power distance 
and organizational commitment, the narrative responses were probably shaped, 
influenced, accentuated, or perhaps even altered by the question’s proximity to these 
other concepts.   Rather, the intent is to create several defined categories and examples 
of responses that may better frame the research results and more fully inform the 
discussion/recommendation sections of this project. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Human bipolarity was both the binding force and the driving energy for all human 
behavior, from sonnets to nuclear equations. 
 
For the Martian-Human Smith, human culture was seen in terms of its hyper-duality.  
People were left hungry while others gorged themselves.  People lusted after power 
while simultaneously being dominated.  People actively attempted to secure peace 
while developing the instruments of war.  The duality of FSN’s as representatives of 
both their home culture and their American workplace produces a similar cleavage.  In 
the case of the results of this research, this schism readily presents itself in the data 
results.  Those coming from a culture where power is definitional show higher levels 
of commitment to an organization where power and status are clearly defined.  Those 
coming from cultures where power is deemphasized indicate lower levels of 
commitment to a hierarchical institution.  At a superficial level, this points to a sort of 
predicted rationality.  But as Smith learned in his Terran experiences, humans are 
rarely rational.  The stated support of an institution can mask less genuine impulses.  
The stated rejection of an institution can hide a high level of commitment.  Further 
interpretation of data suggests a reality that is far less orderly and far less understood 
by Americans working in the State Department.  In examining the language of the 
FSN’s in their narrative responses, a very different reality is suggested than the orderly 
vision of a unified team described in State Department literature.  And as Smith 
discovered “language itself shapes a man's basic ideas.” 
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3.1 Overview of Survey Results 
The survey produced 595 responses.  There are several survey results worth noting 
prior to analysis of the data according to the hypotheses and research questions.  
Specifically, on the first six items of the survey (see APPENDIX 1 for full survey text) 
some trends related to power distance are suggested: 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “It is frequently 
necessary for a manager to use authority 
and power when dealing with 
subordinates.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 1: Power Usage Acceptance Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 97 16,3 
  Disagree 248 41,8 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 97 16,3 
  Agree 120 20,2 
  Strongly Agree 32 5,4 
  Total 594 100,0 
Missing System 1   
Total 595   
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “Managers should seldom 
ask for the opinions of employees.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 2: Opinion-seeking Behavior Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 218 36,8 
  Disagree 208 35,1 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 34 5,7 
  Agree 79 13,3 
  Strongly Agree 53 9,0 
  Total 592 100,0 
Missing System 3   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “Managers should 
avoid off-the-job social contacts with 
employees.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 3: Social Contact Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 131 22,2 
  Disagree 248 42,0 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 139 23,5 
  Agree 47 8,0 
  Strongly Agree 26 4,4 
  Total 591 100,0 
Missing System 4   
Total 595   
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “Employees should not 
disagree with management decisions.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 4: Employee Dissent Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 143 24,2 
  Disagree 277 46,9 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 94 15,9 
  Agree 59 10,0 
  Strongly Agree 18 3,0 
  Total 591 100,0 
Missing System 4   
Total 595   
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “Managers should not 
delegate important tasks to employees. 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 5: Delegation Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 204 34,4 
  Disagree 300 50,6 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 41 6,9 
  Agree 35 5,9 
  Strongly Agree 13 2,2 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
 
 
On all but two of these items, at least two thirds of respondents indicated a 
disagreement or strong disagreement with the high power distance viewpoint.  In the 
context of a hierarchical institution, this point of view would seem to be at odds with 
the organization’s policies. 
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Yet the commitment level results could show a contrast to this expectation as on 15 
items, half or more of the respondents indicated agreement or strong agreement with 
organizational commitment. 
SURVEY TEXT: “I am willing to put in a 
great deal of effort beyond that normally 
expected in order to help this organization 
be successful.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 6: Effort Beyond Expectation Results 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 3 ,5 
  Disagree 17 2,9 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 35 5,9 
  Agree 229 38,5 
  Strongly Agree 311 52,3 
  Total 595 100,0 
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I talk favorably about this 
organization to my friends as a great 
organization to work for.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 7: "Talk Favorably" Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 5 ,8 
  Disagree 33 5,5 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 112 18,8 
  Agree 243 40,8 
  Strongly Agree 202 33,9 
  Total 595 100,0 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I feel very little loyalty to 
this organization.” (R) 
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Figure 8: Loyalty Results 
5 = HIGH LOYALTY (REVERSE 
SCALE ITEM) 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 19 3,2 
  2 28 4,7 
  3 59 10,0 
  4 229 38,7 
  5 257 43,4 
  Total 592 100,0 
Missing System 3   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “I do not feel like ‘part of the 
family’ in my organization.” (R) 
 
 
 
Figure 9: "Familial Connection" Results 
5 = HIGH ‘FAMILY FEELING’ 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 27 4,6 
  2 100 16,9 
  3 134 22,7 
  4 251 42,5 
  5 79 13,3 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
 
 
(It is important to note on the above item that the familial connection could refer to the 
link to other FSN’s rather than to the American Officers or the State Department as a 
whole.  Attempting to create a question that differentiated these areas proved 
problematic for clarity and it was not possible for the survey to include every 
eventuality of interpretation in such a diverse organization.) 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I find that my values and 
the organization's values are very 
similar.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 10: Value Similarity Results 
 
 Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 16 2,7 
  Disagree 74 12,6 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 174 29,6 
  Agree 244 41,5 
  Strongly Agree 80 13,6 
  Total 588 100,0 
Missing System 7   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “I am proud to tell others 
that I am part of this organization.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 11: Organizational Pride Results 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 5 ,8 
  Disagree 19 3,2 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 124 20,9 
  Agree 248 41,8 
  Strongly Agree 197 33,2 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “This organization really 
inspires the very best in me in the way 
of job performance.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 12: Organizational Inspiration Results 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 18 3,0 
  Disagree 84 14,1 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 153 25,7 
  Agree 250 42,0 
  Strongly Agree 90 15,1 
  Total 595 100,0 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “It would take very little 
change in my present circumstances to 
cause me to leave.” (R) 
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Figure 13: Continuation Intention Results 
 
 
 
5 = HIGH CONTINUATION 
INTENTION (REVERSE SCALE 
ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 20 3,4 
  2 74 12,6 
  3 160 27,3 
  4 255 43,5 
  5 77 13,1 
  Total 586 100,0 
Missing System 9   
Total 595   
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SURVEY ITEM: “I am extremely glad that I 
chose this organization to work for over other 
organizations.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
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Figure 14: Preferred Organization Results 
 
 
 Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 6 1,0 
  Disagree 24 4,0 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 126 21,2 
  Agree 277 46,6 
  Strongly Agree 161 27,1 
  Total 594 100,0 
Missing System 1   
Total 595   
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “There's not too 
much to be gained by staying with 
this organization over time.” (R) 
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Figure 15: Long Term Benefit Results 
 
 
 
5 = BELIEF IN LONG TERM BENEFITS 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 43 7,3 
  2 115 19,5 
  3 136 23,1 
  4 235 39,8 
  5 61 10,3 
  Total 590 100,0 
Missing System 5   
Total 595   
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I really care about 
the fate of this organization.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 16: Organizational Concern Results 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 8 1,4 
  Disagree 27 4,6 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 83 14,1 
  Agree 280 47,5 
  Strongly Agree 192 32,5 
  Total 590 100,0 
Missing System 5   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “Deciding to work for 
this organization was a definite 
mistake on my part.” (R) 
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Figure 17: Organizational Decision Results 
 
 
 
5 = ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION NOT 
MISTAKE (REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 5 ,8 
  2 2 ,3 
  3 48 8,1 
  4 239 40,2 
  5 301 50,6 
  Total 595 100,0 
 
 
  
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I do not feel ‘emotionally 
attached’ to this organization.” (R) 
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Figure 18: Organizational Attachment Results 
 
 
 
 
5 = HIGH EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 18 3,1 
  2 94 16,0 
  3 120 20,4 
  4 263 44,8 
  5 92 15,7 
  Total 587 100,0 
Missing System 8   
Total 595   
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “This organization has a 
great deal of personal meaning for me.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 19: Organizational Meaning Results 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 15 2,5 
  Disagree 61 10,4 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 153 26,0 
  Agree 257 43,6 
  Strongly Agree 103 17,5 
  Total 589 100,0 
Missing System 6   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “I do not feel a strong 
sense of belonging to my organization.”  
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Figure 20: Organizational Belonging Results 
 
 
 
5 = HIGH SENSE OF BELONGING 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 17 2,9 
  2 65 11,0 
  3 143 24,2 
  4 263 44,4 
  5 104 17,6 
  Total 592 100,0 
Missing System 3   
Total 595   
 
 
 
 
On several other items related to commitment, however, fewer than half of the FSN 
respondents indicated agreement or strong agreement with commitment.  Related to 
employment duration, several items indicated that a substantial number of FSN’s may 
be amenable to working for institutions other than the State Department and that their 
attachment to the institution is not unique.  This lack of a unique connection to an 
organization can often foreshadow departure (Mobley, 1977; Moble, Griffeth, Hand, 
and Meglino, 1979). 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I would be just as happy 
working for a different organization as long 
as the type of work was similar.” (R) 
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Figure 21: Organizational Loyalty (Job) 
 
 
5 = HIGH LOYALTY TO 
ORGANIZATION BEYOND TYPE OF 
WORK (REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 33 5,6 
  2 152 25,7 
  3 205 34,7 
  4 158 26,7 
  5 43 7,3 
  Total 591 100,0 
Missing System 4   
Total 595   
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SURVEY TEXT: “For me, this is the best of 
all possible organizations to work for.” 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
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Figure 22: "Best Organization" Results 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 22 3,7 
  Disagree 110 18,5 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 206 34,7 
  Agree 180 30,4 
  Strongly Agree 75 12,6 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
 
SURVEY TEXT: “I think that I could easily 
become as attached to another organization 
as I am to this one.” (R) 
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Figure 23: Unique Attachment Results 
 
 
 
5 = HIGH LEVEL OF UNIQUE 
ATTACHMENT TO ORGANIZATION 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 35 6,0 
  Disagree 164 27,9 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 222 37,8 
  Agree 135 23,0 
  Strongly Agree 32 5,4 
  Total 588 100,0 
Missing System 7   
Total 595   
 
 
 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “This organization 
has a great deal of personal 
meaning for me.” 
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Figure 24: Personal Meaning Results 
 
 
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 25 4,2 
  Disagree 111 18,7 
  Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 162 27,3 
  Agree 219 36,9 
  Strongly Agree 76 12,8 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
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Perhaps related to these items is the fact that over two thirds of the respondents 
indicated a neutrality, disagreement or strong disagreement with the organization’s 
employment policies: 
 
SURVEY TEXT: “Often, I find it difficult 
to agree with this organization's 
policies on important matters relating to 
its employees.” (R) 
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Figure 25: Employment Policy Agreement Results 
 
 
 
 
5 = HIGH LEVEL OF AGREEMENT 
WITH EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
(REVERSE SCALE ITEM) Frequency Valid Percent 
Valid 1 55 9,3 
  2 174 29,3 
  3 163 27,5 
  4 171 28,8 
  5 30 5,1 
  Total 593 100,0 
Missing System 2   
Total 595   
 
 
Two other commitment items also produced responses indicating lower commitment 
levels (“enjoy discussing organization to people outside” and “would accept any job 
type in the organization”).  Several unique elements of the State Department, however, 
might explain these outcomes (see section 4.2 for additional details). 
 
 3.2 Results Relating to Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis I: Power distance scores of FSN’s will be positively correlated with 
organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department. 
 
For purposes of measuring the power distance orientation of a respondent, items 1-6 of 
the survey were put into a single category.  Internal consistency of the items is 
accessed by a reliability analysis.  Cronbach`s Alpha is 0.62, which is rather low (with 
0.7 considered “satisfactory”).  However, there was no substantial improvement by 
discarding any one item in the scale and correlation with commitment items from these 
six questions was very high (see subsequent sections).  For purposes of measuring 
commitment, items 7-29 of the survey were put into a single category (to measure this 
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hypothesis).  Cronbach’s Alpha in this case was 0.87 (highly satisfactory) with 
deletion of any one item only providing a nominal increase in the consistency and 
validity of viewing these items as a single instrument.  Thus, changes were deemed not 
to be worthwhile. 
 
To test for correlation between power distance and commitment, the means of each 
respondent’s score in each area were measured against the means of the scores in the 
other area.  The result of r = .12 for the Pearson Correlation Coefficient demonstrates a 
high degree of correlation (correlation is significant at the 0.01 level): 
 
 
Table 1: PD/Commitment Correlation 
  MeanQ1toQ6 MeanQ7toQ29 
Power Distance Pearson Correlation 1 ,120(**) 
  Sig. (1-tailed) 
. ,002 
  N 595 595 
Commitment Pearson Correlation ,120(**) 1 
  Sig. (1-tailed) ,002 . 
  N 595 595 
*If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
 
Several items related to this hypothesis had levels of correlation worth noting: 
Table 2: Autocratic Decisions/Commitment Correlations 
“Managers should make most decisions 
without consulting subordinates.”
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Effort beyond expectation -,096* 
Accept any job type ,192** 
Organization inspires me ,118** 
Best organization to work for ,175** 
Personal meaning high ,120** 
 *If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
 
These strong correlations suggest that an FSN who accepts top-down decisions may 
have a deeper personal connection and appreciation for the organization.  It also could 
indicate that a willingness to accept directives would allow a change in job type, if 
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requested by the institution.  While a weaker correlation, the negative correlation 
between effort and top-down decisions could indicate that this mentality not only 
indicates that an employee should do as s/he is told, but also that s/he should do no 
more than what they are told. 
 
Similar correlations where found for the item “it is frequently necessary for a manager 
to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.”  While the item 
“managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees” had similar correlations 
as the other power distance items, one area appears to be exceptional:   
 
Table 3: Opinion Seeking/Commitment Correlations 
“Managers should seldom ask for the opinions 
of employees.” 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Accept any job type ,179** 
Proud of organization ,141** 
Organization inspires me ,146** 
Best organization to work for ,132** 
Personalize organization ,179** 
Agree with this organization’s employment policies ,147** 
*If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
 
While items related to pride in the organization, personal meaning, and a willingness 
to follow directives in terms of job type were consistent with other power distance 
items; the agreement with the organization’s employment policies was unique.  This 
relationship suggests that a view on management that doesn’t solicit feedback 
corresponds to agreement with State Department employment policies (something 
sharply criticized by respondents in a number of ways; see section 3.7).  
 
Interestingly, the item “managers should avoid off-the-job social contacts with 
employees” (while consistent generally with other power distance items) did not 
strongly correlate with any other items (only some correlation with “happy to spend 
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career here” r=.091 and “uniquely attached to this organization” r=.1).  Possible areas 
of explanation include the cultural and organizational divisions that cloud this issue 
with respect to socializing with American Officers.  The other power distance items, 
however, produced more of the expected correlations including: 
 
Table 4: Dissent/Commitment Correlations 
Employees should not disagree with management 
decisions. 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Accept any job type ,209** 
Organization inspires me ,205** 
Glad I chose this organization ,180** 
Agree with this organization’s employment policies ,149** 
Best organization to work for ,121** 
Decision to work for organization not a mistake ,115** 
Happy to spend career here ,145** 
Personalize organization ,111** 
Personal meaning of organization high for me ,193** 
Feel a sense of belonging ,125** 
    *If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
 
There appears to be a great deal of consistency in the responses related to commitment 
indicated by the extent to which one believes dissent from management opinion is 
appropriate.  An acceptance of management without disagreement seems to indicate a 
strong correlation to a number of other commitment factors in State Department 
employment.  The item “managers should not delegate important tasks to employees” 
produced responses consistent with the rest of the power distance items. 
 
The cumulative effect of these results is to clearly see that attitudes about power have 
a clear relationship with attitudes about commitment when it comes to working for the 
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State Department.  As such, this research would seem to validate the extensive 
literature that suggests the State Department is an institution of hierarchy. 
 
 
 
3.3 Results Relating to Research Question I 
 
 
Research Question I: Is there a significant distinction in responses to these various 
commitment types? 
 
 
The Cronbach’s Alpha score of .87 indicates a satisfactory correlation between all of 
the commitment items to consider them as a single instrument.  Dividing the items into 
two factors in a five-component analysis, 17 of 22 items can be placed into a single 
component.  Component matrix analysis of the data shows the following: 
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Table 5: Component Matrix/Commitment Types 
Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Effort beyond expectation ,411 ,570 ,223 -,110 ,215 
Talk favorably on 
organization ,640 ,420 ,093 ,092 -,136 
Loyalty to organization ,431 -,047 ,567 ,186 ,003 
Accept any job type ,438 ,161 -,574 ,133 ,111 
Similar values to 
organization ,620 ,229 ,021 ,054 -,012 
Proud of organization ,692 ,355 ,076 ,084 -,161 
Prefer this organization to 
a similar job at another 
organization 
,432 -,244 ,034 ,252 ,297 
Organization inspires me ,705 -,037 -,081 ,010 -,122 
Unlikely to leave ,362 -,210 ,358 ,443 ,166 
Glad I chose this 
organization ,728 ,142 -,118 ,206 ,020 
Advantage to staying in 
organization ,631 -,247 -,099 ,050 -,077 
Agree with employment 
policies ,564 -,153 -,093 ,272 -,208 
Care about organization's 
fate ,575 ,103 ,242 -,145 ,192 
Best organization to work 
for ,734 ,102 -,315 ,053 ,101 
Decision to work for 
organization not a mistake ,583 -,008 ,060 ,368 -,006 
Happy to spend career 
here ,690 -,015 -,239 ,041 ,144 
Enjoy discussing 
organization outside -,309 -,040 ,034 ,002 ,777 
Personalize organization ,646 ,135 ,010 -,398 ,189 
Uniquely attached to 
organization ,562 -,355 -,260 -,024 ,180 
Familial connection 
,660 -,302 ,090 -,220 -,142 
Emotionally attached ,727 -,233 ,157 -,358 -,009 
Personal meaning high ,745 -,039 -,009 -,362 ,014 
Sense of belonging ,728 -,296 ,151 -,147 -,078 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
5 components extracted. 
 
Two of the remaining five items fall into a single component including the items: 
 
• I feel very little loyalty to this organization. 
• I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for 
this organization. 
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The first item is a negative, reversed scale item which (in some research) has 
compromised its reliability.  The second item has some unique implications in relation 
to State Department structure that may have affected responses (see section 4.2 for 
additional details). 
 
The remaining three items each fall into unique components in this analysis: 
 
• It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to 
leave. 
• I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help this organization be successful. 
• I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it. 
 
The negative, reverse scale aspect of the first item above (along with its wording) has 
also been a source of criticism in other research (Cohen, 2003).  The second item 
appears more suited to the private sector in contrast to the State Department where 
deviating from job structures and requirements (even with good intentions) can be 
discouraged or (in some cases) prohibited (see section 4.2 for additional details).  
Similarly, discussion of State Department policies and procedures with outsiders is (in 
many cases) not allowed for security reasons. 
 
None of these items sufficiently impacted the reliability of the scale to justify 
exclusion nor would their exclusion have a substantial impact on the overall results of 
this study.  To preserve the integrity of the previously validated work of Meyer and 
Allen (1984, 2001) and Porter (1974) and to prevent any impression of “cherry 
picking” the data to validate hypotheses, both commitment measures are included in 
the results.  The results, in this case, indicate that FSN’s commitment levels are, in 
principle, similarly measured across all items.   
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Despite the generally uniform nature of commitment across all items in this survey 
population, there were a number of interesting correlations in the commitment items 
that merit additional scrutiny: 
 
Table 6: Intra Commitment Item Correlations 
Commitment Item Commitment Item 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Effort beyond expectation Talk favorably about the organization .421** 
Talk favorably on organization 
 
Similar values to organization 
 
.429** 
 
Talk favorably on organization 
 
Proud of organization 
 
.555** 
 
Talk favorably on organization 
 
Glad I chose this organization 
 
.443** 
 
Talk favorably on organization 
 
Best organization to work for .432** 
 
Accept any job type 
 
Best organization to work for 
 
.416** 
 
Similar values to organization 
 
Proud of organization 
 
.456** 
 
Similar values to organization 
 
Glad I chose this organization 
 
.437** 
 
Proud of organization 
 
Best organization to work for .457** 
 
Organization inspires me 
 
Talk favorably on organization 
 
.404** 
 
Organization inspires me 
 
Proud of organization 
 
.436** 
 
Organization inspires me 
 
Glad I chose this organization 
 
.481** 
 
Advantage to staying in organization 
 
Proud of organization 
 
.346** 
 
Advantage to staying in organization 
 
Organization inspires me 
 
.399** 
 
Advantage to staying in organization 
 
Happy to spend career here 
 
.483** 
 
Advantage to staying in organization 
 
Sense of belonging 
 
.475** 
 
Agree with employment policies 
 
Similar values to organization 
 
.364** 
 
Agree with employment policies 
 
Organization inspires me 
 
.423** 
 
Agree with employment policies 
 
Sense of belonging 
 
.416** 
 
Care about the organization’s future Emotionally attached 
 
.420** 
 
    *If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
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There was (predictably) an excellent level of correlation between the various 
commitment items; however these specific correlations are of interest for this research.  
The picture painted in these results is of an organization where personal and 
professional pride is linked to having similar values to the organization.  The belief in 
an opportunity for professional advancement tended to be linked to greater intent for a 
longer tenure and a feeling of inspiration and belonging to the institution.  Agreement 
with employment policies tended to correlate with a number of commitment areas 
including a sense of belonging and inspiration about the organization’s goals.  Concern 
about the future of the organization trended towards strong correlation with emotional 
attachment.  These relationships suggest an FSN workforce where factors of 
commitment such as personal and professional satisfaction with the organization were 
linked to items related to retention and organizational investment. 
 
3.4 Results Relating to Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II: Power distance scores of FSN’s will not significantly impact duration of 
employment.   
 
Power distance scores of FSN’s were not significantly impacted by duration of 
employment.  Pearson Correlation only reached the level of .010 with no significant 
relationship indicated.  Analysis of the results on each item of the power distance scale 
showed no significant relationships between any item and tenure.  Thus, this result 
suggests that duration of employment and orientation to power do not strongly 
correlate in the FSN population.       
 
3.5 Results Relating to Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III: Duration of employment by FSN’s working for the State Department 
will be negatively correlated to organizational commitment. 
 
Employment tenure was measured by the following question item: 
“How long have you been employed by the State Department or other U.S. Government organization? 
0-3 years  4-6 years  7-9 years  More than 9 years” 
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Duration of employment was negatively correlated to commitment items at a Pearson 
Correlation of -.097 (correlation is significant at the 0.01 level).  This suggests a strong 
likelihood that the longer a person works for the State Department, the greater the 
chance there will be a corresponding decline in commitment level.  This decline in 
commitment based on tenure was seen in 19 of the 22 areas: 
Table 7: Tenure/Commitment Correlations 
Commitment Item 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Effort beyond expecation -.029 
Loyalty to organization -.058 
Accept any job type -.032 
Similar values to organization -.012 
Prefer this organization to a similar job at 
another organization -.068 
Organization inspires me -.036 
Unlikely to leave -.044 
Glad I chose this organization -.061 
Advantage to staying in organization -.044 
Care about organization's fate -.063 
Best organization to work for -.082* 
Decision to work for organization not a mistake -.022 
Happy to spend career here -.194** 
Enjoy discussing organization outside -.040 
Personalize organization -.075 
Uniquely attached to organization -.134** 
Emotionally attached -.101* 
Personal meaning high -.149** 
Sense of belonging -.136** 
    *If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
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Significant correlations were found in the areas noted.  Of the three areas that did not 
trend negative in correlation, there was no statistically significant level of positive 
correlation.  Thus, a very specific picture emerges about long-term employment 
duration with the State Department.  Commitment generally declines over time with 
employment retention commitment less likely (“best organization to work for” and 
“happy to spend career here”).  The personal, emotional, and community aspects of 
commitment also tend to be less felt the longer one is with the institution.  In sum, 
these items suggest a working environment that may become less attractive the longer 
one is employed. 
 
3.6 Results Relating to Hypothesis IV 
Hypothesis IV: FSN scores on the measure of power distance will not be significantly 
impacted by the frequency of contact with Americans.   
 
Frequency of a respondents contact with American Officers was measured in the item:  
“How often do you have contact with American Officers in the course of your duties? 
Very Infrequently  1 2 3 4 5 Very Frequently” 
 
Checking correlations to items of power distance and commitment, the results were as 
follows: 
Table 8: Officer Contact Level Correlations 
Correlations
1 ,120** ,097**
. ,002 ,009
595 595 595
,120** 1 -,057
,002 . ,084
595 595 595
,097** -,057 1
,009 ,084 .
595 595 595
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (1-tailed)
N
Commitment Items
Power Distance Items
Contact with Americans
Commitment
Items
Power
Distance
Items
Contact with
Americans
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).**. 
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The positive correlation between commitment and contact with Americans was shown 
to a Pearson Correlation of .097 with high significance.  In relation to this hypothesis, 
however, there was no significant correlation between power distance orientation and 
contact with Americans.  This could suggest that the culture of the individual is largely 
unaffected by the contact with American Officers.  The implications of such a possible 
relationship, where cultural shifts are not part of cultural interaction, are discussed in 
further detail in section 4.5 
 
Interestingly, despite the significant relationship with the commitment items generally, 
the frequency of contact with Americans appears to only significantly correlate to 3 
items in the entire survey: 
 
Table 9: Significant Correlations/Contact with Americans 
Frequency of contact with Americans 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Similar values to organization  
 
.092* 
Proud of organization  
 
.094* 
Sense of belonging 
 
.172** 
    *If p < 0.5  **If p < 0.01   
 
The result of “similar values” being correlated to “frequency of contact” is hardly 
surprising as similarity is typically the basis for most meaningful relationships 
(DeVito, 2009).  Correspondingly, belonging and pride in an institution are obviously 
linked to having better organizational relationships- relationships that require contact 
to be fully realized.  Still, the extent to which American contact had little observable 
impact on the survey results suggests a possible gap between the two groups that can 
perhaps be better understood through the narrative responses to this survey. 
   
 3.7 Results Research Question II 
From the 260 responses to the open questions at the conclusion of the survey, several 
dominant narratives emerge from FSN’s.  These include: 
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• The State Department as a structurally flawed organization (154 instances) 
• Americans separate from FSN’s and lack cultural knowledge of the host 
country (73 instances) 
• FSN’s deserve empowerment, but are denied or ignored (57 instances) 
• Damaging policies and personalities hurt the working environment (44 
instances) 
• The State Department provides a high degree of job satisfaction (46 instances) 
 
An overview of each area along with a series of excerpts from survey respondents 
offers an opportunity for a more detailed exploration.  Please note, for purposes of 
clarity and coherence, FSN responses in this section were edited for grammar, 
spelling, and content (eliminating much of the bureaucratic “Alphabet Soup” that 
makes up the different departments of the organization and making the language more 
consistent with the rest of this research).  Additionally, this section extensively utilizes 
quotations from responses given as they bear a more eloquent and direct witness to the 
experience of being an FSN than a summation or supposition that could be offered by 
this researcher.  The full and unedited version of all respondents’ answers can be 
found in Appendix II.  This is included as this research by no means wishes to suggest 
that the voices and feelings of FSN’s can only be understood or interpreted by an 
American researcher; especially important given several of the statements issued in 
response to the open narrative question. 
 
The State Department as a structurally flawed organization 
Many responses indicate deeply rooted concerns about the structure and policies of the 
State Department.  As noted previously, in an attempt to minimize clientism (the over-
identification by Officers with the host country), officers typically on a fixed 2-3 year 
rotation.  This has created a situation in which FSN’s are continually adapting to new 
American supervisors who typically bring in a new set of policies (often independent 
of the efficacy of the existing policies).  It also prevents continuity and reduces 
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incentives to invest in any one Officer’s policies (especially in the period immediately 
before that Officer’s transfer to a new post and arrival of the next Officer).  The 
responses suggest that there are often gaps in long term planning that make the work 
of FSN’s less meaningful.  Related to this is the notion that some officers focus on 
personal advancement often at the expense of good policy, given that their time at a 
specific post will be relatively condensed.  There were also concerns about consistency 
as the work/communication style of one Officer could be dramatically different than 
the style of the next one, creating a position of dependence on an unpredictable 
working relationship.  This unpredictability in the actions/attitudes of the next Officer 
posted makes long-term organizational investment unrealistic.  Additionally, as 
creating positive change seems to be rewarded over maintaining working programs, 
several respondents felt that functioning processes are discarded when a new Officer 
arrives.  Some sample responses speaking to this concern include: 
 
There is very little long term planning. The longest period is 1.5 years. No views, no 
long term decisions. No American officer cares what happens after his or her 3-year 
tour. 
 
The problem areas are the local US staff that most of the time focuses on empire 
building, lifestyle management and advancement of the individual career and not the 
US Government long-term interests! 
 
The relationship with our American supervisors relies heavily on the personality and 
work style of our supervisors and is therefore subject to change every three years. 
Some of them do involve the FSNs and some of them don't. Each of them has a 
personal work style. Accordingly, the flow of communication is at times really good, 
but there are periods when it is not. These are the results of having watched American 
officers come and go over many years. 
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Sometimes it's really hard to work with many types of bosses, since they just come and 
go every 2 or 3-4 years. We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new 
managers) wants to show their power, their skills, but sometimes it just does not make 
any sense. 
 
The downfall of working as an FSN in this organization is the continuous change of 
officers every one or two years. FSN’s have a difficult time in transition periods. 
 
The fact that supervisors and managers change frequently makes it difficult to be 
attached to the organization. 
 
I strongly believe that there should be a continuity line when officers are transferred. I 
mean that many times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the work done by 
his/her predecessor is suddenly wrong (upon arrival) and everything starts over again 
every two or three years. I understand that changes are good when they mean 
improvement, not just for the sake of changing or doing things your own way. This is 
many times the cause of frustration to FSN employees -together with the saying "in my 
previous post”- and why organizations can't grow on a solid base. 
 
It is sometimes frustrating to get new boss every 2 years, especially since your 
knowledge base is really huge and (my) bosses are often Junior Officers. 
 
The span of the American Officers’ attention is limited[…]they do not really care what 
will happen in the Embassy after their time. I just do my job the best way I can under 
the circumstances hoping for a retirement at 55. 
 
We have gotten used to the fact that every 2-3 years officers change, and the new 
supervisors arrive with their own vision and management styles. Quite often, however, 
they tend to ignore the best practices established at post and force the changes. 
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Sometimes personnel/managing problems tend to be postponed indefinitely as the 
American officer in charge knows s/he will be leaving soon and is not willing to take 
on the burden of difficult decisions. 
 
Management changes every 2-3 years and it’s a pure luck (or misfortune) who will you 
get next, because the atmosphere and everything in the office strongly depends almost 
exclusively on the State Department Officer's skills. 
 
The 2-year-tour basis at State is the very weakness of the system. By the time you 
establish a good work relationship, your supervisor is leaving. You cannot build up 
that expertise with your American partner. A good example of that is with Americans 
who stay four years. Performance is far better than with people who stay two years. In 
other words the big loser is the organization. 
 
These responses suggest that commitment and performance are negatively impacted by 
the near constant rotation of American Officers.  Another weakness identified was 
with the salary structure at many posts.  While the websites promoting FSN job 
opportunities boast that salaries are comparable (or better) than private sector jobs in 
the host country, these responses paint a different picture: 
 
FSNs have become increasingly displeased with the poor salary adjustments that we 
have been given. 
 
In general, I enjoy my work, I am happy to work for the Embassy, but I think that the 
salary system is not fair. 
 
My opinions that are of a negative quality reflect my dissatisfaction with my 
compensation […]not my dissatisfaction with my job itself. 
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No wage increase is also creating a problem for the local staff and they have started to 
seek employment in other organizations that pay more and have more benefits. 
 
It is an honor working for the State however, but truth be told, our salaries and 
benefits quite frankly do not match what our local market is paying for similar 
positions[…]we do not have a retirement plan or pension plan and our low salaries 
make it difficult to cope with rising inflation. Most of us have sent their families back 
to their home country to cut down on expenses. 
 
There is no motivation for work- due to the high inflation that happened in our country 
during the past 4 years the current salary is not enough for the normal life. However 
we are always reminded that we work for the Department of State and should be proud 
of this fact! Salary is not that good as it was 4 years back- and there is constant 
pressing from the Management that really brings stress to the local staff. I like my job 
and enjoy working for this Embassy, however I have started thinking about finding 
some other - well-paid job. (Just FYI- about 25 staff members left jobs here in the last 
year- one of the main reasons for their departures was the salary issue). 
 
Many FSNS have put in years of work, and their salaries have reached the max. And 
they have another 8 to 12 years more to go. There should be some form of incentives 
for these employees. 
 
Related to compensation, FSN’s have indicated serious concern about the structural 
barriers that preclude promotion and the distribution of service awards.  There is a 
feeling from many such responses that vertical movement is not possible and, thus, the 
incentive to work hard or invest in the organization is minimal.  As such, many view a 
long-term commitment to the State Department as professionally untenable.  Several 
responses in this area include: 
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Once you are in, you realize that there really isn't much room for growth - or at least, 
that is the case at our Post. I think that finding the motivation to outdo yourself in your 
job depends a lot on your supervisors. We can't really look at it as an opportunity for 
promotion because there really aren't promotions here. 
 
There are very limited opportunities for the career development. The longer you work, 
the less they are. 
 
There should be more opportunities for promotions and recognition. Officers often 
lose sight of the consistent high quality output of the FSNs. Awards, incentives should 
be offered generously to deserving FSNs. Otherwise it will generate work fatigue and 
frustration among FSNs. 
 
I have heard of how a technician rose to the rank of CEO in some private U.S. firms. 
This is something that can never happen in the State Department (for FSN’s) as these 
high level posts are reserved for Americans. 
 
The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not 
readily available and as such, employees should be encouraged to grow and develop 
to both benefit State but also in order to have skilled workers that move to new careers 
after a few years. For most FSN's, working for the State means doing one position for 
life or leaving. When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but because at some 
point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on.  
 
The upward mobility is also very much limited which is also a great dissatisfaction 
factor. 
 
I think the Department of State is a good organization to work for, but no one should 
spend his or her whole career only in this organization. 
 
  
 98
Retention will continue to be a problem at this post and other posts like it if something 
is not done to make it more attractive to stay [in terms of advancement]. 
 
It is very difficult to project your stay when there is very little room for growth. Good 
supervisors come and go and so does their recognition of your job. There should be 
some plan for professional advancement for FSN's. 
 
I still wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years but I 
don't regret my experience nor working with colleagues. But I'm still looking to quit as 
there is no useful training, no salary incentives, no promotion opportunities and our 
technology roadmap appears dissociated from any needs by technical professionals 
such as me. 
 
The result of these perceived structural flaws are that many FSN’s feel undervalued, 
with little opportunity for advancement, with a seemingly endless and continuous 
rotation of supervisors who may or may not be invested (or competent) in the 
organization’s goals.  This suggests problems for both power distance and 
commitment concerns.  For those with high power distance orientations, the needs of 
continuity, loyalty, certainty, and provision of resources from authority are not being 
met.  For those with low power distance orientations, the opportunity for advancement 
and the need for equity in compensation appear to be a concern for some.  Likewise, 
these structural elements can negatively impact commitment levels.  Issues such as 
pride in work, the feeling of being valued and organizational relevancy are all put at 
risk.   Cumulatively, the basis for the short tenure of FSN’s can likely be found in 
many of the sentiments. 
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Americans separate from FSN’s and lack culturally knowledge of the host 
country 
 
Another narrative theme of the responses is that of separation; separation of American 
Officers from their FSN colleagues and separation of American Officers from the host 
country in which they are posted.  The workplace separation has, according to survey 
responses, had a devastating impact on workplace morale.  Basic collegiality and 
communication necessary to ensure that goals requiring the full participation of all 
employees at a post are, according to some respondents, noticeably absent.  This 
division has in some cases has created a climate where FSN’s feel that they lack the 
respect necessary to do the job.  Additionally, the social and emotional needs of 
employees extend beyond paychecks, checklists, and hours worked.  The absence of 
social contact (ranging from simple friendliness to an emotional investment in the lives 
of colleagues) can create problems for fully committing to an organization (as noted 
by respondents).  This separation between Officers and FSN’s extends to a cultural 
separation, as well.  Lacking the cultural knowledge of the host country and failing to 
adequately communicate with FSN’s has fostered a situation in which American 
Officers are dangerously distant from the culture with which they are supposed to be 
engaging.  The results (as noted in surveys) are that many Americans make visible 
mistakes in dealing the local culture, fail to engage entirely, and show little interest in 
using the most obvious resource (the FSN’s) that could remedy this situation.  Some 
responses include: 
 
I have always felt like there are "us" (FSN’s) and "them" (American officers). 
 
Americans don't really associate much with FSN’s, and we have also learned to keep 
our distance. Truth be told, FSNs are like third class citizens among the community. 
First priority is the American Officers, then the Officers’ family members, and then the 
FSN’s. 
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What works in one country will not necessarily work in another. Cultural sensitivity is 
very important. Bad Officers result in the Ugly American image. 
 
Supervisors sometimes make a big difference between FSN’s and Officers while they 
should treat them equally. Most of the (Officers) do not have knowledge of the 
language and culture of the host country which makes it difficult to deal with FSN’s 
and the mission contacts. 
 
In relation to the question (about social contact off the job), 99 percent of American 
Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-job social contact with 
(FSN) employees which makes for an incomplete experience. 
 
I haven`t had many Officers who care about FSN’s. 
 
When Officers say "We Americans, and you FSNs", it is really hard to work. 
 
The communication/understanding between American and local employees has 
become very distant. Communication, understanding and mutual benefit are keys to 
building the bridges and I hope that management becomes more aware of this. 
Although my values are similar to those of Americans and I take proud in the work 
that I do and how I do it, management decisions "sometimes" lead me to think "what 
am I doing here?" 
 
The breach between U.S. direct hire employees and FSN’s is very wide and I do not 
see a serious effort on the part of management to improve the situation. FSN’s seem to 
be an after-thought or a necessary evil to most American managers who pay lip 
service to the idea of employee integration. 
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Sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisors and 
subordinates… Cultural understanding is important and respecting differences. 
 
More and more (American Officers) often lack a European cultural understanding of 
European situations -- and that makes the relationship more difficult. 
 
American Officers should also develop a greater sense for the local culture because 
American culture is not paramount. 
 
Sometimes, I feel that the (American Officers) do not have the necessary training 
before coming to post and they often have no clue about the culture of the country. I 
personally think that managers should be more aware of the country's culture and give 
opportunities to subordinates to see what they can do. 
 
One of the issues that I have taken up with several other FSN colleagues is the lack of 
social skills of American officers towards foreign employees in the sense that there is 
no inclusion within their circles. An example, during social gatherings it is very 
obvious that American officers will mingle and socialize with their own and leave 
FSN's off to their own too, there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of 
acknowledgment on a daily basis starting from the basic response to a "Good 
morning". There is a strong sense among the consulate, this is we and this is you, 
we're not the same. 
 
I would also recommend that (American Officers) familiarize themselves with the host 
county's labor laws and labor culture, which might differ greatly from that of the U.S. 
 
I have come to dislike the "them" and "us" attitude that exists between FSN and 
(American Officers)[…] There doesn't seem to be much trust anymore. I used to 
socialize a lot with the American community but have completely stopped when it 
became obvious that new staff arriving at Post were no longer interested. 
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I am not part of the family.  I am just an employee. 
 
The organization does a poor job of making me feel like a part of the team. It's almost 
like a caste system with the Americans on one side and the FSN’s on the other. 
 
FSN staff gets the same kind of treatment as the general public. There is no distinction 
between a local employee and an outsider. The organization does not own its locally 
engaged employees and they work with a sense of insecurity. The level of trust and 
respect (from the American staff) between the two communities; the FSN and the 
American staff is diminishing. 
 
Managers should know (in detail) about the culture, attitudes and other factors of 
people of the assigned country. 
 
Over the years, I have found that the American officers have become increasingly 
distant in their interaction with FSN’s.  
 
It is my personal opinion that we suffer from an "us and them" mentality between the 
American staff and FSN’s staff at post, I personally feel that this is terrible for morale 
when American staff cannot even say "hello" in the corridors within the office. It is 
also my personal feeling that this mentality of "us and them" starts and the very top 
and works its way down. 
 
I don't feel as a member of the Embassy "family" as I used to before (there is greater 
feeling of "Americans" and "FSN" as separate entities while we work for the same 
goals and aspirations[...]  There is less mingling of American and Malaysian 
employees today compared with what we had enjoyed several years ago. It could be 
because of the 9-11 aftermath and Americans have become more "careful" (and they 
should not be blamed for that "carefulness") but more inter-mingling events sponsored 
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by the Embassy is probably the way to move forward… We forget that the most 
important element in any organization is human capital and human capital is founded 
upon human interdependence and relationship building. 
 
It is somehow frustrating when people do not trust FSN’s enough just because they are 
not American. 
 
The American officers need to learn the basic culture in country they work in order to 
understand the employee. We work as a team not as a boss/underling. Be humble but 
firm on decision making, but please listen when the FSN’s inform you first. Minor 
mistakes can cause a lot of dissatisfaction on FSN. 
 
Since India is so different from the U.S., there is often an adjustment time needed when 
a new American Officer comes in, as the Officer comes in with perceptions based on 
what he/she are used to in the U.S. and finds that those might not work in local 
conditions. 
 
Generally one is very aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 cultures and that 
an FSN will always be considered an inferior... which is reflected in the way that 
requests are given. One point though is that from time to time a genuinely caring 
American Officer comes along who isn't pretending to purport the "FSNs are 
important to us" directive... that is when local staff actually gives their best. 
 
The "Them & US" attitude of American Officers and Locally Employed Staff is nothing 
short of discrimination. 
 
The sum total of these responses suggests that many FSN’s perceive a two-tiered 
culture in American diplomatic and consular posts.  While this is certainly a function 
of the fact that these posts are “U.S. space,” one senses in these responses that the 
delineation of the two roles (Officer and FSN) extends beyond the fact that these are 
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American institutions.  The unavoidable hierarchy of this institution does not 
correspondingly mandate that the local staff should not be engaged.  These responses 
suggest that a basic level of respect and communication is lacking in the relationship 
between Officers and FSN’s.  Many responses also show the link between this lack of 
personal and professional engagement with FSN’s and the lack of cultural 
understanding of the Officers.  This lack of cultural understanding both hurts the 
ability to effectively utilize the skill set of the FSN’s and the ability to engage with 
host country where the Officer is posted. 
 
FSN’s deserve empowerment, but are denied or ignored 
 
As the cleavage between FSN’s and American Officers is noted by respondents, so too 
is the lack of authority that many FSN’s feel in offering their own expertise and 
experience on the job.  This can contribute to a lack of perceived value by the State 
Department for FSN’s existing and potential contributions. Many note that they have a 
high level of expertise that is underutilized and undervalued by the State Department.  
Others note that their skills would be enhanced by additional training.  The dominant 
theme of these types of responses is that the FSN’s have a valuable skill set and 
substantial human capital that could prove beneficial if fully realized by the State 
Department. 
 
The ignoring of the knowledge offered by FSN’s is identified in several responses: 
 
Newly appointed American Officers do not value the long experience of the FSN’s; 
they ignore the knowledge provided to them and treat them with superiority. 
 
I'd wish to have more responsibilities as a Senior FSN who worked 20 years for the 
American Embassy. 
 
I don't think any of my views/opinions matter or are considered. 
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Because, an American supervisor is always right; it is her/his way, or NO way. There 
is no control mechanism for American Officers[...] Empowering FSN’s in many 
aspects will be helpful not only to create more productive workplace but also to reduce 
personnel budget. 
 
Officers must bear in mind that without FSN’s; they would be able to perform their 
work in a timely and efficient way.  They must be able to trust FSN work. 
 
Sometimes we have to deal with new Supervisors that do not recognize and/or have 
respect for the loyal service we have always given to the organization, as well as the 
vast experience and knowledge most of us have (in my case 26 years of service). 
 
I believe that FSN’s should be delegated with additional duties in order to enable 
Officers to dedicate more time to other issues. 
 
FSN’s -who do most of the work- opinions, are seldom taken into consideration. 
 
In recent years, unfortunately, despite what we are told at training, there is a 
dangerous - I would say suicidal - move to disempower FSN’s who are the backbone 
and the continuity of the Mission. 
 
Officers can learn from FSN’s with experience, but most of the time, they refuse to 
learn thinking that they know everything. I have seen it a lot!! 
 
The FSN’s are the ones who best know the country and the day to day running of Post, 
so it would be best to communicate with them. 
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FSN’s generally accept American management's authority when they make decisions 
without consulting with FSN’s, but if they consult beforehand, that would be very 
appreciated. 
 
I would also recommend mainly young diplomats to not hesitate in using local FSN's 
experience and to be more helpful to FSN’s in their everyday activities. It should 
really be teamwork in order to reach better cooperation and achievement. 
 
Management should include FSN’s in decision-making process. 
 
Also, since India was (until recently) regarded as a "third-world developing" country 
rather than a "developed" one (images from the West tend to show India more as a 
land of snake charmers and Rajahs, rather than one with an IT revolution, etc.), many 
American Officers tend to be more cautious in the beginning when delegating 
responsibility to FSN’s. 
 
We (FSN’s) meet and exceed the standards at our Post.  Nevertheless, time and again 
we are having meetings resembling "school lessons"; where our boss is a “teacher.” 
Our boss recently arrived at Post and he does not understand a lot of things related to 
the job performance. 
 
On many occasion American Officers do not take into consideration the opinion of the 
employees, and FSN’s just have to accept the decisions.  Over the years, the employees 
will argue or discuss a decision being made that will impact their work environment. It 
is like they become submissive. 
 
FSNs are the backbone of the organization and they always try to give their best 
during their association. But problems erupt when American Officers (during their 
usually short tenure) try to show off, or are guided by their whims and egos, that often 
result in disruption in harmony in an otherwise smooth teamwork. 
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The opinions of FSN’s, who know the target audiences better, are not considered when 
planning/evaluating (Public Diplomacy) activities [...]. 
 
It would be nice that FSNs be treated with more consideration. Americans should 
realize it is a strong possibility that other nationalities also have valuable individuals. 
I have heard on so many occasions that FSNs are the most important link in the 
Embassy. It would be nice if behind those words would be some facts to sustain these 
claims. 
 
I find it to be a serious mistake that many FSN’s have much to contribute to 
professional events and relationships in their area of expertise, but are often ignored. 
 
My embassy is structured in such a way that it appears the hierarchy is more 
important than any good idea or project because it gets lost in the many layers it has 
to go through to reach a decision-making level. American officers appear to be too 
reluctant to be proactive or to recommend ideas from FSN's to management. Too 
often, they see FSN's as mere tools for realizing their ideas and executing their orders. 
That can be tiring! 
 
American Officers should understand that in order to produce worthwhile results they 
must partner with their FSN's.  
 
FSN's usually know their local circumstances and programs better, but for the 
Americans this is often difficult to admit. 
 
The best management practice of the State Department would be to a) listen to their 
FSN employees and b) often do what these employees suggest! 
 
As a non-U.S. citizen there is no room to make decisions or to work independently. 
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In my perception, the FSN’s are underestimated and very often ignored specifically 
because of their qualifications and high level of professionalism. Many FSN’s are 
overqualified and their abilities are lost or misused – the organization is focused 
mostly on the happiness of American Officers. Other international organizations in my 
country treat their local staff as the institutional memory and backbone of the 
organization. At the embassy this concept is unheard of. 
 
People are the organization and if the management doesn’t appreciate and value what 
FSN’s can contribute, it is only normal for them to become detached, lose morale and 
finally leave the organization. 
 
Beyond wanting appreciation, authority, and a voice for their ability to contribute, 
FSN’s also indicate an interest in training that could develop these skills even further.  
In both cases, the underlying concept is the idea that FSN’s need to be valued as 
creative capital that contribute to realization of State Department goals and energize 
the organization as it develops new ones.  Some responses related to this 
developmental theme include: 
 
There should be more training opportunities both for FSNs and Supervisors. 
 
Training remains the problem area. I have done this job for over four years now, and 
am still waiting for the specific training to increase my productivity. The same thing 
happened with a job in State (I was there for 17 years) where after 13 years of service, 
I finally got to go see how I should do my work!! Not investing in training is like going 
backwards. 
 
FSN’s need more training on how to do their jobs. 
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There is a need to provide training opportunities to every FSN, especially when it is 
outside the country. It will encourage better knowledge, confidence, skill evaluation, 
and understanding across Posts. The essence of training is for empowerment… 
 
The want of some respondents for training, coupled with the lack of valuation of the 
unique competencies of FSN’s (which may be sorely needed by some Officers), 
indicates that a core need for many FSN’s is the want to be valued by the institution 
and the want to contribute to the realization and development of institutional goals.  
The respondents also indicate that the organizational structure and culture of the State 
Department precludes this kind of organizational investment. 
 
Damaging policies and personalities hurt the working environment 
 
Concerns about empowerment also coincide with examples of policies and 
personalities that hurt morale and limit the commitment tendencies of FSN’s.  In an 
environment where the “two-tier system” is so prevalently seen by many employees, 
coupled with the perception that American supervisors are not engaged with the FSN 
population, it is not surprising that several profoundly disturbing examples of 
damaging behavior were identified.  Collegiality and respect tended to be issues that 
many such responses point towards.   Institutional policy, according to some 
employees, does little to curb this tension and in many ways, exacerbates the problem.  
These responses also pointed out that there is no defined system for airing FSN 
grievances and the systems that may exist are under the domain of Americans (thus 
limiting the perception that these systems could provide honest mediation in a dispute 
involving an American and an FSN).  Coupled with the previously noted issue of 
frequent Officer rotation, the perception here is that it may be preferable to endure the 
abuse and hope the next Officer offers a better working environment.   As noted in 
some of the responses, this attitude of “just accepting organizational injustice” creates 
the sort of negative climate that Masterson, et al. (2000) showed to be predictive of a 
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range of negative organizational outcomes.  Some examples of such policies and 
behaviors include: 
 
American officers do not seek guidance from FSN supervisors or employees; they tend 
to believe that by being who they are, they do not have to request information from a 
local national. They act rude to their fellow FSN’s and sometime discriminatory 
behavior is perceived. The statement "if it comes from an FSN employee, it does not 
count" is very common in this atmosphere. 
 
FSN’s are treated as staff more often than as colleagues. 
 
Most of the American Officers that come to post do not regard the FSN’s; they see us 
as sub-standard. 
 
Americans usually talk down to locally employed staff and have an arrogant view 
towards the host country. 
 
There are some Officers who like to terrorize employees by saying, "you will be fired if 
X happens." This makes the employee feel insecure. This is especially true in an 
African country like ours; they believe that they can get new employees easily. 
 
The one downside with working at the State Department is that some officers believe 
that they are superior to FSNs, or at least treat us in a condescending way that makes 
us feel that. 
 
But the one thing I dislike is that FSN’s are sometimes considered as second-class 
citizens with second-class opinions. 
 
The locally employed staff in my post has been so distressed by the humiliation and 
discrimination from management and American Officers. 
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The Americans are unfriendly and uncomfortable with communicating - sometimes to 
point of being insulting. 
 
FSN’s no longer park inside the Embassy proper but in a separate lot. We are not 
entitled to sick leave when "family members" are sick. We are not entitled to R&R 
when environmental situations are deteriorating (example when the Air Pollutant 
Index is considered seriously unhealthy--but American officers get such privileges). 
We are not entitled to purchase Commissary goods.  FSN’s are not respected the way 
American supervisors are respected […] 
 
Officers sometimes take credit for projects initiated by FSN’s or work carried out by 
FSN’s. More credit should be given to employees. 
 
The Department of State has no feeling in dealing with FSNs and the main policy is 
"WE DO NOT CARE." 
 
We (even as FSN’s) are not encouraged to discuss too much about this organization 
and our job. 
 
As employees of this organization we feel that we are discriminated and humiliated by 
some of our supervisors and managers and not treated well. 
 
The "kiss up and kick down" culture (of the State Department towards FSN’s) just 
doesn't work. 
 
It says a lot that the Ambassador can call me by my nickname even if I never gave her 
permission for that but I have to call her by her title and stand up for her every time 
she enters a room, everyday for three years. I believe you earn respect but nobody, not 
even the Ambassador, gets it for having people stand up for her. 
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I was very attached to the organization and I loved being a member of the US Embassy 
team until my former boss allowed and even encouraged a colleague to take over a 
program that I had created and developed; that's when I no longer felt part of the 
family, although I did not complain. Since then, I have felt that I don't want a lifetime 
career as an Embassy employee. 
 
It is a shame that sometimes various negative characteristic traits of various American 
employees have such a negative influence and portray the institution in a completely 
obstructive light. 
 
American Officers should treat their subordinates with respect, and seek other outlets 
for their bad tempers rather than taking pleasure in being mean and nasty. 
 
American Officers often do everything to make us not feel like a "part of the 
familiy"[…] There is no efficient system that would protect an FSN or control an 
American Officer. There is no "punishment" for being a bad Foreign Service Officer. 
There is no institution behind the Embassy, there is only a supervisor […] working in 
the U.S Embassy and being proud is a myth. 
 
I was sexually touched in a humiliating and public way by a supervisor. Two American 
Officers were there when this happened. They said nothing and only joked about it 
when I brought it up later. I think they know this totally, completely is harassment but 
they want no involvement.  If there is an investigation, it could go against their records 
and hurt their chance for a promotion or better post. They think “the stupid FSN will 
keep her mouth shut and make no problems…” This happens A LOT on many issues.  
They don’t care about us- only their careers.  I have an advanced university diploma- 
do they ever treat me like I have something to offer? NO! The day I leave this place 
with my pride will be one of the best days of my life. 
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Those who listen cannot do anything; those who can do not listen. So what's the point? 
 
Cumulatively, many respondents seem to view the State Department as an institution 
that accepts and obfuscates (perhaps encourages?) abusive, discriminatory, and 
shortsighted behavior on the part of American Officers towards their FSN colleagues.  
Policies do little to curb what some respondents see as a climate of organizational 
injustice.  Beyond FSN concerns about compensation, development, and 
empowerment, respondents seem to be indicating that there are more basic concerns 
about the respect afforded fellow human beings.  For those oriented towards high 
power distance, this is a basic affront to the protection that those with power should be 
affording their subordinates.  For those oriented towards low power distance, such 
behavior contradicts standards of openness, fairness, and equality.  Taken together, 
such attitudes can threaten the commitment level of all employees, if such behavior is 
present. 
 
The State Department provides a high degree of job satisfaction 
 
While many of the respondents indicate serious concerns about the culture of the State 
Department and the behavior of American Officers, a number of responses tend to 
indicate many positive aspects of being an FSN.  Some of these responses indicated 
that there is a greater degree of respect that comes from working for Americans than 
they would receive in a comparable position in their home country.  Others noted that 
many aspects of the American work environment are more collegial, transparent, and 
consistent than what one would find in other countries.  Certain areas and programs 
were singled out where FSN’s were allowed to innovative and demonstrate a higher 
level of creativity.  Some others also showed a general admiration/interest in American 
culture and working for the State Department provides a chance to engage and 
experience some elements of the United States.  A sample of these responses include: 
 
I get the respect I am looking for, happy with salary, emotionally stable in my job. 
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I've really enjoyed doing the public affairs work for the U.S. Government for the past 
16 years, and I hope to continue working at the current post during the rest of my 
career until the mandatory retirement age. 
 
I like working at this institution because they give us a space to be creative, and be 
supportive to any innovative ideas to enhance the quality of the "product" we are 
manufacturing. 
 
In my 8-year career with 3 organizations, the State Department is the only 
organization that rewards innovation, and hard work through various incentives. I 
value competition and this is the most ideal work environment for me. The 
organizational values are also ideal for my country and supervisors appreciate any 
kind of interventions that reflect these values. 
 
I think this organization provides a good example of the U.S. democracy and, above 
all, of what 'you can do for your country'. I share many points of view in way it is 
managed. 
 
In my view, working in Public Affairs for the Department of State offers a wide range 
of professional and personal opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow 
some of the administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to 
limit one's possibilities of what, in my experience, has been an extraordinarily 
interesting and varied job. 
 
I worked for a French Embassy for about 3 years. When I compare the two systems, I 
prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the trust and 
opportunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be done. 
 
  
 115
I have worked for 27+ years with the Department of State, 22+ years in a supervisory 
position. I'm dealing with the public day-by-day representing the Department of State - 
I'm proud to be a member and know that my work and how I perform has a little 
influence on the overall Austrian/U.S. relations. 
 
I feel that teamwork is a strong method of work it has been practiced within this 
organization over the years. Likewise, leadership shown by the current and former 
Officers has strongly created a sense of belonging to this organization as a family. 
 
I feel a great gratitude for the US Embassy in Bogota. My work performance in these 
31 years has been outstanding and I have been very lucky with the American 
Supervisors I have worked with. 
 
This is the best organization. 
 
Here are what I think to be key factors for good management: effective 
communication; continually seeking to improve work methods; showing interest in 
training subordinates and listening to them. Most managers I have worked with in the 
State Department have demonstrated these skills. 
 
With U.S. supervisors I feel like I can give more than 100% of myself because they 
really support you- not only as a worker but also as a person. I work much better 
under U.S. supervision because I really feel like I’m working for the State Department. 
I always wanted to live to the U.S. so I'm glad I’m working at the Embassy- it's a must 
for me! 
 
The job might be very challenging and stressful at times, but our good and positive 
work environment keeps me motivated and makes me want to try harder everyday and 
achieve higher goals for the mission. Having lived in the United States for 5 years, I 
have been able to accommodate to the mission's values pretty quickly. For me, serving 
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this mission, gives me a sense of belonging to this great nation and its culture that I 
really love, even if I am not a U.S. citizen! I think that's what makes America unique: 
diversity and equal opportunities for all! 
 
I feel lucky and blessed to work for U.S. Embassy in my country. It was a dream since 
childhood to become an interpreter and work for an international organization, but 
never could I imagine that I would be more than just an interpreter, I have worked as 
assistant and now as coordinator. And not in a simple international organization but 
the U.S. EMBASSY! I am very proud of it and very thankful to those people who 
trusted me and chose me for a vacant position at the Embassy over 6 years ago. 
 
It has been pleasure working for State. My supervisors both here and in Washington 
are professionals and very good people. I appreciate the attitude with which they treat 
subordinates: I never felt I was one. 
 
I feel grateful for the chance to work with the American community. I don't spend a 
great deal of time with them but they are always gracious and thankful for my work. 
 
I gave been working with the State Department as an FSN for more than 25 years. The 
fact that I am able to work so many years in an organization speaks volume about my 
workplace. I like two-way communication.  We are able to solve an issue together and 
also agreed to disagree to keep the peace with our officers. Of course there are times I 
when I have met with difficult bosses but I tell myself they come and go, but I can stay 
as long as I am needed and I enjoy the working environment of office. 
 
Responses such as these indicate that beyond the challenges and difficulties posed by 
employment as an FSN, there are many who still take a great deal of pride in their 
work and view the State Department in a favorable light.  Such energy, however, could 
be threatened if the perceptions voiced in other responses become fully systemic.  
Cultural factors, such as the distribution of power, have been shown to have a 
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significant effect on commitment.  Given the crucial role of FSN’s in realizing State 
Department goals, the need for more experiences such as these and structures to deal 
with the alienation and disempowerment experienced by others need to be more fully 
explored.  Thus, the narrative responses to the open question suggest that the State 
Department is at a precipice with full engagement of the FSN population as one 
possibility and a dangerous shortage of people capable of fulfilling the organizational 
mission as the other.     
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Chapter 4 
 
My failures are so much more numerous than my successes that I am beginning to 
wonder if full grokking will show that I am on the wrong track entirely — that this 
race must be split up, hating each other, fighting each other, constantly unhappy and 
at war even with their own individual selves… 
 
In trying to create an enlightened and peaceful worldview to better humanity, Smith 
found many of his fellow humans less than receptive his ideas.  For the United States 
to reach out to the world, it will need to create a dialogue that can only come from 
understanding the world.   FSN’s can assist in that process of dialogue, however the 
results of this research may indicate that a cleavage between the institution and the 
locals who frequently serve it may represent a significant barrier in building that 
connection.  From misunderstanding the cultural values of “the other” to creating an 
institution that (at least for some) prevents their full participation, understanding these 
results is crucial to understanding some fundamental challenges for the U.S. Foreign 
Service.  Smith’s view was that such misunderstanding was often willful and contrived 
with impugnity, leading him to believe that the ability to relate was fleeting and 
hopeless.  Ultimately, dialogue and communion opened the door for a new way of 
thinking.  Similarly, for the State Department to reach out to the world, it must begin 
by discovering a new way of thinking- and learning how the old ways have contributed 
to the cultural cacophony that has hampered the institution.  That can only happen by 
examining the profound differences in attitude this research has discovered.
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4.1 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis I 
Validation of the initial hypothesis that power distance is positively correlated to 
organizational commitment has significant implications to both the State Department 
and to this research.  However the result could be misleading and misread if not placed 
into a clear context.  Specifically, a superficial reading would suggest that the State 
Department’s culture works fine in contexts where the FSN population accepts a high 
degree of power distance.  This view would be shortsighted, however.  The higher 
levels of commitment in a high power distance population could actually mask 
existing problems and invite substantial challenge if FSN’s are required to engage in 
more creative and self-directed work for future State Department outreach.   
 
Peterson (2003) noted that a covert culture that operates independently from the 
existing institution is common in high power distance cultural settings.  In the case of 
the State Department, the possibility of FSN’s “going rogue” and re-interpreting 
directives and policies (while ostensibly “being committed to leadership”) would have 
disastrous consequences for any sort of institutional coherence.   With many American 
Officers lacking the cultural awareness, linguistic ability, and personal relationships to 
get a sense of what the FSN’s are thinking or doing outside the defined employment 
context (Asthana, 2006; Committee on Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 
2003; Holt, 2004), it is possible that such non-sanctioned decisions and attitudes could 
exist with virtual impunity with the American Officers unable to identify or diagnose 
this delineation.  Alvez et al. (2006) validates this danger by showing that in a high 
power distance context, ‘the leader’ makes most overt decisions but ‘the followers’ 
routinely make covert decisions on their own.  As one FSN states, “American 
Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-job social contact with 
FSN’s” meaning that Officers may lack any real sense of the attitudes that FSN’s have 
beyond the public face they share in the work setting.  Another noted that the 
management style and priorities of FSN’s working in a supervisory position could be 
dramatically different (and potentially detrimental) when compared to the style and 
priorities of an American Officer.  The result is clear- although FSN’s oriented 
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towards high power distance may “fall in line” with many policies and express a 
commitment to the organization, the secretive nature of those “without” compared to 
those “within” in a high power distance context can have damaging effects for any 
attempt at a unified or consistent organizational position.  When leadership lacks the 
tools and aptitude to “scratch beneath the surfaces” in such a situation, the danger 
becomes even more pronounced. 
 
Beyond concerns about the public/private dichotomy of subordinates with a high 
power distance orientation, there are also concerns about the initiative of followers to 
engage in self-directed leadership and creative organizational processes.  Existing 
priorities with which the State Department is tasked (VIP visits, consular tasks, 
immigration and visas, trade rules, etc.) inherently require some creativity and 
initiative, as existing U.S. policies may not match the situation on the ground in 
specific countries (as one respondent stated, “a host county's labor laws and labor 
culture, (may) differ greatly from that of the U.S.”).  Additionally, the concept of U.S. 
representation and public diplomacy (if intended to be effective) will require 
substantial guidance and leadership on the part of FSN’s who know the local culture 
far better than their American counterparts.  As Miles (1975) argues, the tension 
between those who “think” versus those who “do” will be problematic if FSN’s with a 
high power distance orientation are expected to show initiative and create 
programming.  Concerns also exist about the perception of delegation as “weak 
management” and a threat to the established “leader/follower” roles (Sagie & 
Koslowsky, 2000).  Sagie and Aycan’s argument (2003) that the culture of dependency 
of subordinates to their superiors in high power distance contexts can stifle questions, 
comments, suggestions, and initiatives emanating from those at the top of the 
hierarchy.  Kirkman et al. (2001) and Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) suggest that 
serious confusion can result when subordinates in such a situation are required to 
suddenly participate in decision-making and engage with management.  Suggesting the 
dangers of this relationship, one respondent states “FSN's often don't feel responsible 
for anything nor do they have initiative.”  When situations require FSN guidance and 
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leadership, the need for responsibility and initiative become paramount.  In FSN’s 
oriented to high power distance who correspondingly show higher levels of 
commitment, this research would suggest that empowerment could be problematic and 
the self-identified commitment offered by the FSN’s could be misinterpreted by a 
management structure that is not fully engaged. 
 
Although this research has suggested a positive correlation between high power 
distance and commitment to the State Department, this correlation should not be 
viewed as fixed or certain in a context in which expectations of a “leader” in a high 
power distance context are not fully embraced by some American Officers.  As Aycan 
et al. (2000) argue, a leader or supervisor is expected to give guidance, protection, 
nurturance, and care to the employees, while subordinates are expected to give trust, 
loyalty, deference, and appreciation.  Respondents indicating that American Officers 
can be a source of hostility, humiliation, and threats coupled with concern about basic 
job elements such as compensation and benefits demonstrate that the institution may 
not meet the expectation of “protection” and “care”.  Statements from respondents 
such as “no American Officer cares what happens after his 3 year tour” and “many 
times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the work done by his/her predecessor 
was wrong and everything starts over again every two or three years” suggest that the 
guidance from management can lack consistency and clarity.  Cumulatively, the 
danger is that FSN’s oriented towards a high power distance may feel that the 
management, although hierarchical, has not embraced its role as “provider” that is 
expected in stratified cultural settings.  Thus, the visible face of commitment may hide 
a covert and undetected culture that undermines or rebels against the goals of the 
organization (Peterson, 2003).      
 
While the dangers of misinterpreting the higher levels of commitment from those 
oriented to high power distance are serious, perhaps a greater danger exists in the 
finding that FSN’s favoring low power distance correspondingly have lower levels of 
commitment.  In many cases, these FSN’s may feel stifled by a State Department 
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culture that doesn’t allow them to demonstrate their skills or contribute to decisions 
made about projects. A low power orientation suggests a perception that everyone 
should be part of the decision making process, with an emphasis on equality and 
interdependence between leader and subordinate (Sagie and Aycan, 2003).  
Respondents making statements such as “I don't think any of my views/opinions 
matter or are considered,” “we are not part of the decision-making process,” and “my 
views are ignored” indicate a tension that exists in the hierarchical structure of the 
institution.  With many FSN’s taking pride in their knowledge, experience, and 
credentials, failure to empower such individuals to participate fully in the organization 
suggests a possible explanation for the reduction in commitment and retention.    
 
Beyond participation in decision-making, the sharing of information is also an 
expectation of a person with a low power distance orientation.  Drawing on Hartzing’s 
(1999) work, a low power distance typically corresponds to a freer flow of 
information.  Decisions are more transparent and communication is less obtuse.  The 
need for an individual to be “in the loop” is stronger and the communication chain is 
more inclusive.  In the case of the State Department, however, it seems that many feel 
shut out from the process.  A possible defense on the part of the State Department 
might be that the need for secrecy and separation in information flow is based on 
security and confidentiality reasons.  However, previous investigations into the 
Department’s modus operandi of information policing instead of information sharing 
suggests that the motivations are, at best, antiquated (Cold War relics) or, at worst, an 
attempt to hold onto power through controlling the flow of communication rather than 
opening up dialogue (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).  It should also be noted 
that FSN’s have shown understanding and appreciation for the need for some aspects 
of communication to be controlled for security reasons (sample statements from some 
FSN’s include “we can't discuss much out of the office about the organization due to 
operational security reasons” and “we are not encouraged to discuss too much about 
this organization and our job with people outside due to security concerns”).  FSN’s 
not only respect this control- they are expected to engage in it, as well.  One could 
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argue that it is possible for an organization to communicate transparently without 
overexposing what clearly needs to be private, secure, or confidential (private sector 
companies navigate this issue all the time).  More dangerously, the act of withholding 
information affords the informed with “the power of privilege.”  For those oriented to 
low power distance, who expect to be legitimate and contributing members of an 
organization, the act of not sharing communication can alienate the individual from the 
institution (De Jong, et al. 2006).   
 
The issue of organizational justice and some concerns raised by FSN’s also points to 
some of the reasons why those with a low power distance may be less inclined to fully 
commit to the organization.   Distributive justice (a belief in fair outcomes based on 
action) was found to be emphasized in many lower power distance cultures (Lam et 
al., 2002).  The idea that the actions of the individual ought to be positively connected 
to that individual’s outcome is another area in which respondents suggest there are 
shortcomings in the State Department structure.  The concerns consistently voiced 
about salary inadequacy, the lack of performance incentives, the inability to advance 
regardless of work quality, and the perception that American Officers actions are not 
effectively checked by the institution (one respondent writes “there is no "punishment" 
for being a bad Foreign Service Officer”), suggests a belief that there is no strong 
relationship between action and outcome in the State Department.  For those less 
rooted in hierarchy, this gap makes full organizational investment unrealizable as the 
connection between “what I do” and “what I get” is a foundational element to a low 
power distance view of the world (Lam et al., 2002).   
 
Individuals with a low power distance orientation may tolerate hierarchical systems, 
but this tolerance doesn’t necessarily indicate organizational investment (Robert and 
Prost, 2000; Page and Wiseman, 1993).  A number of responses indicate 
dissatisfaction with the lack of respect, autonomy, and power they feel in the 
organization and, perhaps not surprisingly, a suggestion that their employment 
duration will not be extended (e.g. “when I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, 
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but because at some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on,” 
“no one should spend his or her whole career only in this organization,” and “I still 
wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years”).  This 
could be part of the general discomfort found in low power distance orientations with 
an organization based on hierarchy and status (Hofstede, 1980; Singelis, et al. 1995; 
Triandis, 1995).  With the State Department clearly rooted in hierarchy and status 
(Krizay, 1988), the disconnect between those who have different conceptions of power 
can create the kinds of barriers that make organizational investment unlikely.  All of 
these results are remarkably consistent with Gouttefarde’s (1996) study of a mixed 
power distance organization.  As was the case there, the closed information channels, 
the lack distributive justice, and the barriers created by those in the upper echelons all 
combined to stifle communication and hinder effective organizational relationships.  
As one FSN stated, “we feel like ‘neither fish nor fowl.’” 
 
Neither of these challenges (recognizing the pratfalls of high power distance and 
understanding the commitment gap of those with a low power distance orientation) 
would necessarily be insurmountable.  Two-way communication, respectful discussion 
of roles, honest negotiation, and an understanding of cultural variables could all be 
employed to build a mutually agreeable set of values and policies that the entire team 
buys into.  Unfortunately, the suggestions of respondents and the existing literature all 
point to substantial weaknesses in the State Department that may preclude the full 
embrace of any or all of these solutions.  Statements such as “Americans don't really 
associate much with FSN’s, and we have also learned to keep our distance,” “I have 
come to dislike the ‘them’ and ‘us’ attitude that exists,” and “over the years, I have 
found that the American officers have become increasingly distant in their interaction 
with FSN’s” suggest that the communication gap will make the dialogue necessary for 
cultural understanding difficult in many cases.  Fernandez, et al. (1997) suggest that 
inadequate awareness of international variations in cultural systems, including values, 
can exacerbate expatriate failure.  When there are barriers to effective cultural 
communication in many State Department personnel (Committee on Appropriations: 
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U.S. House of Representatives, 2003; Holt, 2004), the chance to discuss the nature of 
the supervisory relationship and power structure of the organization in the context of 
local culture can be lost.  As there is a friction between local practices and 
standardized institutional policy (Poutsma et al. 2006), many potentially competing 
and contradictory policies must be explained by both supervisors and subordinates 
making mastery of change management more challenging (Friedman, 2007).  Shipper 
et al. (2003) argue that empowerment, discussion, shared ownership of policy, and 
mutual feedback are all part of a low power distance context.  In high power distance 
contexts, managers should be more adept at giving directives and keeping employees 
in line with organizational policy.  Finding the nuance necessary to understand the 
intersection between culture and work relationship requires consistent and authentic 
engagement.  In cases where this engagement and dialogue is not present, it can be 
expected that there will be significant challenges.  In the case of power distance, 
uninformed managers might give orders in a way that suggests self-importance to an 
audience that wants openness.  Similarly, in another situation, the same manager might 
delegate important tasks in a way that is seen inappropriate in a high power distance 
context.  The result of all these areas could compromise organizational effectiveness 
and the commitment level of the team members.  Without consistent, two-way 
communication, these results (while unfortunate) should not be unexpected. 
 
In summation, the results related to the first hypothesis show that those more inclined 
towards hierarchy are also more inclined to be committed to the hierarchical institution 
of the State Department.  This result indicates that the challenges posed by a high 
power distance orientation may be masked or ignored without active dialogue and 
follow-up.   These results also suggest that a decreased commitment from those 
oriented to a low power distance may be cause for concern.  Narrative comments from 
participants show that in some cases, the dialogue necessary to overcome both sets of 
challenges may not be taking place.  Coupled with the lack of cultural background by 
some Officers, validation of this hypothesis suggests potential cultural/structural areas 
of concern for the Department. 
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4.2 Discussion of Results Relating to Research Question 1 
 
The results showed remarkable consistency between the various types of commitment 
included in the survey.  Porter et al. (1974) identified commitment types including the 
want to continue membership within an organization, acceptance of and belief in the 
values of an organization, and the willingness to invest effort and energy into an 
organization.  The included items from Meyer and Allen (1984) investigate 
commitment in terms of “affective commitment” (positive feelings, identification, 
attachment, etc.), “continuance commitment” (the extent to which the cost of leaving 
an organization keeps an individual in place in an organization), and “normative 
commitment” (the feeling of obligation to an organization).  The results (as indicated 
in the previous chapter) are similar across commitment types and from both 
instruments.   
 
The factor analysis shows that all but five of the results from commitment items could 
be bundled into a single group.  The five items that produced unique results in 
comparison to the other items in the survey include: 
 
• I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help this organization be successful. 
• I feel very little loyalty to this organization. 
• I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for 
this organization. 
• It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to 
leave. 
• I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.  
 
The analysis on these items does not change the fact that commitment was largely a 
discrete category for FSN’s.  Even in these cases, there are external factors that 
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provide compelling explanation for these items.  On the “effort beyond expectation” 
item, compelling evidence seems to suggest that many FSN’s really want the 
institution to succeed.  Recalling Sardar and Davies’ (2002) work, if Anti-
Americanism is truly so widespread, the decision to work for the American 
Government could represent a decision antithetical to the values and mores of a local 
culture.  Combining this with the repeated concerns about the State Department being 
unable to match salary increases in other positions in a host country, it would seem 
that deciding to work at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate could be connected to some sort 
of deeper want to support American efforts in a country or region.  The intensity of 
willingness to go beyond what is expected is identified in the chart below (see results 
section for a more detailed statistical analysis): 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor Disagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
Effort beyond expecation
300
200
100
0
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Effort beyond expecation
 
 
Despite factors limiting commitment and concerns about short FSN employment 
tenure, it would seem that engaging in activities that support U.S. interests (even those 
beyond expectation) is within the scope of what FSN’s are willing to do.  This item 
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could give some pause, as it shows that the motivation and potential of the FSN 
workforce may, in its latent form, be stronger than the State Department currently 
supports. 
 
The “accept any job type” item could also be a result of some of the unique elements 
of State Department structure.  Unlike a company where the focus is typically on a 
unified set of products or services with items like security, record keeping, or 
healthcare outsourced to external contractors, an embassy (for example) provides all of 
those services internally.  It could be expected that a person working in public 
diplomacy would not accept a job in motor vehicles services.  A physician’s assistant 
in the healthcare center would be an unlikely candidate to deal with visas in the 
consular section.  A security coordinator would likely be uncomfortable working with 
the translation group.  While speculative, it could well be the diversity of jobs in an 
embassy inhibited respondents from suggesting they would accept “almost any job” to 
stay employed by the State Department. 
 
The “enjoy discussing organization with outsiders” question could be misinterpreted, 
as the State Department expressly requires employees NOT to discuss the specific 
goings on of the organization with outsiders (as noted by responses to the open-ended 
question).  Commitment is obviously less of a measure in this case as the lack of 
external contact about the State Department may actually point to a higher level of 
commitment rather than a lower level (as suggested by the survey).  If interpreted 
differently, however, the question could be applied to the extent to which a person 
talks about her/his workplace (though obviously not security details or confidential 
information) with friends and family.  It might also be seen differently by those 
working in public diplomacy and outreach where discussing the organization with 
outsiders is directly written into the job description.  In which case commitment level 
may impact the results based on this interpretation.   These differences are clearly 
reflected in the survey results (see results section for a more detailed statistical 
analysis), which tend to group around “neither agree nor disagree.”  It appears likely 
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that in the context of the State Department, those working in different contexts will 
likely read this item differently.  
 
Strongly AgreeAgreeNeither Agree
nor DIsagree
DisagreeStrongly
Disagree
Enjoy discussing organization with outsiders
200
150
100
50
0
Fr
eq
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en
cy
Enjoy discussing organization with outsiders
 
 
Both the “very little loyalty” and “very little change to cause me to leave” items are 
“reverse scale” items in which the phrasing is negated.  The reader is required to 
affirm an item they disagree with to indicate their disagreement.  With a large 
population of non-native speakers of English, such a process could have potentially 
been confusing (with perhaps even native speakers of English not immediately 
comprehending “It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause 
me to leave” at first glance!).  Previous research has indicated reliability problems with 
the reversed scale items in the commitment survey (Cohen, 2003). Curiously, Principle 
Component Analysis placed seven other reverse scale items in the same factor bundle.   
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Ultimately, none of these factor results adequately justify excluding any of these items 
from the survey nor do they undermine the articulated result that commitment types 
were not reported as distinct by this study.  Given the size, diversity, and consistency 
of the research population, this result is quite interesting.  It indicates that 
commitment, despite the variety of forms of commitment, may be more uniformly 
understood and enacted than the literature would suggest. 
        
4.3 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis II 
 
Those with an orientation to high power distance tended to have employment tenures 
consistent with their low power distance colleagues.  Keeping in mind the work of 
Sagie and Aycan (2003), a high power distance view of hierarchy tends to see power 
as a protective (rather than coercive) force with connotations of paternal “protection of 
the family” ascribed to the powerful. It could be that salary concerns, divisive 
attitudes, and a lack of appreciation may point to a structure in the State Department 
that embraces the hierarchical aspects of high power distance while failing to fully 
realize the protective/providing functions expected of those with power.  Thus, the 
very concept of commitment in a high power distance culture may be illusory- “I cede 
power and offer commitment to you so long as it protects and provides for me.”  In 
low power distance cultures (e.g. the “West”), a commitment takes on the character of 
law suggesting that a fully informed and autonomous agent has made a public decision 
that s/he (by her/his acceptance) is bound by (Fang, 1999).  As Peterson (2003) 
suggests, high power distance cultures may have a covert structure where grievances 
about those in power remain equally sharp but the presence of these grievances is 
masked by the face of overt, public commitment.  This result indicates that although 
those with high power distance orientation may indicate a higher level of commitment 
to a hierarchical organization (i.e. the State Department), there may be grievances that 
compromise this; with respondents stating that “there is no efficient system that would 
protect an FSN or control an American Officer,” “the ‘kiss up and kick down’ culture 
(of the State Department towards FSN’s) just doesn't work,” and “the Department of 
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State has no feeling in dealing with FSNs and the main policy is ‘WE DO NOT 
CARE.’”  While employment duration cannot be seen as the full measure of 
commitment, we should expect that a committed employee would remain on the job 
longer.  That is not the case here, further validating the point that the State Department 
should proceed cautiously in high power distance cultures that express a high level of 
adherence and investment in the organization; it could well be that this commitment 
(on the part of such FSN’s) is illusory, especially when the actions of State could be 
seen as a violation of the “leader/follower” arrangement endorsed in that cultural 
setting.  Especially dangerous would be for Officers to wrongly assume that 
oppressive, autocratic power (without nurturance and protection) works in high power 
distance cultures (Aycan et al., 2000).  Future research should also investigate the 
extent to which commitment in high power distance cultures refers to a commitment to 
power generally, rather than a commitment to those with power specifically. 
 
Beyond the results related to this hypothesis, it is important to note that 57.3 % of the 
total study population had tenure of employment of 0-3 years.  While the population of 
new employees may have had (for whatever reason) greater inclination to complete 
this survey, this percentage is essentially consistent with overall State Department 
attrition rate of 38%.  By comparison, the turnover rate for the U.S. job market is 
23.4%, with an overall rate of 8.2% for government positions (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2006).  There are other factors that could explain elements of the disparity 
(reclassification of positions to new departments, ad hoc/temporary projects, etc.), but 
considering all firms and organizations face these elements the attrition rate is still 
relatively high in comparison to the U.S. Government and economy overall.  The 
findings of this study show that a significant number of FSN’s have not been and do 
not expect an extended duration of employment in the State Department.  This is 
echoed in their narrative responses, including “once you are in, you realize that there 
really isn't much room for growth,” “there are very limited opportunities for the career 
development,” “The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career 
opportunities are not readily available,” “the upward mobility is also very much 
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limited which is also a great dissatisfaction factor,” “retention will continue to be a 
problem at this post and other posts like it if something is not done to make it more 
attractive to stay,” and “I still wouldn't recommend to anyone new staying here for 
more than 3-4 years.”  These attitudes would suggest the stratification of State 
Department power and decision-making make the organization unattractive for long-
term employment for many FSN’s. 
 
Regardless of motivation, the short duration of employment of many FSN’s creates 
operational, relational, and cultural barriers to many elements of State Department 
success.  Operationally, the replacement of employees is costly and fosters 
inefficiency.  For example, the training and orientation time alone for a new employee 
has been estimated at 153 hours (Ehrenberg R.T. and Smith, E.G. 2003).  More 
importantly, the service level and communication quality that comes from frequent 
employee turnover can create serious setbacks for an organization (Hinkin T.R. and 
Tracey J.B., 2000).  For an organization that overtly expresses a mission of improving 
the American image abroad and providing excellent service, such discontinuity could 
prove disastrous in presenting a coherent message and managing the specific details 
associated with the work of a post.  The issue of cost cannot be overlooked as when an 
FSN leaves; s/he takes the skills and knowledge acquired in her/his time in the State 
Department. This knowledge was developed at great time and expense.  Employment 
modeling has indicated that replacing an employee (in the private sector) can cost 
more than three times the employee's annual salary (Del Monte, 2009). Clearly, if an 
employee engages in ethical misconduct, lacks relevant skills, or has a job that no 
longer serves an organizational function, change is necessary.  But the frequency and 
extent of State Department turnover suggests greater systemic problems.  With a 
ballooning budget deficit coupled with a new President who expects engagement to be 
a priority of the Department (January 22, 2009 transcript of Obama’s address to State 
Department employees), the need for efficiency and cost-effectiveness should be a 
paramount concern.  Longer tenured FSN’s are more likely to grasp the policies and 
programs of the post.  Their institutional memory can be informative when new 
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initiatives emerge.  There is a greater understanding of the formal and informal 
policies and procedures of the host country in terms of their relation to State 
Department policies.  In sum, the State Department requires FSN’s who are capable 
and experienced.  Policy initiatives and diplomatic posts’ operation would benefit from 
longer and more sustained commitment from FSN’s.  This research suggests that the 
State Department may be at a disadvantage. 
 
While the operational implications of higher turnover are important, there are 
relational aspects that should be considered, as well.  There are a number of instances 
where the relationships built by FSN’s could be damaged with frequent turnover.  As 
employment law differs from country to country, it is critical that FSN’s in a 
supervisory position have connections to the host countries labor bodies, the 
fluctuating employment rules, and the implications these might have on how jobs are 
constructed by the State Department.  As cases requiring consular action can extend 
over many months, change of employees could compromise the decision-making 
process.  Visits from officials and representatives from the U.S. require coordination 
of security, press, venues, etc. and the connections FSN’s have with institutions 
working in these areas are damaged if there are frequently new employees.  Perhaps 
most damaging is the fact that pubic diplomacy depends on the quality of relationships 
the local population and institutions (i.e. businesses, schools, universities, etc.) and 
those relationships risk non-sustainability when there are frequently new FSN voices 
initiating contact.  If building bridges is one of the State Department’s goals, those 
bridges are at risk when turnover doesn’t allow sustained engagement. 
 
This is particularly dangerous in cultures valuing continuity of contact.  Hofstede’s 
work notes that the meaning of a relationship is often different in more collectively 
oriented culture.  Continuity, trust, mutuality, shared values, and tradition are often 
emphasized in more collective cultures.  Business decisions that the West may view as 
merely transactional take on a relational character (Hofstede, 1980).  In such contexts, 
the contact base of an FSN is in many ways the relationship base of the State 
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Department in that country (as American Officers rotate frequently and lack the skills 
for communicating locally).  A disruption of such relationships with a new staff 
member tasked with maintaining organizational outreach and connection could create 
an initial period of uncertainty on the part of external contacts with another extended 
period of relationship re-building.  Additional disruption could severely damage the 
institution’s reputation, as consistency, loyalty, and certainty are perceived as 
compromised in cultures valuing long-term collaborations and connections.  Clearly, 
the turnover rate of the State Department is cause for concern if the Department 
expects to effectively carry out an agenda. 
 
An interesting result was uncovered in analysis of the data related to “frequency of 
contact with Americans” and “commitment level” that could point to a basis for 
remedying many of the above items related to long-term commitment.  Specifically, 
the finding that “frequency of contact with American Officers” was positively 
correlated to organizational commitment.  While this would initially seem to be in 
conflict with the narrative responses that indicate concern about perceived 
disengagement on the part of American Officers, it would appear that the opposite is 
true.  When Americans communicate frequently with FSN’s, it seems to mitigate the 
concerns that inhibit organizational commitment.  That is to say, when dialogue is the 
basis of a work assignment, the level of commitment on the part of the FSN is higher.  
Commitment encompasses a wide range of topics including loyalty, job focus, 
personal meaning of work, emotional connection, and mutuality of outcome (Porter et 
al., 1974; Meyer and Allen, 1991).  When a position involves frequent contact with 
Officers, it can be assumed that this contact will include discussion of organizational 
goals, challenges, policies, and procedures.  Thus, the work of an FSN in this context 
is more directly linked to the larger organizational mission.  The frequency of 
communication between FSN’s and officers was identified as problem for many of the 
respondents (“sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisors 
and subordinates,” “there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of 
acknowledgment on a daily basis starting from the basic response to a ‘Good 
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morning,’” “there should be more (combined) training opportunities both for FSNs and 
Supervisors”).  In this context, the relationship of the contact frequency measure to 
organizational commitment should not be so surprising.   
 
4.4 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis III 
 
The need for consideration of items related to employment tenure become 
substantially more important when considering the results related to this item.  In the 
State Department, commitment was negatively correlated to length of employment.  
Basically, the longer you work for the State Department as an FSN, the less committed 
you are.  In an ideal organization, employment commitment should increase with 
employment duration.  A wealth of literature suggests employment duration should be 
positively correlated to commitment (Mowday et al., 1982; Mathieu and Zajac, 1990).  
Moreover, this commitment should supercede potential problems the employee has 
with the organization and the work itself (Mueller et al. 1992).  That is to say, the 
commitment that should come with employment duration is stronger than the problems 
that inevitably come up in a job.  The more alarming prospect for the State Department 
is that disengaged employees remaining on a job are more inclined to engage in the 
“progressive withdrawal process” (Mobley, 1977; Moble, Griffeth, Hand, and 
Meglino, 1979).  In this process, declining attitudes towards a job typically precede 
temporary withdrawal (i.e. absenteeism, extending inadequate or merely adequate 
effort, etc.).  These often foreshadow permanent withdrawal (i.e. quitting; see previous 
results discussion).  In the case of an employee who remains in the position, the result 
can be the continuance in a position with limited energy being expended into to 
performance.  The narrative examples related to this item can offer a near perfect 
manifestation of such a process with responses including “I work for the Embassy for 
31 years I am 53 years old and although I tried very hard to change this mentality 
around I have finally become cynical and I just do my job the best way I can” and 
“Despite the fact that I am very willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond normally 
expected to make this organization more successful, there is no motivation.”   
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Such employees may, perhaps, pose an even greater danger to the accomplishment of 
organizational goals than employees who quit early on in their tenure.  Such 
unmotivated employees can infect the workplace with cynicism and decrease the 
motivation of their colleagues.  In some instances, disengaged employees remaining 
with an organization can create a “shadow institution” that actively undermines the 
overall goals and priorities of the whole.  Some of the first significant research on 
shadow organizations was done by Allen and Pilnik (1973).  In describing the possible 
negative outcomes of shadow organizations, they state: 
 
What lies beneath is another organization, frequently invisible to outsiders, rarely committed to writing, 
but usually more powerful than the first. Of what does it consist?  It consists of the informal day-to-day 
behavior carried on in the name of tradition, habit, and expectation; it consists of what people actually   
do rather than what they say... As such, (shadow organizations) often subvert rather than support an 
organization’s priorities.  Whatever the company does is likely to be less successful than it might   
otherwise be. (p. 3) 
 
The negative manifestation of these “shadow institutions” typically comes from long-
time employees who have, through experience and attitude, developed a number of 
negative norms that spread through the organization as a whole.  Working on an 
extended research project that lasted over ten years, Allen and Pilnik utilized analysis 
of workplace discourse at over 100 companies.  Some of the emerging narratives of 
negative shadow organizations show startling similarity to many of the negative 
responses articulated in the narrative portion of this study.  Some examples from their 
work include: 
 
 Norms of autonomy and empowerment.  These include the development of 
an “us/them” mentality concerning management and leadership. (“They are 
always trying to take advantage of us around here”). 
 Norms of performance. These represent acceptance of a “good enough” 
standard of achievement. (“There’s no point in trying around here… mediocre 
results are satisfactory”). 
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 Norms of leadership and supervision. These norms tend to be negative for the 
organization when managers view policing and supervision as their role rather 
than development and empowerment. (“Managers tend to overlook their 
training… it’s best to hide your problems and avoid your supervisor”). 
 Norms of employee relations. When employees view their goals as separate or 
antithetical to the goals of the organization, the outcome tends to negatively 
impact organizational effectiveness. (“Our organization doesn’t care about the 
welfare of its associates… many of us are treated merely as an extra pair of 
hands.”) 
 Norms of innovation and change. These encompass an overarching rejection 
of change and a suspicion for new ideas. (“Around here, we hang onto to old 
ideas long after they have outlived their usefulness… you better not have an 
idea your boss didn’t come up with first.”).  
 
FSN’s (especially long serving ones) are viewed by the State Department itself as 
being the “glue” and “institutional memory” of the organization.  In many ways, with 
frequent American Officer rotation, the long serving FSN is empowered to shape the 
organizational culture of a post in ways that an officer on a temporary assignment 
cannot.  In terms of their influence in a “shadow institution” of other FSN’s, they have 
both the credibility of seniority and the status of being a part of the host culture.  Thus, 
their attitude will shape the attitudes of those around them in ways that may or may not 
be detected during an American’s time at a post (especially true considering the 
difficulties Americans may face in understanding the local language and culture).  
Based on the results of this study, the decline in commitment correlated to 
employment duration coupled with many responses that echo those identified in Allen 
and Pilnik’s (1973) work suggest another potential barrier for organizational 
effectiveness in the State Department.  The decline of commitment over time by some 
FSN’s could lead to an overall decline in commitment for FSN’s as a whole.   
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This also suggests that FSN’s may not have fully realized their own role in the 
“us/them” paradigm many have observed on the part of American Officers.  If senior 
FSN’s with declining engagement suggest that the institution favors an “us/them” 
mentality (as previous research would suggest), the result could be that other FSN’s 
accept the validity of this view.  Basic principles of perception accentuation and self-
fulfilling prophecies would then make it likely that the suggestion of the division 
between Americans and local staff make the reality of that division more likely.  This 
is not to suggest that the cultural aptitude or work attitudes of American Officers is 
optimal; both the research on State Department cultural ability and numerous items 
presented by the FSN’s themselves beg otherwise.  However, when employees become 
disengaged during long-term employment and their attitudes about the institution are 
shared, the possibility of meaningful and productive dialogue and mutual work 
between FSN’s and Americans becomes more remote.  
 
4.5 Discussion of Results Relating to Hypothesis IV 
 
The intersection of multiple cultures typically functions dialectically.  There are 
syntheses and transformations that occur via contact with the “other” (Carbaugh, 
1990).  With the frequency of contact that occurs between non-Americans and 
Americans within U.S. posts, it would be expected that there would be some cultural 
shifts that occur on both sides (Kim, 1988).  In the case of the State Department, 
however, it appears that exposure to contact with Americans has no significant 
relationship on the perception of power on the part FSN’s.  It could be attributed to the 
idea that the cultural values of FSN’s are so set, that contact with Americans will not 
be sufficient to shift their values.  This view, however, the fact that virtually all 
intercultural contact moderates the views of both sides.  One might also suggest that 
the values of State Department Officers are so wildly disparate, that a consistent and 
singular influence never reaches FSN’s at an American Post.  Yet, it would be 
expected that there should be at least some level of uniformity of values and attitudes 
for a population (American Officers) who received the same kinds of training, selected 
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the same sort of career, and operated in the same fixed structure.  While speculative, 
elements of both presumptions lack a satisfying explanation for the following question 
this result begs- why are FSN’s so uninfluenced culturally (at least in terms of power) 
by their American counterparts?  Why, when contact with Americans correlates to 
commitment, would we not see stronger results on this item? 
 
The answer could be (at least according to several narrative responses) that the 
interaction lacks the sort of cultural engagement that creates the chance for reflection 
about one’s cultural values.  Statements that point to this include “communication, 
understanding and mutual benefit are keys to building the bridges and I hope that 
management becomes more aware of this,” “lack of communication is a real barrier,” 
“this is we and this is you, we're not the same,” and “American officers have become 
increasingly distant.”  The suggestion here is that work communication lacks the sort 
of personal quality that is a part of most significantly influential relationships (DeVito, 
2009).   
 
Some might suggest that this is not only acceptable, it is appropriate.  After all, 
encouraging the FSN’s at a post to adopt a different value set smacks of the sort of 
imperialism the U.S. is regularly saddled with.  Yet there are still questions about the 
lack of cultural influence that may point potential problems the U.S. has reaching 
populations abroad. If U.S. embassies and consulates are supposed to be run in the 
same style and to the same standard as Stateside offices (U.S. Department of State: 
Careers Representing America, 2007), it would follow that a complete orientation to 
American standards and values must (or at least should) be occurring.  This result 
would suggest FSN’s face problems orienting to American values, because such 
orientation inevitably should lead to the sort of dialogue and reflection that shapes 
values in some way.  In this case, however, it appears that the values people have 
towards institutional power are unaffected by the powerful institution (the State 
Department) they work for.  In cases of public diplomacy and representing American 
values to the community, this may point to other problems (Committee on 
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Appropriations: U.S. House of Representatives, 2003).  If the people working directly 
with the Americans fail to have their values influenced by this contact, how likely is it 
that external communities will reconsider their perceptions of America?  Again, this 
research is not suggesting this as the only explanation for this phenomena (the lack of 
cultural influence that comes with frequent contact with Americans), nor should the 
State Department be challenging officers to go out and “proselytize foreigners” to 
accept American values.  Rather, this is merely a result that should give pause as the 
shift in values that typically comes through intercultural contact is not happening in 
this context.  That alone is enough to reflect on why and seek out other areas of 
diplomatic and consular operations that may be further reflected in this tendency.         
 
4.6 Discussion of Results Relating to Research Question II 
 
The emerging narratives from the open question in the survey suggest a range of issues 
within the Department that demand additional reflection, discussion, and possible 
future research.  These narratives appear closely linked to the concept of 
organizational justice; that is to say, the first four reflect concerns about an 
unresponsive, unfair institution that limits the ability and control on the part of FSN 
employees.   Organizational justice refers to people’s subjective perceptions of fairness 
in organizations (Colquitt, et al., 2001).  The perceptions of justice have strongly been 
linked to organizational commitment and job satisfaction, with many FSN concerns 
echoing the concerns of employees in organizations they perceive as unjust 
(Masterson, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Lam et al., 2002; Moorman, 1991).  This 
commitment based on the perception of organizational justice was also strongly linked 
to turnover and intention to exit a job. Moorman, et al. (1993) indicated that 
perceptions of justice were significantly related to turnover intentions and the 
perception of harmony/conflict in the organization. Loi et al. (2009) identified the four 
types of justice most often indicated by the literature: distributive, procedural, 
interpersonal, and informational (Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007; Colquitt, 2001).  
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As each narrative was seen in a broad cross-section of responses, it is important to 
reflect on each: 
 
The State Department as a structurally flawed organization  
 
The primary concerns about organizational structures included the frequency of 
Officer rotation, the lack of competitive compensation, and a structure that does not 
permit advancement for FSN’s beyond a certain level.  The frequency of Officer 
rotation creates problems of consistency.  A basis of organizational justice is 
consistency in the organization’s message, policies, and procedures (Colquitt, et al. 
2001).  Many respondents in this area noted that there is little incentive to invest in the 
job when a new Officer will likely re-do or radically alter any programs previously 
initiated.  Thus, the feeling of having work valued over time is lost along with the 
sense of ownership in organizational outcomes, compromising the sense of meaning 
that employees expect in an organization perceived as just (Mossholder et al., 1998).  
Moreover, the feeling of appreciation and fairness in compensation could also be 
compromised with the need to prove one’s self again to a newly rotated supervisor 
(also noted by respondents).  The concerns about compensation are crucial as 
Greenberg (1990) found this to be one of the most stable and overarching 
measurements of perceived organizational justice on the part of employees.  With 
many respondents voicing concern about the fact that fair FSN salary adjustments may 
not be an institutional priority, the narrative of an organization that is inconsistent in 
its valuation of employees could prove counterproductive for long-term organizational 
commitment.  In connection with salary concerns, the lack of advancement beyond a 
certain level or position also may serve as a disincentive for full organizational 
commitment (Loi et al., 2009).  A strong belief among people participating in an 
organization perceived as just is that exemplary and effective work should lead to 
promotion, greater opportunities, more responsibility in the organization’s decision-
making, etc.  An organization that systemically and (virtually) categorically denies that 
opportunity for a substantial portion of its workforce faces serious challenges in 
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creating a climate that suggests fairness or provides sufficient incentive for significant 
employee commitment.        
 
Americans separate from FSN’s and lack culturally knowledge of the host 
country. 
 
This group of responses indicates a disconnect between American Officers and FSN’s, 
as well as a disconnect between American Officers and the culture of the host country.  
Colquitt et al. (2001) argue that interpersonal respect and sensitivity is important when 
organizational procedures are executed.  They further note that informational justice, 
referring to the accuracy and quality of explanations individuals receive about 
organizational procedures, correlated to employment satisfaction and organizational 
commitment.  As interpersonal communication requires mutuality and sharing between 
interdependent people (Devito, 2009), authentic dialogue has to allow an equality of 
voice and full recognition of the “other” as a respected part of the discourse.  
Lindblom (2001) argues that information sharing is part of the relational “principle of 
cooperation” where providing information (rather than hording or obfuscating 
information) is an interactional goal.  With status often serving as a justification for the 
disconnect, the organizational tensions created by this power gap will only be 
compounded (Gouttefarde, 1996).   With many respondents noting a lack of 
meaningful dialogue between FSN’s and American staff, the perception of being fully 
valued by the institution is compromised.  This kind of disconnect is only exacerbated 
when there is a culture gap on the part of American Officers.  As Hoon Nam and Wie 
Han’s (2005) and Helfrich’s (1999), work indicates, a lack of cultural understanding 
between an organization’s leaders and employees can create misunderstandings about 
what is fair and just in the organization’s members.  In the case of the State 
Department, FSN’s must clearly accept that the values of the institution need to remain 
American.  However, the consistent theme of responses was that there was a lack of 
understanding of the local culture on the part of the Americans.  As noted, this can 
lead to confusion on the part of FSN’s in terms of policy and frustration for Americans 
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who feel that the local staff are ineffective or insubordinate.  For an organization to be 
perceived as just by its employees, understanding and respect both need to be part of 
the interaction (Colquitt et al., 2001).  The culture gap of Officers has been clearly 
shown in popular press investigations, academic research, government inquiry 
committees, and the FSN’s themselves.  As noted, this gap continues to have negative 
implications for voicing the American viewpoint abroad, but it also has internal 
implications in terms of the perception of organizational justice.  This set of responses, 
in turn, creates concerns about the magnitude and duration FSN commitment to the 
organization.       
  
FSN’s deserve empowerment, but are denied or ignored  
 
FSN’s repeatedly indicated that they their experience and knowledge of the local 
culture could benefit the work of the State Department.  Unfortunately, many also felt 
that their role was largely subordinated and their expertise largely ignored by 
American Officers.  This was also reflected in the responses that indicated a lack of 
training opportunities demonstrated a lack of interest in maximizing the capabilities of 
FSN employees.  Franz’s (2004) analysis of workplace attitudes in Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, 
and United States identified a number of findings relevant to this set of responses 
including that higher organizational empowerment consistently resulted in a stronger 
perception of justice in an organization, regardless of what country that organization is 
operating in.  While empowerment had a more direct effect on job satisfaction in more 
individualistic cultures, the perception of “empowerment as indication of a just and 
fair organization” appears to be universal.  Considering the effects of organizational 
justice perceptions on commitment and long-term employment (Colquitt, et al., 2001), 
the perception of a lack of empowerment appears to point to substantial organizational 
challenges in terms of retention and job engagement.  Crabtree (1998) furthers this 
point by suggesting that in cross-cultural organizations, empowerment is an essential 
part of effective communication.  Furthermore, she notes (in contrast to the perception 
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of many in the State Department) that empowerment must be mutual and two-way; 
that is to say, it cannot feel as though power is a gift that comes from the powerful and 
those “with authority” should willingly seek ideas from the communities they are 
engaging with. For many FSN’s, it’s not just that structural barriers precluding 
advancement are the source of their dissatisfaction- it’s the fact that many compelling 
and locally relevant ideas have been ignored or never allowed to be presented in the 
first place.   
 
Additionally, the value of training based on the perceptions of employees and the 
return for the organization is not in dispute.  Baron and Armstrong (2007) established 
a rubric based on the positive outcomes training and learning opportunities produce for 
organizations, not the least of which should be the perception of value training offers 
to those who participate in it.  By sending people to training, it suggests that their skill 
sets are important and their competence is such that they are capable of doing even 
more for the organization.  The repeated suggestion that training is not available and/or 
fairly distributed could be interpreted as a perception that the State Department does 
not view the performance of FSN’s as being worth investment.  What’s more, if a lack 
of training is hindering performance and performance evaluation is the basis for 
compensation/promotion, one might reasonably conclude that the system is unjust, 
furthering the perceived fairness gap that can erode FSN loyalty, commitment and 
focus. 
 
 Damaging policies and personalities hurt the working environment  
 
The recurring themes in this area included a feeling that some American Officers not 
only put up barriers to FSN’s, there are some that actively engage in behavior that 
hurts morale, undermines the credibility of employees, and lacks the level of respect 
that is expected in a fair working environment within an institution that may overtly or 
covertly accept (perhaps even endorse) such behavior.  When enough employees 
institutionalize these views, the expectation is that there will be a reduction in justice 
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perception and an overall reduction in commitment and effort to doing a job 
effectively.  The type of communication identified fits with the theory of 
disconfirmation in negative communication relationships (Pearson, 1993; Galvin,et al., 
2004).  Disconfirmation negates, ignores, or minimizes the existence of “the other” in 
the communication process.  Examples of this type of communication include ignoring 
the presence and expertise of others, avoiding contact, engaging in monologue style 
communication (rather than dialogue), giving orders instead of requests, engaging in 
meticulous evaluation of others, ignoring ideas presented by others, and focusing 
interactions towards the self instead of listening to the viewpoints of others.  This type 
of communication is typically linked to discrimination and is often institutionalized 
(DeVito, 2009).  The lack of institutional oversight on this issue and the belief that 
there is not a neutral and open location where such grievances can be aired is also a 
cause for concern in terms of justice perceptions.  As one respondent stated, “those 
who know, don’t care and those who care, don’t act… so what’s the point?” 
 
Beyond implications for FSN’s in the workplace, if such attitudes and behaviors are 
prevalent they call into question the efficacy of such Officers in presenting the views 
of the United States to an international audience.  Take for example the respondent 
who felt that it was culturally inappropriate for a State Department official to use his 
nickname when speaking to him in public.  Perhaps this official has an acute sense of 
the local culture and instantly utilizes that sense when dealing outside audiences in the 
host country.  A more likely outcome, however, is that the same communication 
pattern of disconfirmation experienced by the FSN’s is still (at least partially) in place 
when dealing with the local culture.  Consistently, the literature has suggested an 
arrogance and an ignorance that leads to ineffectiveness for State Department 
outreach.  If the narrative of inappropriate attitudes and behaviors on the part of 
American Officers is accepted as valid (and the prevalence of this in the written 
responses seems to indicate that the issue should be considered), perhaps this needs to 
be reflected on when making an evaluation of the institution as a whole.  A common 
adage in the world of client service suggests that a satisfied client typically only nets 
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one to two more additional satisfied clients, while a dissatisfied client typically yields 
ten more dissatisfied clients.  If the attitudes of a few officers (perhaps more) outlined 
in this research are reflected in the public face presented by the Department, the idea 
of State serving as a remedy to the misinformation and misunderstanding that is the 
basis for much of the distrust of America could be unrealistic. 
    
The State Department provides a high degree of job satisfaction   
 
While the narratives of dissatisfaction demand attention, it is also important to note the 
frequency of responses that indicated that the State Department provides a high degree 
of job satisfaction.  While some of these responses were glowing about the 
organizational culture, the values of the U.S., and the institutional structure, many 
seemed to be responding to concerns that they may have heard from colleagues.  As an 
example, one states “I think that in organization supervision it is important to involve 
subordinates in the decision making process. At the same time there are cases when 
decisions should be made in authoritative manner.”  Another follows by stating “I still 
believe that basic decisions have to be made by (American Officers)” despite the 
expertise of the local staff. This would suggest that the perceived lack of voice 
expressed by many FSN’s should be reconsidered as both fair and necessary for 
effective departmental action.  Another example of this sort of rebuttal to the views of 
many in the organization is that FSN’s should “not to allow some of the 
administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit one's 
possibilities” indicating that the complaints of others are not well founded.  Still others 
suggest that their particular area/department is the source of their happiness.  These 
responses appear to make a delineation between the quality of the State Department 
generally and the quality of their area specifically.  Others seem to indicate that in 
comparison to the working conditions at local institutions, suggesting that the State 
Department is superior and could serve as a benchmark that is needed for economic 
progress.  As one response states, “this organization rewards hard work and 
innovation… it would be ideal if other workplaces in my country did the same.”  
Another continues on this theme arguing that in terms of corruption in the country he 
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is from, the “strict control over the way money is spent (in the State Department)” has 
been enlightening.  Relating to this theme, others expressed that American supervision 
is generally more transparent and reliable than the subterfuge engaged in by the local 
staff.  This “State Department is good in comparison to X” theme is also found in the 
statement “I worked for a French embassy for about 3 years. When I compare the two 
systems, I prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the trust and 
opportunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be done.”  
Another element of many of these responses was that their specific, personal 
experience with American Officers has been excellent.  While certainly a positive 
indicator for their employment, the caveat in these responses is clearly that others have 
not had a similarly uniform series of good experiences with American Officers. 
 
While it’s tempting to label all of these responses with the broad brush of “happy 
employees,” doing so ignores the impetus that justification was needed to explain their 
positive experiences.  Basic theories of group interaction and cognitive dissonance 
hold that when an individual’s perception is different from the group’s perception, 
there is a need to rationalize this disconnect (Festinger, 1957; Cooper, 2007).  In the 
case of these “positive” responses, a careful reading suggests that these FSN’s may 
NOT be arguing for the organizational justice of the State Department.  They may 
merely be arguing that the State Department, a specific area, or supervisor is just in 
comparison to others.  Moreover, such positions may point to a situation in which 
these individuals are the minority view, as minority viewpoints tend to require greater 
rationalization to achieve consonance (Read, et al.,1997).  This is not to minimize the 
satisfaction these individuals have with their employment.  Rather, it is merely to 
suggest that a possible level of defensiveness in these responses indicates that the 
negative narratives previously documented could have attained sufficient 
organizational traction to require those having positive experiences to justify those 
perceptions. 
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On the whole, the emerging narratives that come from the responses to the open 
question seem to indicate the perception of a lack of organizational justice in many 
areas.  With justice perceptions linked to organizational commitment, the basis for 
many of the institutional problems FSN’s have in the State Department is clearly 
identified.  It is important to note that several responses indicated that things in these 
areas have gotten worse.  Qualifiers such as “in recent years,” “over the last eight 
years or so,” “in the past, things were different,” etc. seem to indicate a perception that 
a change in the attitude of the Department as a whole has been responsible for 
declining standards across a range of issues.  Perhaps the Bush Administration set a 
unilateral tone for the Department to generally disregard the worth of non-Americans.  
Perhaps increased security measures served as a basis for increasing disengagement 
with local populations, including FSN’s.  Perhaps the values of a new administration 
emphasizing multilateral partnerships will trickle down to increasing access and 
empowerment for FSN’s.  Or perhaps the view that things were better in the past is 
simply a manifestation of the Historical Fallacy where previous events are selectively 
remembered as being better than they actually were.  Answering these questions is 
beyond the scope of this research.  Further research would do well to follow up on this 
study in the future to see if the perceptions of FSN’s have significantly changed over 
time.  As the current responses represent the only opportunity available for analysis, 
the only inference possible at present is that there is a justice gap in terms of how the 
State Department is viewed as an institution.     
  
 149
Chapter 5 
 
I do know that the slickest way to lie is to tell the right amount of truth at the right time 
— and then shut up. 
 
As Smith discovered, the gap between human values and human behavior is often 
canyonous.  Humans can proclaim justice while attempting to crush it; they can 
proclaim tolerance while seeking to destroy those who are different.  If “humanity” 
can viewed as a proxy for what Heinlein saw in post-war America, the current 
attitudes of the world appear to mirror his dim view of the United States.  In a world 
increasingly weary of an America that seems to engage in policies that undermine the 
values that it promotes, the work of U.S. foreign relations must consider the anger of a 
world that, like it or not, it must engage with.  FSN’s are in the employ of the U.S. 
government, but they are also citizens of that world.  Their feelings towards America 
as they relate to culture and world attitudes represent both a window to the world and a 
suggestion of the institutional strength of the State Department.  As Smith ultimately 
found humans willing to embrace a new way of thinking, this research suggests that an 
important audience for American aspirations may be in the very FSN’s working for it.  
Unlike Stranger in a Strange Land, there may be no singular leader to change the 
world’s understanding of the United States.  Change, if possible, will need to be won 
in the understanding and respect afforded to individuals- perhaps individuals like the 
FSN’s.
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5.1 Overview of the Impacts of Research Results 
 
While much of these results have been considered in terms of their organizational 
context, there is a broader context in terms of the effect on international relations.  As 
this research has outlined the specific cultural reactions that individuals have to State 
Department employment, the general perceptions the world has towards the United 
States also should be examined in terms of relationship to culture.  The findings in this 
chapter note that high power distance in a country is generally negatively correlated to 
perceptions of the United States.  While apparently running counter to the results of 
this research, this chapter argues that the distinction points to a possibly serious 
miscalculation that overt support for U.S. institutions in high power distance cultures 
may mask serious misgivings.  Through the prism of the State Department, 
consideration is given to the idea that a general misreading of what overt support 
means in relation to culture may be a source of ongoing missteps in overall U.S. 
foreign policy.  Considering the extent of many of the negative stereotypes the world 
has towards the United States, the origin of FSN dissatisfaction with the State 
Department is also considered.  Do negative stereotypes frame FSN dissatisfaction or 
do negative behaviors match existing stereotypes?  While a fully salient answer is 
probably unattainable, what is clear is the damage that this dissatisfaction can do on 
world perception of the United States.  With FSN’s in a unique position to speak either 
for or against the United States in their home communities, the public diplomacy role 
of FSN’s is reflected upon.  Given the extent to which FSN dissatisfaction appeared to 
be correlated with objections to the Bush administration, consideration is given to 
evaluating the extent to which “Obamamania” may positively shape the institution.  
For a number of institutional and political reasons, this analysis suggests that 
meaningful change both in the world and the State Department created by the new 
administration will be either fleeting or nominal in scope.  Thus, the foundation of 
change in world attitudes towards the U.S. is best realized by meaningful and ethical 
utilization of resources such as Foreign Service Nationals.  
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5.2 Anti-Americanism, Culture, and Power Distance 
 
Research into the phenomena of Anti-Americanism is far-reaching and varied.  For 
purposes of focus and clarity, this portion of the research will focus on examining 
recent literature that suggests Anti-American attitudes that could be informed by the 
results of this study.  As Sardar and Davies (2002) argue, the resentment held by the 
world towards the United States is salient in most populations.  Noting how widely 
held this attitude is, Katzenstien and Keohane (2006) summarize the world’s position 
by stating: 
 
When its Belgrade embassy is bombed, Chinese people believe it was a deliberate act of the United States 
government; terror plots by native British subjects are viewed as reflecting British support for American 
policy; when AIDS devastates much of Africa, the United States is faulted for not doing enough to stop it 
(p. 25). 
 
While unsurprisingly more intense in some locations, the attitude that the policies of 
the United States are not good for the world is held in places that would seem to be 
pro-American or at least benign to U.S. interests.   Many Middle Eastern populations 
find the U.S. to be untrustworthy as expressions of support for democratic reforms are 
seemingly contradicted by policies that include tolerance for autocratic regimes in the 
region (Peterson, 2002).  Of course, Muslims do not live only in Arab nations: the 
majority of the world's Muslims, diverse in religious and social attitudes, is spread 
around the globe, with heavy concentrations in Central, South, and Southeast Asia.  As 
Peterson (2002) notes, their views of America have a different mix of pros and cons, 
as do attitudes in Western Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and elsewhere.  Concerns 
regarding trade law, subsidized agriculture, environmental standards, and the 
perception of a unilateral superpower contribute to a disparaging worldview for many. 
Even the tone of “stalwart” allies has grown increasingly acrimonious, with many 
European populations and governments openly suggesting that the U.S. is not only 
inappropriately using its power, but it is doing so in a way that invites dangerous 
outcomes for the world.  The promise of independence from U.S. influence was a 
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primary voter motivation on the part of the electorate in 2009 parliamentary elections 
in Japan (The Economist, Sept. 5, 2009).   Given the vital role of such partners in 
international cooperation on issues such as the global economic decline, the prevention 
of terrorism, and the creation of a climate favorable for improved environmental 
policies, this rift has profound implications (Peterson, 2002).  Scholarship in this area 
suggests that the opportunity to improve this climate is unlikely to come about so long 
as globalization is seen as a soft-pedaled attempt at Americanization (Katzenstein & 
Keohane 2006).      
 
While the literature suggests a widely varying historical basis for Anti-Americanism, 
contemporary analysis of these attitudes suggests an emerging manifestation of this 
attitude composed of the following elements: the discussion of America in terms of 
crude stereotypes; the causal attribution of malign intent and implausible (sometimes 
conspiratorial) omnipotence to the U.S. government; and the desire to narrow one’s 
own society’s contact with corrupting American influence (Cox, 2008).  While there 
are certainly zealots who literally see the United States as an instrument of some sort 
of supernatural evil, Cox suggests that, in the main, Anti-Americanism operates from a 
quasi-rational (if circular) set of logical principles.  Moreover, these attitudes should 
not be misconstrued as authentic criticism of U.S. policy.  Instead, the rejection of 
policies emerging from the U.S. is not discussed on its own terms, but, rather, as an 
indication of a deeper and more profound cultural, intellectual, attitudinal, ethical, and 
spiritual poverty that has infected (perhaps chronically?) American society.  The crude 
stereotypes ascribed to Americans include items such as cultural illiteracy, laziness, a 
lack of foresight/planning, willful ignorance, dishonesty, selfishness, arrogance, self-
indulgence, hypocrisy, inattentiveness, and an unwillingness or inability to engage in 
dialogue with those outside of its borders (Peterson, 2002).  Furthering this typology 
of Anti-Americanism, Katzenstein and Keohane’s 2007 book Anti-Americanisms in 
World Politics suggest that these stereotypes are manifested in global politics via one 
or more foundational worldviews including liberal objections (the U.S. does not live 
up to its ideals); social objections (lack of social welfare, the death penalty, 
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unilateralist policies, spotty adherence to international treaties); sovereign nationalist 
objections (desire to reinforce sovereignty and power of one's state); and radical anti-
Americanisms (calls for the destruction or transformation of U.S. institutions).  Thus, 
the cultural perception of Americans as “ignorant” or “selfish” becomes political 
“liberal objection” as the U.S. is cast as a country that willfully or stupidly ignores the 
human rights violations that its policies foster while continuing to proclaim the mantra 
of “Land of the Free.”  Indeed, the case can clearly be made that objections to the 
United States in terms of base stereotypes cannot be separated from political 
implications in which the U.S. is viewed as an unreliable or unworthy political partner 
(Arnoff, 2008).  As Katzenstein and Keohane (2006) note, Anti-Americanism is more 
than simply opposition to what the United States does, but extends to opposition to 
what the United States is.       
 
It should be noted that despite the virulence of rhetoric expressed against the United 
States, the interest and appreciation that many have towards American culture cannot 
be separated from this animosity.  As Diven (2007) recalls at a protest in the 
Philippines, one protester carried a sign stating ‘‘Yankee Go Home—and Take Me 
with You!’’ This perhaps exemplifies the ambivalent attitudes of some critics of the 
United States.  It is this attitude, of simultaneous aversion and attraction that could best 
characterize the attitude that much of the world has towards the United States.  One 
could vocally criticize foundational aspects of American culture while, at the same 
time, pine for a Harley Davidson or Harvard professorship (or both).  This could 
represent a unique space of personal political worldview.  If someone finds a region or 
country repugnant, it is almost certain that avoidance will be part of that attitude 
(Storti, 2002).  Yet in the case of Anti-Americanism, fascination and consumption 
appear to exist in parallel and not exclusive to animosity and hatred.  This is central to 
Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2006; 2007) thesis that the polyvalence of American 
culture and policy is the foundation for world resentment.  They offer numerous 
examples of the polyvalence of United States.  Clerics in the Middle East decry the 
lack of morality in a sexual explicit and hedonistic culture, while the United States has 
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the most robust church attendance of any industrialized country.  Liberals criticize the 
U.S. for a repressive society, while the U.S. leads much of the world in policies 
favoring women’s emancipation and gay rights.  Human rights advocates decry U.S. 
military and security policies, while America has played a crucial role in genocide 
intervention and aid to the world’s poor and disenfranchised.  In sum, Katzenstein and 
Keohane argue that the United States simultaneously creates arguments for Anti-
Americanisms while engaging in actions that seemingly should mitigate them.  
Ironically, as noted in the previous chapter, U.S. public diplomacy in recent years has 
failed to utilize the attractive aspects of American culture as a narrative antidote to 
those aspects that many in the world find objectionable.  This failure, coupled with the 
fact that American humanitarian and developmental contributions have been poorly 
lighted to the world (especially in cases such as Kosovo and in the aftermath of the 
recent Pakistani earthquake where large Muslim populations were the beneficiaries) 
has contributed to a climate where programs such as the State Department’s efforts at 
public diplomacy have had difficulty in creating measurable changes in these attitudes 
(Peterson, 2002).  
 
As the focus of this research is primarily on the role of FSN’s in the State Department, 
the intersection of their cultural values with organizational values, and the impacts of 
this relationship on the institution in its representative function, it is important to 
consider world attitudes towards the U.S. in relation to the cultural contexts that 
inform them.  Specifically, what are the unique opinions of specific countries and how 
might those opinions relate to this research?  Fortunately, Glick et. al’s 2006 study 
provides an ideal framework for the exploration of such questions. 
 
5.2 Anti-Americanism, Culture, and Power Distance        
 
One of the most comprehensive studies of recent sentiment towards the United States 
was conducted by Glick et al. (2006).  The population of their study was composed of 
some 5000 respondents in 11 nations.  Participants indicated their perceptions of the 
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personality traits of, intentions of, and emotional reactions to the United States.  A 
central thesis justifying the importance of this research progress is their suggestion that 
“perceptions of America as a powerful but malevolent nation decrease its security” (p. 
363).  Several compelling results relating to this research include the following items: 
 
Table 10: World Perception of U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006) 
 
 
Glick et al.’s findings confirm the stereotype of the United States as a competent, 
arrogant nation that lacks “warmth.”  It’s also important to note that the argument that 
the world makes a sophisticated distinction between the attitudes and actions of U.S. 
citizens and the U.S. government is not born out through these researchers’ findings.  
Only moderate and inconsistent levels of relationship were identified in which 
respondents indicated a measurably distinct opinion between the Americans and their 
government.  Noting the research that Cold War public diplomacy focused on the use 
of non-state actors to make the case for a pluralistic and open society coupled with the 
argument that the U.S. has minimized public diplomacy to focus on military and 
governmental channels, this measure could be seen as a possible outcome of this 
prioritization.  Of relevance to this research is the fact several FSN narrative responses 
drew a distinction between perceptions of the State Department and perceptions of the 
U.S. as a whole.  As noted, these responses were exceptional.  For many, “the 
Americans” was used synonymously with Foreign Service Officers, Supervisors, and 
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the State Department.  In the context of Glick et al.’s findings, it would seem that the 
general sense is that perception of American institutions should be viewed as generally 
consistent with the perception of America as a whole.   
 
Glick et al. found a similar consistency in attitudes regarding perceptions of the U.S. 
government mirroring perceptions of U.S. citizens in measuring the emotional opinion 
of the 11 nations: 
 
Table 11: World Emotions towards U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006) 
 
 
While envy (generally regarded as a socially undesirable trait) scored lower than the 
other two emotional measures utilized, the cumulative evaluation of these measures 
suggests what Glick et al. refer to as an “ambivalent” emotional attitude towards both 
the citizens and government of the United States, with similar levels admiration and 
contempt shown in most countries.  As many countries in the survey are considered 
“staunch” allies of the United States with similar political goals and challenges, this 
symmetry for positive and negative emotional reaction towards the U.S. should be 
disconcerting as it may indicate only soft support or non-support for American 
international objectives.  At the micro-level of diplomacy examined in this research (a 
single post, consulate, or embassy), there is similarly inconsistent support for 
American Officers.  While some respondents indicated much admiration for the 
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institution, many narrative responses, survey totals, and retention levels, all indicated a 
similar sort of “ambivalence” towards long tenure and organizational investment.  In 
the case of public diplomacy, this lack of personal investment corresponds to a lack of 
institutional investment in reaching out to constituencies with hostile or negative 
attitudes towards the United States.  Three states in Glick et al.’s research (or two and 
Palestine, depending on one’s predilection) specifically are facing challenges in which 
American intervention is far more salient: Palestine, Korea, and Turkey.  Of interest to 
this research is the fact that in each of these three examples, the level of admiration 
was far lower than the level of contempt (both for citizens and the government).  This 
would seem to suggest that the previous level of Cold War public diplomacy in which 
U.S. efforts focused on creating support in opposition countries has dwindled in much 
the way current research argues (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008; Barron, 2007; 
Schneider, 2006). 
 
When combining the emotional perception of and the traits ascribed to the United 
States and its citizens, a final relevant category emerges: the perceived goals of the 
U.S. 
 
Table 12: Goal Perception of U.S. (Glick, et al., 2006) 
 
With near unanimity, the perception is that the U.S. is primarily concerned with 
domination and maintenance of its position of superiority, with a greatly reduced 
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interest/respect for human rights.  While the gap between “domination/superiority” 
and “human rights” is lower in several U.S. allies (Israel and Australia) and wider in 
countries that perceive American intervention in their regions to be a threat (Palestine, 
Korea, and Turkey), the generalized international perception of a self-absorbed, 
uncaring superpower consistent with Katzenstein and Keohane’s (2006; 2007) thesis 
emerges.  And as Katzenstein and Keohane argue, the distinction between the 
government and its citizens is not clearly defined, again re-enforcing that the message 
of America (in terms of public diplomacy) is primarily viewed as being the message of 
the American government. 
 
In reference to this research, orientation to power distance in each of the cultures 
studied bears scrutiny.  Hofstede (1980) identified the scores of numerous countries on 
the scale of power distance.  For purposes of a general comparison, the 11 nations 
studied in Glick et al.’s work are identified below: 
 
Table 13: PD/11 Nation Study (Hofstede, 1980) 
 
Power 
Distance 
Australia 36 
Belgium 65 
Brazil 69 
Chile 63 
England 35 
Israel 13 
Italy 50 
Japan 54 
Korea 60 
Palestine 
(Arab Countries) 
80 
Taiwan 58 
Turkey 66 
 
While virtually impossible to fully bifurcate culture from international events, this 
comparison suggests an interesting tension with the results of this study: high power 
distance seems to negatively correlate to a variety of perceptions of the United States, 
while high power distance also seems to positively correlate to organizational 
commitment to the United States State Department by FSN’s.  In the case of 
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comparison to Glick et al.’s work, countries such as Australia, Italy, and Japan (with 
relatively lower levels of power distance) tended to have a more favorable view of the 
United States across a range of emotional and image-related measures. Hofstede’s 
research focused on Israel as a singular country, with Palestinian results linked to a 
more generalized “Arab” identity.  This is obviously problematic if attempting to build 
an argument that approaches a level of social scientific fact (to say nothing of the 
political events that have shaped the perceptions of both groups), however for the 
purpose of acquiring a general understanding of culture and its implications on 
attitude, this distinction has proven valid (Cohen, 2003).  The results, nonetheless, 
further the argument that power distance is in some way related to a country’s view of 
the United States with Israel’s score of 13 corresponding to a generally favorable view 
and Palestine’s score of 80 corresponding to a range of negative views towards the 
U.S. and its people.  Again, a conclusive statement that X level of power distance 
corresponds to Y level of support for the U.S. is not the goal of this research (and, 
frankly, probably a proposition that cannot be realized).  What is suggested by 
previous research, however, is that there is some level of relationship between these 
two measures. 
 
In contrast to these research results, high power distance was positively correlated to 
organizational commitment to the U.S. State Department by FSN’s.  There are several 
arguments that could be made in attempting to explain this schism.  Initially, one 
might argue that in countries with high power distance (typically less supportive of the 
U.S.), the FSN workforce might be composed of cultural outliers who support 
America despite the likely negative views from the local community.  While 
potentially explanatory, this ignores the fact that FSN’s who choose to work for the 
U.S. government in low power distance countries would also likely have a more 
favorable orientation to the United States in selecting the State Department as an 
employer.  Another argument might be that employees in high power distance 
countries (regardless of workplace) will report higher levels of organizational 
commitment out of a sense of loyalty to hierarchy or a need to retain a job for financial 
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reasons (assuming a lack of opportunities in a potentially underdeveloped country).  
However, this research has shown that employment retention intention and tenure were 
unaffected by the power distance orientation of FSN’s.  Thus, the most compelling 
justification for this tension is that overt indications of support in high power distance 
countries may cover up more covert doubts and even rebellion against the institution 
(Peterson, 2003; Alvez et al., 2006).  This is especially damaging for any attempt by 
the State Department to depend on the support of FSN’s in such cultural settings, as 
Officers may take the spoken “yes” of local staff to be a more meaningful indication of 
commitment than what is actually inferred.  This danger of misappropriation of 
cultural meaning is not hypothetical- as Hofstede (1980) identified the U.S. as a low 
context culture in which written and spoken statements are viewed as the definitive 
promise of commitment.  As such, the institution of the State Department may 
wrongly be assuming that an argumentative FSN community has a lower level of 
commitment while a compliant FSN community is more reliable.  While highly 
speculative, this could point to a more global problem for the United States in 
international relations.  If U.S. foreign policy operates from a perspective that assumes 
overt support from members of the international community indicates reliability and 
partnership, it is possible that this may lead to agreements and alliances that don’t 
serve U.S. interests over time.  The list of leaders who enjoyed U.S. support only to 
wreak havoc in the wake of that support is considerable (Osama bin Laden, Sadam 
Hussein, Manuel Noriega, ad nauseam).  The corollary of snapping back at those who 
share similar policies and values with the U.S. when they criticize American action 
was fully in evidence in the run up to the second Gulf War.  While this research only 
covers the case of FSN’s working for the State Department, it is worth considering and 
reflecting in future research to see if this tendency to accept overt statements of 
support (when culture, history, and intention suggest otherwise) has compromised the 
ability of the United States to conduct its foreign affairs.    
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5.3 Results as a Reflection of Anti-American Attitudes                         
 
While the gap between stated commitment and power distance is an area of concern 
highlighted by these research results, the narrative responses produce data that 
suggests that many of the prevailing attitudes of Anti-Americanism are present in the 
worldwide FSN population.  Specifically, looking at the work of Katzenstein and 
Keohane’s (2006; 2007) and Glick et al. (2006), several categories of Anti-Americanism 
could be identified in the 260 written statements from FSN respondents.  Specifically, the 
following themes related to stereotypes of the United States and its citizens could be 
identified in the description of the State Department and its personnel: 
 
Table 14: Anti-Americanism/Narrative Survey Responses 
Attitude Linked to Anti-Americanism Frequency 
Arrogance  102 instances 
Cultural Insensitivity 88 instances 
Laziness 37 instances 
Lack of Future Focus 47 instances 
Coldness 29 instances 
 
In the case of arrogance, a number of respondents noted that the attitude of the State 
Department minimized the importance of FSN contributions and reflected an “us first” 
perspective towards the organization.  While several noted that focusing on the U.S. 
mission was important, the perceived incompetence of FSN’s made the work 
unsatisfying and results more inefficient as the important local perspective was not 
included as part of the decision-making process.  Cultural insensitivity was also 
indicated as being a primary problem as Officers were viewed as uninformed and (at 
best) disinterested in the local situation.  The perception of laziness along with a lack 
of future focus were typically seen as foundational issues to perceived organizational 
weakness, with American staff focusing on short duration postings with little effort 
extended towards sustainability of policies and programs.  Like cultural insensitivity 
and arrogance, the perception of many FSN’s appears to be that the American Officers 
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put up barriers to access for “outsiders” to the extent that their attitude is one of 
coldness instead of collegiality and friendliness.  In sum, many of the stereotypes 
outlined in recent research dealing with Anti-Americanism are present in the 
observations of FSN’s regarding the institution.  And while difficult to link causally, 
one could argue these attitudes affect related items in the study such as duration of 
employment, organizational investment, and job commitment.   
 
Having identified the presence of these attitudes in the FSN population, the 
challenging question emerges of considering the extent to which these attitudes were 
created by employment experiences at the State Department versus the extent to which 
these attitudes existed prior to employment with experience serving as validation of an 
existing viewpoint.  The relevance of this distinction cannot be overstated.  If the 
opinions reached by many FSN’s regarding Americans emerged organically through 
their employment at the State Department, it suggests that the existing stereotypes of 
Americans as arrogant, insensitive, lazy, and disengaged from reality could be based in 
reality; that is to say, the stereotypes reflect existing and observed American behavior 
on the part of FSN’s.  If, on the other hand, the stereotype existed for FSN’s prior to 
being employed by the State Department and served as a frame for observed behavior 
of Americans, it could suggest that the negative images held by many in the world 
towards Americans is so pervasive that neutral and open interaction may now prove to 
be difficult.  Devito (2009) speaks to this issue in describing the human perception 
tendencies regarding the attribution of control and overattribution.  These tendencies 
suggest that in an attempt to ascribe motive to human behavior, human tendency is to 
identify a finite number of characteristics to an individual or group and utilize these 
characteristics as a sort of heuristic to explain that person’s or group’s behavior.  In the 
case of negative FSN perception of Americans, it could be that the stereotypes of the 
United States have so permeated the world that close contact with Americans will only 
serve to re-enforce these stereotypes.  If FSN’s, a group that has willingly chosen a 
close personal and professional association with the U.S. government, are so shaped 
by these negative preconceptions, it is quite foreboding for any attempt the United 
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States may make at world engagement with populations even less receptive to the 
American viewpoint.  Alternatively, if an open/positive perspective on the part of 
many FSN’s was negatively impacted by frequent interaction with American Officers, 
it suggests that many of the world’s worst perceptions of Americans may exist openly 
in the culture of the State Department.  Additionally, given that the relationship 
between Officers and FSN’s has the character of both personal interaction and 
professional contact with the U.S. Government, Glick et al.’s results that show strong 
overlap between perceptions of the government and the American people is very much 
realized in this relationship.  In sum, the world’s perceptions of the American people 
and the American government would seem to be manifested in the attitudes of the 
FSN’s.   
 
5.4 Results as a Contributor to Anti-American Attitudes 
 
It is difficult to quantify the extent to which the tensions and contradictions faced by 
FSN’s may contribute to worldwide Anti-American sentiment.  While there are only 
several thousand FSN’s worldwide, it could be argued that a number of characteristics 
regarding their position may produce substantial impacts on world opinion.  A good 
analogy could be the work of the Fulbright program.  In the case of this program, 
direct and sustained engagement with the U.S. and its institutions has produced 
numerous “citizen diplomats” who articulate and explain American attitudes and 
values to their country of residence (Bellamy & Weinberg, 2008).  While not 
specifically identified as such, FSN’s (designed or de facto) serve a similar role.  It is 
not difficult to imagine FSN’s returning home after a day of working at a U.S. post 
only to be asked questions by their friends and families about what Americans are 
“really like.”  It could also be expected that the people of their community will give 
the answers given by FSN’s a greater level of merit.  Thus, the opinions of 30,000+ 
people worldwide will be crucially in shaping the opinions of an exponentially higher 
number of constituents.  If the suggestion given by FSN’s is that Americans are 
honest, fair, open, and engaged, it could go a long way in changing the perceptions of 
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many.  If, alternatively, these FSN’s answer such questions with answers that mirror 
much of the world’s opinions about Americans, one could similarly expect that the 
negative stereotypes will be validated and perhaps made more intense considering that 
FSN’s are seen to be in a position of greater knowledge about America and its values.  
The attitudes of FSN’s could then be viewed as extension of American public 
diplomacy and a manifestation of soft power.  Currently, no literature or publications 
coming from the State Department suggests an understanding of this role in FSN 
employment.  Given the responses to this survey that local staff are uncomfortable or 
unable to discuss even basic elements of their job/experience, it would seem that this is 
another opportunity for world engagement that is being lost. 
 
Beyond the representational function FSN’s could serve in their community, the 
impact of compromising the morale of local staff could also contribute to negative 
perceptions on the part of the international community.  While FSN staff indicated a 
willingness to go beyond expected performance levels, the reduced commitment with 
employment duration, the interest in entertaining other professional opportunities, 
along with a number of items outlined in narrative responses seems to indicate that 
turnover and fluctuating commitment levels may compromise State Department 
performance in a number of ways.  This compromised performance could play a role 
in decreased effectiveness in interaction with the host country.  For example, if the 
FSN’s in a visa section are all recent hires or feel dissatisfied with their 
supervisor/position, they may be less helpful in dealing with visa applications.  This, in 
turn, may cause applicants to view the institution as being obstinate, disengaged, or 
arrogant.  Another possibility is that FSN’s tasked with public diplomacy projects may 
be tasked with programs initiated by an Officer that are locally unfeasible.  With 
energy and resources committed to project that fails to produce a positive outcome in 
terms of connecting with a host country’s population, the result may do little to change 
perspectives.  In short, as U.S. posts serve as functional windows to the United States, 
failures caused by misuse or mistreatment of FSN’s could exacerbate negative views 
of America held by the residents of a host country.   
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Again, as noted in the previous research, the basis for Anti-Americanism is 
complicated and multi-faceted.  No one instance can be seen as causing worldwide 
resentment or limiting the effectiveness of American foreign policy.  The attitudes that 
FSN’s develop in their employment cannot be directly linked to global negative 
attitudes towards the United States in any directly measurable way.  It is important to 
note, however, their role and their performance has a direct impact in the attitudes of 
many individuals towards the United States.  Reflecting on Batora’s and Nye’s views 
on public diplomacy, the multiplicity of individual attitudes can deeply affect global 
attitudes.  While this research shows widespread interest in job engagement on the part 
of FSN’s, the cultural misunderstandings and the declining levels of commitment also 
deserve consideration.  If FSN’s are seen as a crucial instrument in international 
engagement, failures to effectively utilize this resource must also be considered when 
world opinion suggest that a lack of engagement is a serious shortcoming of the United 
States. 
 
5.5 Barack Hussein Obama: The Pink Elephant in the Room 
 
In both recent world opinion and in the statements given by FSN’s in this research, 
there is a largely unspoken but palpable influence of the presidency of George W. 
Bush.  Fairly or unfairly, Bush became the physical embodiment of what was seen as 
the worst elements of the United States and its government.  Jingoistic, self-centered, 
imperialist, and grossly ignorant, the perceptions of Bush became synonymous with 
perceptions of the inherent “dark character” of the United States.  So extensive was 
world hatred of Bush that Blackburn (2008) noted in response to the Project on 
International Policy Attitudes 20 nation survey: 
 
Around the world, Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin beat President Bush in the trustworthiness polls. Not 
that they do so splendidly among the men and women in the streets, rues and avenidas. It's just that Mr. 
Bush does worse. He usually does worse than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well… Mr. Bush was 
unpopular most places pretty early. He became unpopular at home comparatively recently. He staked 
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his foreign policy on the belief that everybody yearns for freedom. Now, the leader of the Free World is 
beaten in polls worldwide by undemocratic rulers of China and Russia (p 3).     
 
Such reactions are validated by a number of studies including a 20-country poll 
coordinated by the Project on International Policy Attitudes at the University of 
Maryland in 2008 where Vladimir Putin was found to be more trustworthy and 
democratic in every nation with the exception of Spain, Nigeria, and Thailand 
(Blackburn, 2008).  In the period immediately after Bush’s second election, negative 
reaction was felt even more sharply, with a poll of over 20,000 people in 21 countries, 
in late 2004/early 2005 showing that a solid majority (58%) viewed Bush's re-election 
as negative for world peace and security, with only about a quarter of those polled 
(26%) calling the re-election a positive step (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 
2005).  The reasons for this negative perception are both well documented and as 
varied as the negative perceptions of America.  Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of 
the world’s hatred of Bush is the closeness with which such hatred mirrors the 
stereotypes that much of the world holds about the United States as a whole.  Virtually 
every aspect of Anti-Americanism identified in this research was present in the 
world’s conception of Bush’s failures and shortcomings- ranging from cultural 
insensitivity (calling for a “crusade” in the Middle East) to a lack of intellectual 
proficiency (“You've also got to measure in order to begin to effect change that's just 
more - when there's more than talk, there's just actual - a paradigm shift”) to poor 
planning (appearing in front of a “Mission Accomplished” banner in Iraq in 2003) to 
apparent indifference to basic human rights standards.  For diverse world populations 
with diverse grievances towards the United States, Bush stood as a salient and tangible 
embodiment of virtually every criticism against the U.S. one could construct (Sweig, 
2006).   
 
While not overtly mentioned in the narrative responses of FSN’s, the suggestion of a 
more sinister organizational tone in roughly the timeframe of Bush’s election was 
present in many of the responses: 
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• In the recent years, at our Post, FSNs have become increasingly displeased… I have heard it over and 
over again from the FSNs who have been here for more than 15 years - things are very different now, 
and not for the better. 
• Some of the answers are related to my feelings towards the current Administration. The answers would 
have been different if you had asked the questions 8 years ago. 
• If you would have given me this survey just a couple of years ago, I would have answered the questions 
very differently: I used to really feel part of this organization, even emotionally attached… I remember 
the time when everybody, American officers and FSN's alike, were one big family. These days, the 
American officers really show that you are inferior to them. 
• In past, we had more chance to help, support and give ideas. Now for FSN's it is harder and more 
difficult to communicate with American supervisors. In past I felt as a part of family and now I am just 
employee. 
• The new officers coming in ... are just soooo different and distant from then the 'old guard'. 
• When I first came to work in this organization, I was proud of it. But now, after 10 years, I feel 
disappointed. 
• In the beginning of my 10+ years at the State Dept. the atmosphere was fairly good, however within 2 
years that deteriorated sharply. Generally one is very aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 
cultures and that an FSN will always be considered an inferior... 
 
In these and similar responses, the impression is a decline in the attitude of the 
organization towards FSN’s that approximately coincides with Bush’s ascendancy.  In 
social science survey research, there is a bias in which people recall higher levels of 
satisfaction with previous instances over current ones.  The responses of FSN’s could 
merely be a reflection of that bias (“things were better in the ‘good old days’”) or they 
could point to a more significant manifestation of world perception on the operation of 
the State Department.  Referring to section 5.4 of this research, similar questions 
emerge about the correlation/causation of the Bush administration on the decline of 
FSN morale in the State Department.  Did administration policies and attitudes 
fundamentally change the actions of Foreign Service Officers or was the specter of 
Bush-as-Boogeyman so great that the negative behaviors on the part of Officers were 
attributed to an imagined realignment of fundamental State Department values?  A 
fully satisfying answer is not tenable, but it is clear that a number of FSN’s ascribed 
the period of the Bush administration as being the foundation for unsatisfying changes 
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in the institution.  Whether real or imagined, however, the perception has acquired the 
feeling of truth for many respondents.   
 
Perhaps such intense animosity directed towards a single individual created vacuum 
from which only a newly knighted “hero” could emerge.  For both the United States 
and the world, that hero was constructed as Barack Hussein Obama.  As both the 
world and much of the FSN community cast George W. Bush the “villain,” it is 
necessary to explore the extent to which America’s redemptive “champion” could 
change such perceptions.  Obama created an unprecedented euphoria in world reaction 
to a U.S. presidential election.  As a person of African heritage, as a child of an 
immigrant, and as a product of a single mother with working class roots, the mythos of 
Obama was framed as a validation of the American values of tolerance, opportunity, 
and equality.  His Harvard education and editorial position on The Harvard Law 
Review spoke against perceptions of the United States as a nation that embraces an 
anti-intellectual view of its leaders and policies.  His election was also framed as a 
vehement response to the liberal, social, and sovereign objections to the United States.  
In terms of liberal objections, the world press quickly noted Obama’s intent to 
dismantle the Guantanamo prison camp and change surveillance/detention policies as 
an indication that the U.S. was going to focus on a foreign policy that lived up to its 
ideals.  The Spanish national daily El País proclaimed that Obama’s victory is a 
chance to turn the page after a presidency characterized by “eight years of 
incompetence and abuses.”  Germany’s Bild-Zeitung stated "Barack Obama has won 
more than just the U.S. Presidential election: he has won the hearts of the (world).”  
The Syrian daily Ath Thawra suggested that a historic change could allow America to 
re-engage on policies related to social justice throughout the world.  The state-owned 
Egyptian Gazette ran the headline “World hopes for a ‘less arrogant’ America.”  In 
answering many social objections to the United States, Obama promised healthcare 
reform, government investment in job creation, and an increased focus on 
environmental policy.  In the days immediately after his election, the Austrian national 
newspaper Die Kronen Zeitung proclaimed that Obama would end American wars in 
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the Middle East, help solve the world economic downturn, provide national healthcare 
for all Americans, increase environmental standards, provide aid and support to 
developing countries, and heal America’s racial divide.  The feeling that sovereign 
concerns about the United States could be remedied through an Obama presidency has 
been frequently articulated throughout the world.  For example, in Obama’s June 3, 
2009 speech in Cairo, his suggestion for a state solution in Palestine and a more 
generalized respect for institutions in the region and in the world created an immediate 
positive response from those who identified themselves as skeptics of U.S. foreign 
policy actions and motives (Childress, et al., 2009).  One Egyptian observer suggested 
"just one of him is worth 10 George Bushes (Childress, et al., 2009)."  In sum, the 
consistent message of much of the world was that Obama was some sort of 
transformational remedy to the American identity created under George W. Bush.   
 
 While the survey distributed for this research project was done prior to Obama’s 
election, given the perception that Bush’s tenure had (in some way) negatively 
affected the organizational attitude of the State Department, it logically follows that an 
Obama administration would be viewed with optimism in its ability to re-establish the 
more open relationships (real or imagined) previous administrations fostered.  The 
tone of openness and engagement suggested in the honeymoon period of Obama’s 
ascension would certainly speak to such a change; however there is reason to doubt 
that the cultural shift FSN’s presumably hope for (and perhaps expect) will come 
about.  There are three key reasons that such optimism is likely misplaced. 
 
1.  Presidential administrations have long-lamented the lack of effect their programs, 
goals, and initiatives have had on the State Department. 
2.  There are structural dimensions to the State Department that make the organization 
change resistant. 
3.  Sentiment appears to be growing that the general promise of change Obama spoke 
for in his election may be unrealizable or seriously mitigated by political reality. 
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Initially, the effect of Presidential administrations on the State Department has 
historically been nominal in scope (Krizay, 1988; Rubin, 1985; Gingrich, 2003).  
While administrations come and go based on the political choices of constituents, the 
position of Foreign Service Officers is a sort of constant.  Given their position of 
entrenchment, considering the problems a mass exodus of career officers would create, 
and keeping in mind the fact that much of the State Department’s work is no longer 
overtly political, the ability to operate in a fashion largely independent from 
Washington ensures that the day to day operations of the organization are (for the most 
part) not affected by the climate emanating from the White House.  This, coupled with 
the fact that the work of foreign policy is now largely done in structures independent 
from the State Department (Rubin, 1985), means that Presidential goals and values do 
not necessarily affect the attitudes and actions of individual posts on a range of issues. 
 
Additionally, structural dimensions to the State Department ensure that the policies of 
a President carry little weight in the operations embassies and consulates.  While the 
President has the power to make political appointments, Obama has appointed only 
about a third of ambassadors, which is in line with historical trends (“Obama admits 
some ambassador picks political”; January 9, 2009).  The remaining two-thirds of all 
ambassadors are career State Department employees who (ostensibly) are supposed to 
represent an administration’s values and policies, but who, nonetheless, are a product 
of the existing State Department culture.  For those who are political appointees, the 
expectation of competence, consistency, and availability is often not well founded.  In 
describing the training process that these political appointees go through, Kushlis 
(2008) states: 
 
If anyone thinks a two-week how-to-be-an-Ambassador course at the State Department’s Foreign Service 
Institute is adequate preparation for becoming a US Ambassador, he (or she) must be smoking something 
far stronger than tobacco. But that – according to the August American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), 
which counts all former Secretaries of State and various other American foreign policy luminaries as 
members – is what newly appointed ambassadors get. I could add whether they need it or not – but that 
seems unnecessarily gratuitous[…] Professional staff runs the Embassy. They do so because 1) there are 
months between the time an individual is nominated for an Ambassadorial position and actually arrives at 
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post; and 2) most political Ambassadors haven’t a clue as to what being an Ambassador is all about 
anyway. Frankly, they never really run much more than their secretary and those individuals in the 
administrative office who tend to their personal needs. Then it’s time for them to leave – wearing the 
honorific title on their lapel pins to the grave. As a consequence, the highest ranking professional staffer – 
the Deputy Chief of Mission – is tasked not only with ensuring that the Embassy functions smoothly, that 
US interests are represented as well and as appropriately as possible and that the Ambassador and his or 
her spouse (or other kin who may have come along for the spare bedroom) cause as little damage as 
possible while in the country – and ideally are turned into public relations assets - rather than liabilities 
(retrieved on October 26, 2009 from http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/2008/07/how-not-to-
appo.html). 
 
While Kushlis’ tone is frank to the point of being pithy, her career as an FSO along 
with a litany of anecdotal and compiled evidence suggests that politically appointed 
ambassadors typically serve for relatively short periods with varying degrees of 
effectiveness in their position.  Diaz (2009) notes that while political appointments to 
sensitive posts such as Ambassador to the United Nations or to strategically important 
regions or states serve as an extension of administration policy, the vast majority of 
political appointees are large-scale campaign donors (with some cynically suggesting 
that the desirability of an ambassadorship comes with a correspondingly high price 
tag).  Obama’s administration (despite campaign promises) has continued this practice 
with many appointees lacking diplomatic experience, knowledge of the host country, 
political experience, or even a modest understanding of the language of the country 
they are appointed to (Lee, 2009).  In most of these cases, the primary work of setting 
the policies and standards in posts with politically appointed ambassadors will be done 
by the so-called DCM (the Deputy Chief of Mission).  DCM’s are uniformly Foreign 
Service Officers coming from the training, culture, and climate of the State 
Department (Dorman, 2005).  In sum, the perceived change in organizational climate 
that could come from a new administration will be greatly mitigated.  The vast 
majority of posts will be staffed by career Foreign Service Officers and those where 
the president has made a direct appointment will likely receive their de facto 
leadership from an FSO, as well.  These barriers for change, coupled with the fact that 
State in many ways operates independently from Washington would suggest that 
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differences FSN’s might expect from an administration promising openness and 
engagement may be far less consequential than previously thought. 
 
Finally, there is the sentiment that the more generalized global shift of U.S. priorities 
that Obama is perceived as embodying may produce far less consequential results than 
previous rhetoric would suggest.  For FSN’s tasked with attempting to justify their 
employment at an institution that is (theoretically) an extension of the Bush 
administration, the shift to Obama would obviously be a cause for optimism.  From the 
tiresome task of attempting to explain Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, and “aggressive 
interrogation” to friends, relatives, and embassy visitors, FSN’s likely experienced a 
great deal of personal, interpersonal, and community-based stress in their jobs.  
Obama, with his promises of moving U.S. adventures towards an ethical resolution 
and creating international policy that is both multi-lateral and respectful of state’s 
rights, seemed to offer a kind of non-specific, but palpable sense of international hope 
and (more to the point for many FSN’s) a relief from feeling as though they work for 
an institution the world sees as (at best) unsavory.  As the administration has 
progressed, however, the initial optimism that Obama could serve as remedy to the 
stereotypes and objections many have towards the United States has proven to be a 
slippery proposition.  The World Public Opinion organization conducted a multi-
national survey utilizing respected opinion polling institutions in each state.  Asked 
whether they have confidence in Barack Obama to "do the right thing regarding world 
affairs," for all nations (excluding the US) an average of 61 percent say they have 
some or a lot of confidence (“Though Obama Viewed Positively, Still Much Criticism 
of US Foreign Policy: Global Poll,” 2009).  Despite these positive perceptions of 
Obama’s integrity, the overall perceptions of the United States fluctuated little from 
previous perceptions during the Bush administration.  The U.S. continues to receive 
sharp criticism for coercing other nations with its superior power (15 of 19 nations), 
failing to abide by international law (17 of 19 nations), and for how it is dealing with 
climate change (11 of 18 nations). Overall, views are mixed on whether the US is 
playing a mainly positive or mainly negative role in the world, however when asked 
  
 173
about the U.S. treatment of individual countries a consistent trend emerges suggesting 
that optimism about Obama has not translated into an overall optimism regarding the 
United States: 
 
Table 15: Perceived U.S. Relations (WorldPublicOpinion.org) 
 
 
Initial programs initiated by Obama at home have faced political hurdles and have 
produced results inconsistent with the stratospheric level of expectation his election 
seemed to promise (Krauthammer, 2009, September 4).  In terms of Obama’s 
worldwide reputation, it appears that the promise of immediate closure of the 
Guantanamo facility is unfeasible in the near term due to a lack of alternative facilities, 
the questionable legal status of detainees, and security concerns about mass amnesty 
(Ephron, 2009).  On matters from healthcare to environmental policy to defense to 
finding a feasible withdrawal strategy in two wars to dealing with a global economic 
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downturn, it would seem that the administration is discovering that producing the sort 
of (unrealistic?) change supporters around the world expected will prove a far more 
difficult challenge than knocking down the caricatured straw man of George W. Bush.  
As these political realities become more salient, the initial redemptive power of 
Obama for improving world perception of the United States could wane.  In 
conjunction with the deeply rooted stereotypes and fears the world has towards 
America, along with the recent poor record of public diplomacy, it would seem that the 
initial goodwill that FSN’s may experience towards the institution of the State 
Department is not likely to be long-lived. 
 
All this analysis should be taken with the enormous caveat of uncertainty.  The 
administration may prove capable of meeting much of the world’s standards in 
rejuvenating international perception of the United States and creating the climate of 
openness, respect, tolerance, and justice voiced during the campaign.  This is merely to 
suggest an initial analysis of the results of the administration measured against 
international hopes has produced a calculus that suggests world opinion towards the 
administration may have peaked and residual concerns about America and its 
institutions may again come to the fore.  Taken into consideration with structural 
barriers to change in the State Department, the change hoped for by many (including 
FSN’s) may simply not come to pass.  
 
5.6 Results as a Basis for Organizational Change 
 
These results suggest a number of items of concern that beg for meaningful and 
engaged solutions.  In terms of culture, the effect on the attitudes of both states and 
FSN’s towards the policies and institutions of the United States can no longer be 
overlooked.  Its effect is pronounced and simply dismissing this aspect of the 
organization and leaving leadership in the hands of the often willfully uniformed can 
no longer be the basis for a stable future for the institution.  Like the cultural 
perceptions of the FSN’s, the perceptions the world has of the United States are 
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inextricably linked to what America and its institutions both say and do.  The 
mirroring of FSN’s objections to the State Department and world objections to the 
United States should be the basis for some serious introspection and change.  Whether 
a cause or a correlation, the perception of arrogance, intolerance, incompetence, and 
unilateralism in both the State Department and the U.S. demands remedies.  Just as 
Martin Luther King proclaimed “injustice anywhere is injustice everywhere” the State 
Department must consider the treatment and meaningful utilization of FSN’s as matter 
of its public diplomacy.  This research has shown a number of areas of dissatisfaction 
on the part Foreign Service Nationals.  What cannot be calculated, however, is the 
extent to which perceived misuse or mistreatment has had on their community’s image 
of the United States.  For America to reach out, it must rely (as it historically did) on 
the expertise and knowledge of its supporters in communities across the globe.  In 
many cases, one of the strongest and most culturally viable constituencies in making 
the case for America can be found in the work of FSN’s.  While it is tempting to 
imagine that a single leader, slogan, or image can be the basis for shifting world 
attitudes towards the United States, much important work can come by effective 
leveraging of international partners at the ground level.  In doing so, the State 
Department can improve both its operational success and achieve more in getting the 
American message across the globe.  The lessons of change this research suggests 
could be similarly applied to a number of international organizations. 
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Chapter 6 
 
There comes a time in the life of every human when he or she must decide to risk his 
life, his fortune, and his sacred honor on an outcome dubious. Those who fail the 
challenge are merely overgrown children who can never be anything else. 
 
As the world increasingly embraced Smith’s view of a better humanity, unsurprisingly 
he was attacked by those seeking to maintain the status quo.  Charged as a heretic by 
the governments of the world, he was branded a terrorist and enemy to civilization.  
Besieged by forces seeking to bring him and his followers to justice, Smith ultimately 
teleports his supporters far away from those seeking to destroy them- at the exact 
moment of impending doom.  Despite those who rejected his message, he felt a higher 
calling to a better existence.  Leaders of international organizations (especially the 
State Department) face a similar moment of decision.  The efforts of people like the 
Foreign Service Nationals can be a centerpiece of a renewed call for international 
engagement or they can continue to be ignored, misunderstood, and marginalized.  As 
this research has suggested a gap in cultural understanding that has had dire 
implications on organizational commitment, the time for change is now.  The remedies 
for this misunderstanding are implicitly found in many of the research results.  When 
institutions begin valuing the work of all people and seeking the input of citizens of 
the world in addressing the communities of the world, the change can be profound.  As 
the Martian-Human Smith offered a new reality based on inclusion, integrity, and 
openness, so too can international institutions become internationally aware of the 
audiences they address.  There will always be strangers and there will always be 
strange lands, but perhaps through engagement the strangeness no longer has define 
us.  
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6.1 Overview of Recommendations  
 
While exploratory in nature, this research can serve as a basis for recommendations for 
the U.S. State Department.  As other international organizations and diplomatic 
institutions face similar dilemmas in terms of officer rotation, utilizing local staff, and 
public outreach across a broad spectrum of cultures, these recommendations also merit 
consideration for contexts beyond the State Department.  Given that culture is at the 
heart of many of these findings, the need for increased cultural training on the part of 
officers is absolutely essential.  Many of the expectations of local staff related to issues 
like power distance as well as other cultural values could be better met with greater 
understanding and a more open perspective.  This cultural engagement could then be 
the sort of interpersonal engagement that allows for better working relationships 
overall.  In terms of public outreach, it’s clear that the substance of the message still 
needs to originate from the State Department or relevant institution leading the 
international organization.  However, a change in metaphor needs to occur in how 
local staff are viewed in making sure that message reaches the local target audience.  
Viewing local staff as a bridge and seeing their work as high-level consultation on the 
needs of the community would be a powerful change from a culture that too often 
seems to view local staff as merely the conduit for programs largely initiated and 
owned by the institution.  A key step in both directions could begin with longer 
postings for officers ensuring that they acquire local expertise while providing an 
incentive to use it, as their time at a given post will be longer.  With frequent rotation, 
there is little incentive to understand the local conditions as another post is just years 
(or months) away.  To facilitate the needed interaction and to improve training 
outcomes requested by local staff, there should be more combined trainings on the part 
of staff and officers.  This would simultaneously create a better link between the two 
groups, improve the skill sets of both audiences, demonstrate a perceived equality 
between local staff and officers, and provide a feeling of worth to participating local 
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staff.  With these enhanced organizational positions for local staff, the next step would 
logically be to better create incentives for long-term organizational commitment by 
providing empowerment, advancement opportunities, and rewards.  Again, no one 
would argue that local staff should control the position of an institution operating in 
foreign country.  However, an alternative organizational structure creating access to 
new challenges, responsibilities, and achievement for local staff could go a long ways 
towards answering questions about the viability of a career with the organization.  
Going hand in hand with this increased responsibility for local staff would be 
increased accountability for officers.  A system of upward evaluation would allow 
local staff to assess the quality of the work being done by their superiors.  For such a 
system to be effective there would also need to be a system of protection that allows 
for the airing of grievances on the part of local staff (to ensure that high evaluations 
are not coerced).  Yet such a system is in wide-use in the private sector with favorable 
results.  Additionally, this research has identified certain areas of the organization 
where employment satisfaction may be higher.  Identifying the climate and policies of 
such areas could also offer insight for improving the institution as a whole.  Such a 
comprehensive implementation of programs could lead to fewer cultural 
misunderstandings, better integration of staff to departmental goals, improved outreach 
to local communities, and a power structure that changes the view of hierarchy from 
“power over” to “power from.”   
 
6.2 Increased Cultural Training for Officers 
 
An overview of the training available for Officers at the American Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) shows that there are a limited number of programs directly related to 
cultural interaction, outside of language courses (Peterson, 2002).  Given the 
deficiencies in language outlined in the literature and this research, it would appear 
that even the language courses are being underutilized.  Understanding the concept of 
culture as a something that shapes the epistemology of a group has profound 
implications for effective diplomacy.  Knowing that power distance shapes a group’s 
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perspective on leadership might better inform an Officer about what to expect when 
meeting a country’s delegation.  Understanding the collective/individual nuances of a 
country can provide information about what sorts of development programs might be 
successful for a region.  Exploring a culture’s perception of time might allow for more 
realistic expectations about the speed of the negotiation process.  Perhaps most 
importantly, this epistemological view of culture removes the perception of cultural 
difference from the “they shake hands this way and slurp raw fish heads at dinner” 
Star Wars Cantina view of culture that permeates the popular imagination.  This view 
of culture as a way of knowing would obviously improve engagement with the local 
staff.  This engagement would allow improved organizational processes and better 
understanding.  For example, on the issue of power distance, Bing (2004) offers 
examples related to change management effectiveness: 
 
CHANGE—how do you handle those with a preference for Power Distance/Hierarchical Style? 
Use senior staff to make announcements/to communicate change 
Use legitimate power to exercise authority 
Tell subordinates what to do differently (do not leave it to them to figure out "how" to do thing 
differently) 
  
CHANGE—how do you handle those with a preference for Low Power Distance/Participative 
Style? 
Use influencing skills 
Include them in a discussion; explain your (or the company's) position 
Allow for questions and challenges 
Provide a forum where they can be involved in discussion/framing "how" things will be different (work 
processes during the interim) after you provide the "what" (p. 85).   
 
For Officers in an international organization to explore issues such as this one would 
be an excellent exercise in reflection about culture and communication.  Although no 
such seminar could adequately explain all aspects of culture (nor should it), moving 
officers beyond the “they are so lazy” or “they are so forceful” mentality towards a 
broader understanding of cultural motivation would be beneficial in the 
communication process both with staff and the community.  And there must be 
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meaningful consequences for Officers who fail to take the “culture question” seriously.  
Peterson (2002) argues that Officers in the State Department must utilize all training 
available as it relates to culture and supplement this with knowledge gained through 
experience with host countries (presumably with FSN’s serving as an excellent entry 
point to increased cultural understanding).  He goes on to suggest that this cannot be 
yet another aspirational goal that is celebrated and ignored.  Officers demonstrating 
cultural competence as it relates to their diplomatic and consular work should be 
rewarded and Officers failing to connect their work with the culture in which they 
operate should receive punishment or demotion.  Only when policy requires that 
cultural understanding is a basis for modern diplomatic engagement will institutions 
change their practice of willful ignorance.  
 
For example, the findings of this research show that cultures with a high power 
distance have a higher degree of organizational commitment to hierarchical institution 
such as the State Department.  As hierarchy is inherently a part of international 
organizations tasked with enacting a mission typically derived at a central location, it 
is expected that similar results would occur in other international organizations 
(though obviously additional research could more adequately answer this question).  
This research also showed that the stated commitment of high power distance cultures 
does not necessarily translate into increased employment tenure.  This is wholly 
consistent with the existing literature that suggests that the public commitment voiced 
to authority in high power distance cultures may actually mask feelings of 
dissatisfaction.  For an Officer not versed in the often dichotomous expressions of a 
culture, this inconsistency could lead to them to wrongly believe that high power 
distance cultures are more loyal.  Likewise, the stated lower levels of commitment in 
low power distance cultures may be misread as insubordination when the reality is that 
the people of such cultures merely expect more transparency and a greater voice in the 
decision-making processes.  Training that increases the sensitivity and awareness of 
these different views could offer new officers insight into the cultures in which they 
operate.  There will always be a tension between representing the culture of the 
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institution and adapting to the environment of the host country and there should not be 
an expectation of cultural pandering as a part of this training.  Cull (2008) expresses 
this tension in examining U.S. public diplomacy efforts during the Cold war by stating 
“cultural (understanding) needed to be far enough from the great diplomatic machine 
to maintain integrity [. . .] but still close enough to retain relevance to the broadest 
goals of foreign policy” (p. 343).  Mediating this tension is understanding that 
awareness can be the starting point for dialogue that allows issues related to culture to 
be better understood on both sides. 
 
6.3 Local Staff as Bridge for Public Diplomacy        
 
As centralization of diplomacy has been documented as a trend for the last several 
decades (i.e. in the U.S., the President largely controls foreign policy independently 
from the State Department), a key function of diplomatic posts has increasingly been 
to engage in outreach to the local community (in addition to the day to day 
bureaucratic functions).  As Officers in an international organization can never be 
expected to fully build up networks and connections in the host country, it becomes 
incumbent for the local staff to play an active role in organizing and directing this 
outreach.  Peterson (2002) identifies a number of elements in State Department public 
diplomacy specifically that could be remedied by FSN’s playing a greater role in the 
conception and deliver of outreach programs: 
 
(The State Department ) must adopt an "engagement" approach that involves listening, dialogue, and 
relationship building… Traditionally, U.S. public policy has been communicated via a push-down 
method, which suffers from limited reach and inadequate explanation to foreign media. Policy is 
created, speeches given, press releases written, and press conferences held -- all with a primary focus on 
addressing American news media. Messages are typically delivered by a limited number of officials to 
foreign audiences, composed primarily of representatives of governments and international 
organizations. Foreign publics get short shrift. This push-down approach affords little open discussion 
of the basis for policy decisions. Communications, geared toward a domestic audience, assume a keen 
understanding of the American system of government -- knowledge that is often deficient among 
foreign publics. Often absent is the linkage of policies to the values of others, indeed to our own values 
of freedom and democracy (p. 92).   
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While the essential message and story of this outreach still will come from the 
organization, the process, structure, and style of this outreach best emanates from local 
sources.  Folk narratives of the business world abound with disasters that occurred 
when companies pushed forward marketing plans without considering the needs of the 
community they operate in.  One such example was that of Parker Pens’ old slogan of 
“Use a Parker and you won’t get embarrassed” (that the pen would not leak on you).  
When translated into Spanish without regard for local slang, the slogan was read as 
“Use a Parker and you won’t get pregnant.”  Diplomatic missteps have repeatedly been 
linked to such a lack of understanding of the local culture (Bush’s famous use of 
“crusade” to stop terrorism, for example).  Similarly, public outreach carries with it 
many dangers for Officers not fully integrated into a culture.  An Officer might 
suggest that due to facebook’s popularity as a social network, it is an ideal platform to 
reach the youth of the country.  However, in many countries (Russia in particular) 
there are similar but locally unique social networking tools.  Public outreach might 
include cultural programs such as presentation of artwork that necessarily needs to be 
considered in relation to the values and interests of a community.  To make such 
programs effective, the input of members of the host culture are absolutely crucial to 
program effectiveness. 
 
With that in mind, this research proposes that local staff should be treated as 
independent agents in conducting much of the public outreach and public diplomacy of 
a post.  An appropriate analogy from the private sector would be that of an advertising 
or marketing agency- they don’t create the product and they are accountable for how 
the message is presented, but (in most cases) they are given a great deal of autonomy 
in creating messages that will generate the desired results.  Cotton (1996) identified 
numerous areas of success in such self-managed teams.  Despite concerns that self-
managed teams would ignore leadership directives, results indicate that such groups 
are actually more engaged in the policies of the leadership (with increased job 
satisfaction, productivity, and reduced absenteeism as important additional benefits).  
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Moreover, self-managed teams tended to function (albeit with different structures) in a 
variety of different cultural settings (Sagie & Aycan, 2003).  This view needs to take 
hold when considering public diplomacy.  As the literature suggests, the biggest gap 
for the United States in getting its message out is a lack of cultural understanding for 
the communities it is trying to reach.  For an international institution to effectively 
communicate with diverse populations, the messages need to be constructed by 
members of those diverse populations.  This may represent a radical departure from 
the hierarchical and territorial perception that public diplomacy is the domain of 
Officers in the institution.  Such a cultural shift in an organization would not come 
easily, but the potential success of empowering local staff to speak to local 
communities should not be underestimated. 
 
6.4 Longer Postings for Officers 
 
A consistent theme of the narrative responses was that short duration postings hurt 
accountability, integration, and consistency for the State Department (and one would 
expect other international organizations, as well).  The primary argument against 
longer postings is that of clientism; that an officer would “go native” and begin to see 
world events from the perspective of the country they are posted in rather than the 
perspective of the country they represent.  The reality is this- there is no documented 
study on the point at which a posted Officer is at risk for engaging in clientism.  One 
could argue that in the age of the internet, inexpensive international telephone calls, 
satellite television, and easy air travel to and from the home country, the risks of 
clientism are minimal in comparison to what they were in the past.  In a bygone era 
when a diplomat was sent to a foreign land for years with limited communication to 
her/his home country, the risk of beginning to identify with the local culture was far 
more acute.  This is clearly no longer the case.  Coupled with the fact that, according 
to the narrative portion of the survey, Officers tend to primarily associate with one 
another, it could be argued that the risk is almost non-existent.  In cases where an 
Officer does seem overly focused on the needs of the country s/he is operating in, 
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reviews of her/his performance should reflect this.  Staying focused on the needs of the 
organization is always a condition employment and guarding against clientism should 
not be viewed any differently from other aspects of job performance.  Clientism, 
however, has been given the metaphoric quality of communicable disease.  The very 
term used to describe the condition is “clientitis,” which seems to sound similar to 
tonsillitis or appendicitis.  While the extent and duration of contact that causes this 
“country as client” view has yet to be adequately measured (or clearly defined), 
“clientitis” as the threat that legitimates short postings remains fully in tact.  The basis 
for this concern is three-fold: the accusation of clientitis remains a pariah, the “fear” of 
clientitis allows Officers to refrain from the difficult and often messy process of 
cultural interaction, and short duration postings allow for faster career advancement 
for Officers. 
 
Initially, the appearance of clientitis represents one of the more damaging accusations 
an Officer can face (Krizay, 1988; Armacost, 1996; Shaffer, 2006; Tucker, 2001).  The 
perception that an Officer is no longer representing the interests of her/his country or 
institution compromises both the competence and integrity of the Officer in lasting and 
damaging ways that will seriously impact her/his career.  Schaffer (2006) and Tucker 
(2001) identify incidents in which simply acclimating or working with the local 
community brought charges of clientitis from other diplomats and officers.  The term, 
it seems, has the power of fact whereby the mere accusation that an Officer has “gone 
native” erodes that Officer’s credibility to such an extent that lasting damage may be 
incurred to her or his positions, regardless of merit.  One might suspect that personal 
grudges and resentment of those with the ability to more effectively operate in a 
foreign culture could also be a motivating factor in the accusation.  The process of 
engagement with local populations can also lead to recommendations of restraint from 
Officers posted in the “enemy” country when conflicts emerge.  In arguing about the 
dangers of clientism, the conservative American policy institute The Heritage 
Foundation called into question the actions of the British Foreign Service during the 
Falklands conflict (Krizay, 1988).  They stated that British FSO’s in Argentina 
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recommended that Thatcher pursue diplomacy before considering military action and 
argue “the proclivity to accommodation shown in that instance by the British Foreign 
Office is an institutional characteristic of most foreign services” (p. 2).  The 
cumulative message here is that Officers engaged with the local population risk being 
branded as disloyal, unreliable, weak, and perhaps even unpatriotic.  This alone makes 
the idea of short postings and a lack of engagement with local populations and local 
staff a preferable organizational standard.  But beyond prevention of accusations of 
parochialism, the fear of clientism serves other practical functions, as well. 
 
Using clientism as a justification, Officers are allowed and potentially encouraged not 
to become meaningfully involved in the culture of the host country.  The stress created 
by meaningful and sustained interaction with another culture is not trivial.  Storti 
(1990) found that meaningful intercultural interaction (beyond superficial or tourist-
level interaction) can actually produce the symptoms of physical illness on the part of 
those involved in the interaction.  There also tends to be something he describes as an 
“expatriate sub-culture” where those expats from a country or region tend to band 
together in isolation when placed into a new cultural environment.  Given that most 
foreign services and international organizations can provide ready access to people of 
a similar background, such sub-cultures could easily permeate.  While Storti’s work 
analyzes how such sub-cultures typically hurt the personal satisfaction of those 
involved by preventing full integration into their new environment, clientism can 
moderate this concern.  Isolation from the community can be justified as the 
appropriate action to ensure that the mentality of Officers is never unduly influenced 
by the country in which they reside.  Such a justification provides a remedy against the 
enormously taxing work of intercultural interaction, which has been found to be 
among the most stressful forms of communication by a number of exemplary studies 
(Ward, et al., 2001; Wan, 2004).  Additionally, the most stressful period of 
intercultural interaction typically occurs later in the process (DeVito, 2009) as 
differences at the beginning of intercultural relationships are typically minimized, seen 
as trivial, perhaps charming, or even only as a minor irritation/inconvenience.  It is 
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only as time goes on that such differences are seen in terms of their greater 
implications in terms of meaning and understanding, producing what is called the 
“crisis period” of intercultural interaction (Oberg, 1960).  Short-duration postings, 
justified by the fear of clientism, create a situation in which Officers in a mission can 
avoid a great many of the challenges (and miss many of the rewards) of intercultural 
interaction.  
 
Beyond reducing the intercultural stresses of international work, short duration 
postings have another compelling advantage for many Officers: they create more 
advancement opportunities and reduce accountability for programs initiated during a 
posting.  At the conclusion of one posting, Officers (at least in the State Department) 
have the opportunity to “bid” on where they will be posted next.  Each new bid can 
bring a move to a more attractive location, a job with higher levels of responsibility, or 
the chance to affect policies at a post in a diplomatically important country or region.  
By increasing the number of postings, there are (necessarily), more chances for 
advancement.  To justify this ascension, Officers are then compelled to create 
meaningful new initiatives at their current post in a relatively short period of time 
(promotion does not come from “maintaining something that is already good”).  This, 
coupled with a lack of understanding of the cultural environment they are in, creates a 
situation in which potentially unworkable programs are developed in short order with 
long-term outcomes not really considered as a part of the decision-making calculus.  
This was validated in many of the narrative responses in this research with statements 
such as: 
 
• There is very little long term planning... the longest period is 1.5 years. 
• The problem areas are the local US staff that most of the time focuses on empire building, lifestyle 
management and advancement of the individual career and not the US Government long-term 
interests. 
• We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new managers) wants to show their power, 
their skills, but sometimes it just does not make any sense. 
• The downfall of working as an FSN in this organization is the continuous change of officers every one 
or two years. 
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• The span of the American Officers’ attention is limited… they do not really care what will happen in 
the Embassy after their time. 
• The 2-year-tour basis at State is the very weakness of the system. 
 
As senior level Officer positions are also rotated regularly, the long-term implications 
of programs initiated during a posting cannot be considered.  It may be multiple 
“generations” of Officers before the full ramifications of previous policies are 
understood; a long enough period of time that creating accountability is unrealizable.  
Ironically, the one group of people who serve as the organization’s “institutional 
memory” are the FSN’s (Foreign Service Nationals: America's Bridge, 2007).  
However, without an institutional position with legitimate power, their perceptions 
related to the long-term implications of the actions and policies initiated have little 
traction.  Thus, international organizations and foreign services should consider longer 
duration postings for Officers with a system of accountability for their work that 
extends beyond their period at a post. 
 
Several respondents suggested that Officers posted for four years tended to have a 
greater understanding of local conditions, a better working relationship with the local 
staff, and an interest in creating more sustained and developed programs at the post.  
The current norm (depending on area) for a posting is approximately 1-3 years.  By 
shifting this to a 3-5 year system of tours, meaningful interaction with the community 
would likely increase.  Cultural differences would be brought to the fore and real 
dialogue would be harder to avoid.  Programs such as public diplomacy, which often 
are built on long-term relationships and planning, would benefit by Officers who can 
now take a longer view on the development and results.  Bellamy & Weinberg (2008) 
argue that the biggest barrier faced in public diplomacy is that knowledge gained is 
typically taken away when a practitioner accepts a new appointment.  The diffusion of 
local experience related to public diplomacy and the lack of sustained relationships 
could be remedied by Officers working in one location (with greater FSN input) over a 
longer period of time.  Beyond public diplomacy benefits, local staff tasked with 
working for a chronically unproductive or hostile supervisor would now have an 
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incentive to speak out against him or her (rather than merely waiting for the year or 
two to end and hoping for better luck on the next Officer).  In sum, a system of longer 
tours could create an environment where decisions are better grounded in the local 
reality and more sustainable over time.  In the context of longer postings, the issue of 
clientism needs to be considered in a meaningful (rather than subjective) way.  Internal 
research and the evaluation of Officer performance should examine the extent to which 
country identification affects the integrity of the organization’s work (if at all).  While 
there is potential risk in such a program if local culture is found to unduly influence an 
Officer’s decision-making, the dangers of culturally unengaged Officers making 
decisions with nominal regard for the future are not theoretical.   
 
There are obviously logistical items that need to be considered before such a shift 
could be realized in the State Department or other international institution.  Posts in 
hostile locations often require officers to live and stay on a highly secured compound 
on the grounds of the office.  Family members are often forbidden to travel with or 
visit Officers posted in such locations.  Naturally, a 3-5 year posting in such a location 
would be problematic for organizational morale and may limit the pool of future 
applicants.  Additionally, while blind ambition in FSO’s should be kept in check, it is 
beneficial to an organization to have Officers looking for advancement.  The system of 
promotion would need to be reconsidered in the context of Officers staying at one 
location for a greater period of time.  There is also the fact that global situations are 
always in flux and more officers may be needed in a country or region that suddenly 
becomes strategically important.  Clearly, maintaining an Officer’s posting at a 
location that is less strategically important may not be in the organization’s best 
interest.  These concerns, however, can be remedied through creative solutions on the 
part of an organization.  What this research suggests is that the need for engagement 
with local populations and the need for a long-term strategic vision should be a central 
feature of an organization’s decision-making.  This can only be met through a system 
of tours that is long enough to allow such consideration. 
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6.5 Local Staff Evaluation of Officers 
 
An important piece in the role of local staff is the function of providing an institutional 
memory for the organization.  Officers come and go, there are always new leaders, and 
new administrations, but the local staff can be the continuity for the organization that 
extends beyond these changes.  The only way that continuity can have meaning, 
however, is if the local staff can provide their input into the quality of work being done 
by a supervisor and comment on the long-term results of policies and procedures 
initiated by previous Officers.  Such an arrangement could offer the organization a 
better understanding of the conditions at a post over time and provide context for 
evaluating the work of Officers.  Reciprocal evaluations would also have the benefit of 
ensuring that local staff have the opportunity to voice concerns about the attitudes and 
actions of Officers which are problematic while giving the chance to express 
appreciation for the exemplary efforts of many supervisors.  Numerous such scales 
exist for public institutions (McEvoy, 1990) and could be adapted to meet the needs of 
local staff in their evaluation of Officers.  The results of such reciprocal evaluations 
have shown great potential in governmental work as evidenced in the findings of 
Daley (1997) who states: 
 
Organizations and supervisors need to pay particular attention to those factors that employees expect 
them to provide (and, hence, hold them accountable). Fairness and trust are salient. Yet, the preservation 
of fairness and trust are indeed found in the details of administration. Fairness and the trust it engenders 
are not the result of subscribing to general principles, but are earned from adhering to those principles in 
carrying out day-to-day activities. The performance appraisal process and the duties of protecting merit 
are a crucial aspect of this day-to-day struggle (p. 311). 
 
Additionally, Bernardin (1986) contends that employee evaluations of supervisors 
must be an important piece in any organization that wants accountability for the 
quality of its leadership.  In an organization like the State Department, such a change 
in thinking would require a number of steps to ensure effectiveness.  Marques (2008) 
notes that there are some common mistakes made in creating supervisory evaluation 
programs.  Some of the shortfalls include: 
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• Putting employees in a position of vulnerability for honest assessment 
• Organizational complicity in minimizing negative supervisory evaluations 
• Ignoring or discarding reciprocal evaluations 
• Viewing any one evaluation in isolation 
 
In the case of the State Department, the relative position of FSN’s makes each one of 
these areas a concern for any such program.  If local staff believe that honesty will 
lead to retribution without the possibility of redress, the accuracy of reciprocal 
evaluations will obviously be compromised.  Concerns about the State Department 
“protecting its own” and minimizing or discarding negative evaluations would also 
prove to be a disincentive for investing much effort in a reciprocal evaluation program.  
After all, why risk honesty when the outcome produced will be nominal at best?  The 
reciprocal evaluation process also carries with it a risk that the personality clashes that 
can always occur in an institution will be exacerbated by a litany of “he said/she said” 
dueling evaluations.  McEvoy (1990) recognizes a number of practical and 
methodological concerns endemic to creating such supervisory evaluations.  A strong 
recommendation is that such evaluations must be given worth, employees must be 
protected, and consequences based on performance must follow, but these evaluations 
need to be part of a multi-faceted evaluation system in which the perceptions of those 
who work for, with, and above a person are all taken into account in the evaluation 
process.  Doing so creates a substantial incentive for people (especially Officers) to 
view each level of the organization with a perspective of collegiality, respect, and 
teamwork- something that many respondents indicated was desperately needed.     
   
6.6 Empowerment and Advancement for Local Staff 
  
An important part of any of the previously stated recommendations is a greater 
opportunity for advancement and promotion in local staff.  For local staff to feel 
invested in organizational decisions, they need to me more fully included in the 
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discussion process.  Again, this is not a recommendation that local hires need to direct 
organizational decisions.  There might be some matters related to confidentiality and 
security that they are necessarily excluded from.  It is important to note, however, that 
many organizational day-to-day procedures and new programs could benefit from the 
insight and expertise offered by local staff who reside in the host country.  The 
organizational culture must also work hard to solicit this input from a population that 
may have felt excluded from participation in organizational processes.  In the case of 
the State Department, American Officers must create a space for dialogue when FSN’s 
are part of decision discussions.  Merely allowing ornamental “participation” on the 
part of local staff is not sufficient.  Officers must build functioning relationships with 
the local staff and facilitate a real chance for the staff to offer their ideas during 
discussions.  Officers must also ensure that the local staff who dissent on ideas and 
proposals are not overwhelmed.  Their purpose in decision-making must be more than 
to rubber stamp proposals already agreed upon by Officers.  The result of such 
participation should be policies that are more in line with the local reality of both the 
post and the host country.  This would also have the ancillary benefit of making the 
local staff feel more involved in the organization’s priorities, improving commitment 
levels and possibly increasing the likelihood of employment duration.  Such 
participation would also effectively close the door on the common critique of “we just 
don’t matter around here” here that was common in the narrative responses in this 
research. 
 
Such a shift in focus will present challenges in terms of cultural perceptions of 
empowerment noted in this research.  The role of local staff in decision-making needs 
to be clearly defined and understood.  In the case of those with a high power distance, 
such responsibility may not be fully internalized.  Hoon Nam and Wie Han’s (2005) 
analysis of such a situation shows that some staff members might be nervous in 
participating in a process that could require creative thinking that extends outside of 
their fixed employment position.  Changing from a “command and control” to a “lead 
and support” model may make high power distance cultures uncomfortable in a 
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position that calls for leadership from multiple organizational levels.  A management 
strategy of empowerment emphasizing participative decision-making may also be seen 
as weak and ineffectual in vertical cultures (Mendonca & Kanungo, 1994).  
Correspondingly, those with a low power distance might embrace the empowerment 
but require clear role definition about the point at which a level of institutional 
hierarchy needs to be maintained.  Navigating these two areas can only come from the 
extended dialogue that should be initiated in the other program recommendations.  
There is precedent for improved management based on cultural understanding.  In 
studies of organizations where the construction of participative power and decision-
making was different among members, Shipper et al. (2003) found:    
 
The results indicate that the relationship between self-awareness and effectiveness needs to be explored 
controlling for culture. It appears that in low power distance (PD) cultures such as the United States and 
United Kingdom, self-awareness of interactive skills may be crucial relative to effectiveness whereas in 
high PD cultures such Malaysia, self-awareness of controlling skills may be crucial relative to 
effectiveness. These findings follow from Hofstede's (2001) suggestion that different cultures value 
different managerial behaviors. Thus, the need for self-awareness of different managerial skills varies by 
culture (p. 189). 
 
Kirkman, et al. (2001) argue that this awareness is manifested in the foci of 
management when new programs are introduced.  In terms of power distance, for 
example, responsive and aware managers understand that in low power distance 
cultures, management must clarify the outcomes expected and rationale for the new 
program.  In high power distance cultures, a greater focus needs to be placed on 
making the expected performance clear and any item requiring self-direction needs to 
be articulated by a source with legitimate power.  Such challenges in terms of 
empowerment can have significant benefits. Franz (2004) found that empowerment 
improved workplace morale regardless of power distance.  What is important, 
however, is that an organization must invest effort in understanding the local staff in 
conjunction with providing more opportunities to shape the direction of the 
organization.  
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Understandably, when local staff engage in more organizational decision-making, it 
will follow that additional promotion and advancement positions need to come with 
the increased responsibility.  This presents a potentially systemic challenge to 
maintaining sustained organizational commitment on the part of local staff.  Policy in a 
Foreign Service or international organization will typically come from a centralized 
location.  In the case of the State Department, it will come (at least principally) from 
Washington with an expectation that American Officers are accountable for enacting 
programs related to that policy and producing results.  Thus, there will always be an 
institutional hierarchy, regardless of the level of empowerment that is given to local 
staff in carrying out policy.  As such, while Junior Officers can work to the level of an 
Ambassador, Regional Security Officer, or Deputy Chief of Mission at an important 
post (regardless of whether such a position is ever attained), there will be a clear and 
visible ceiling for FSN’s at their specific post with most key positions of power still 
squarely held by Americans.  For those who are ambitious, this barrier could 
ultimately be what prevents long tenure with the organization.  Similar situations exist 
in other international organizations.  In each context, the situation will be different 
based on a number of factors (type of work, size of post, local culture, etc.).  With that 
in mind, this research can only recommend that international organizations generally 
and the State Department in particular must make finding meaningful advancement 
structures a priority for local staff.  This will obviously be different based on the 
various situations encountered.  However it would be folly to ignore this situation and 
not expect change.  This process begins when the organization considers responses 
like the one encountered in this research:     
 
The nature of local employment is such that long-term career opportunities are not 
readily available[…] For most FSN's, working for the State means doing one position 
for life or leaving.  When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but because at 
some point, the work has been accomplished and it is time to move on.      
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If a valuable and contributing member of the team has such a viewpoint, how can the 
organizational structure for local staff be adapted to ensure that such a person is 
motivated to extend her/his career with the organization?  Without providing 
advancement opportunities, years of experience and the investment in extensive 
training will walk out the door every few years and the organization will be forced to 
re-invest the same (or more) resources to have an employee of (hopefully) equal 
competence.  The entire process is costly, inefficient, and damaging to the 
organizational mission.  The basis for long-term commitment comes from answering 
the argument above. 
          
6.7 Combined Trainings for Officers and Local Staff 
 
A consistent call by respondents was an increase in the amount of training for local 
staff.  Training serves numerous valuable functions for an organization beyond 
improving efficiency and skills.  Training has been found to improve organizational 
commitment, build up internal networks, increase knowledge sharing, and develop a 
climate of team building and shared organizational ownership (Smith, 2004).  
Obviously, all of these functions are incredibly important and could benefit both the 
local staff and the organization as a whole.  The State Department has a developed 
training infrastructure with the Foreign Service Institute in Washington serving a 
(primarily) American audience of Officers with a network of training centers, online 
courses, and onsite courses delivered to FSN’s throughout the world.  While the 
segmentation between Americans and FSN’s in training is not official policy, it is (in 
many ways) the de facto reality.  Creating courses that incorporate both American 
Officers and FSN’s would allow the knowledge sharing and team-building functions 
of training to stretch across the divide between each group.  It could also develop 
greater opportunities for discussion of work-related issues in a safe and appropriate 
context.   
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There would be some challenges that such combined trainings would intrinsically face 
in the current conditions of the State Department.  Specifically, facilitating the 
participation of FSN’s in discussion would involve a level of local understanding of 
the culture considerations regarding interaction.  Officers could certainly contribute, 
but if the feeling on the part of participating FSN’s is that a dominating Officer is 
seeking validation and not really inviting discussion, this could result in non-
participation.  In short, the focus of such courses needs to be explicit in the call for 
equal participation from all sides.  This is important in addition to making sure the 
level of course content enhances the skills of both FSN’s and Officers.  For the course 
to be successful, the opportunity for mutual development must be understood by both 
sides.  The end result for the State Department and other international organizations 
would be that training serves not only to improve the attitude, skills, and effort of the 
workforce- it could be the basis for building bridges across the organizational divide 
experienced by local staff.  This important function can only be realized, however, if 
both sides go into the training with a level of enthusiasm and a willingness to develop 
(i.e. elimination of the “I don’t have time to go to a stupid training” response). 
 
6.8 Employee Satisfaction Surveys by Area 
 
Some base measures for progress created by all of these areas need to be established 
by systematic and regular evaluations of local staff satisfaction.  Such an evaluation 
would offer insight into the overall effectiveness of new initiatives in increasing the 
organizational commitment of local staff and the cultural/relationship competence of 
the institution, as a whole.  As this research has shown, this can vary by area.  In the 
case of the narrative responses in this survey, certain sections of the State Department 
were identified as being more conducive to empowering local staff and having a 
respectful dialogue with colleagues.  Public affairs/public diplomacy, for example, 
produced: 
 
• I've had some rough experience with a very few Americans and that was mainly personality issues 
of the individuals. Generally speaking, I enjoy my work in the Public Affairs Section. 
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• Working for the Public Affairs section of the Department of State is unlike working for most 
other organizations. Only employment in the diplomatic service of one's own country or in a 
multi-national organization like the UN would be comparable. In my view, working in PA offers a 
wide range of professional and personal opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow 
some of the administrative, management, ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit one's 
possibilities of what in my experience has been an extraordinarily interesting and varied job.   
• I'm dealing with the public day-by-day representing the Department of State - I'm proud to be a 
member and know that my work and how I perform has a little influence on the overall 
Austrian/U.S. relations. 
 
A comprehensive study that investigates each area of an organization specifically 
could allow an even more detailed view of the structures of each section and their 
relation to the overall satisfaction the local staff.  Thus, regular evaluation of 
employment satisfaction should seek to identify departmental areas and locations that 
are yielding higher levels of engagement on the part of local employees.  Upon 
identifying exceptionally high areas of satisfaction, an investigation into the work-
style and programs of that area could yield several examples of best practices that 
could be employed throughout the organization as a whole.   For example, if some 
location offered a high degree of autonomy for local staff doing public diplomacy and 
this produced higher levels of satisfaction/commitment, that area should be 
investigated to determine if these kinds of autonomy giving structures might benefit 
other local in other areas/locations.  Due to the need for anonymity and discretion 
required for respondents to the survey in this research, there were no questions about 
location or area included in the study (I was advised by the State Department that this 
would probably decrease the authenticity of responses; tracing “who said what” would 
be relatively easy if I knew the post/area of the respondents).  An organizationally 
implemented survey in the context of an organization that is more open and engaged 
with local staff could yield the kind of honest results that could help the institution 
make productive choices in employment policy.  
 
In sum, these program recommendations would not remedy all of the challenges noted 
by FSN’s in this research.  But if an international organization is able to offer a stake 
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for local staff to contribute in the organization and is willing to provide respectful 
dialogue that seeks clarity and understanding (rather than snap judgments and 
hierarchy), the result could very well be an institution that fully realizes the resources 
brought to the table by all team members. 
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Concluding Summation 
 
In evaluating the overall results of this research, there are clear and potentially 
instructive answers to many of the questions raised.  The State Department’s 
publications highlight the importance of FSN’s while suggesting (in a typically genteel 
fashion) the “other” status of its foreign employees.  Both aspects of the role of an 
FSN were keenly understood by this research population- that they are crucial to 
meeting missions objectives in the context of transient American Officers and 
ambassadors and that despite (or perhaps because of) their important status, their role 
is not fully valued.  This research also demonstrated that an individual’s cultural 
orientation matters in the context of such an organizational structure.  Not surprisingly, 
acceptance of hierarchy played a role in the perceived acceptance of institutional 
norms and policies that limit the organizational voice of FSN’s.  Based on existing 
research, this result is unsurprising and unremarkable (outside of the fact that this was 
the first such investigation into the perceptions of FSN’s).  What is important to note, 
however, is that this perceived acceptance on the part of FSN’s accepting hierarchy 
may mask hidden feelings that are at best ambivalent towards the State Department.  
Both narrative responses and analysis of employment patterns shows that the those 
who give a generally unquestioning “yes” to State Department policies may actually 
hide a vehement “no” in their personal and private interactions.  When coupled with 
many American Officers demonstrated lack of skill at reading cultural cues (or even 
functionally speaking a foreign language), this relationship creates a recipe for 
potential missteps.   
 
Literature explored in this research suggests that public diplomacy has power in 
shaping world perception towards a state.  The extent of this power is certainly 
debatable, but history has shown that world perception and political action are, at least 
at some level, related.  The Cold War may have been won with doctrines of mutually 
assured destruction, a massive military industrial complex, rocket ships and space 
planes, and the threat of tanks in eyesight at contested borders.  But it would be naïve 
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to believe that these displays of hard power alone were completely decisive in the 
conflict.  The West, with its (perhaps constructed?) allure of fast cars, good times, rock 
music, political autonomy, and freedom from want, undoubtedly shook the faith of a 
portion of the population that was joyously complicit in rebellion against Party elders.  
As the U.S. is currently engaged in yet another military/ideological battle, the woeful 
state of its public diplomacy is fully outlined in this research.  If the current conflicts 
of the U.S. are as much about “the hearts and minds of the world” as many argue, the 
demonstrated inability to speak to the world can no longer be overlooked.  Given the 
power that FSN’s could wield as advocates for American interests in both their 
communities and countries, it is striking how underutilized and undervalued many of 
these potential “citizen diplomats” feel, as outlined in this research.  For the State 
Department, or an international institution, to bring its message to foreign populations, 
that message must be constructed with (and in some cases by) members of those 
populations.  This research, along with the work of others referenced herein, makes a 
strong case that the level of cultural understanding on the part of institutional leaders is 
inadequate for meeting this mandate. 
 
Perhaps, as some argue, this research points to a deeper truth about the duality of the 
American character that has profound implications for its foreign relations.  America 
proclaims itself as a land of immigrants, ignoring the sizeable population that was 
displaced by its founding.  Through the metaphor of a “melting pot,” America has long 
argued that the unique ethnic character that each culture brings when it arrives in the 
country shapes the flavor of the whole.  Through the years and over generations, the 
old identity is generally lost, leaving only the label of the previous tradition.  There are 
self-identified Italian Americans who speak not one word of the language.  Many 
Americans celebrate their Polish heritage, while remaining completely ignorant of the 
goings on in “the old country.”  Students on a short excursion to Europe or Asia may 
come back with what they project as a meaningful understanding of the cultures they 
visited.  Perhaps this “culture as costume” and “culture as custom” view has created an 
overly optimistic perception that “They” are not so different than “Us” and that 
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understanding is easy.  Perhaps in this context, it’s easy to understand why the State 
Department broadcasts a policy of engagement with the world and appreciation for its 
local workforce- the concept of difference has not fully been internalized by much of 
American culture.  This could speak to a number of questionable decisions made by 
American policy-makers- specifically that other states want their economies and 
institutions to mirror those of the United States.  This core belief, that cultural 
difference is not significant enough to be a priority, could be at the foundation of a 
government that seems to regularly behave as though the world wants and should want 
to be American.  Within the microcosm of the State Department, the duality of the 
American conception of difference comes to the fore- the FSN’s are not like us but we 
can assume that they are exactly like us.  Culture pulls people in different directions.  
It twists and turns people.  It can make a decision seem completely rational, while 
being catastrophically stupid, based entirely on one’s cultural orientation.  It shapes 
time.  It alters the perception of space.  It creates problems that one group tries to 
solve, while another group simply tries to manage.  It is ugly and beautiful.  It can 
inspire the basest instincts and uplift human impulses.  In short, how we see the world 
affects how the world will see us.  Until culture is viewed as a fundamental part of the 
epistemology of states, communities, and individuals, the full understanding of 
decisions and the motivation for those decisions will be impossible- leaving those 
ignorant to believe that planetary gaps are merely at arms length.                  
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APPENDIX 1: Survey Copy 
 
This paper version of the survey was distributed at the described training sites.  It was 
a paper copy completed by the FSN’s present. 
 
Survey instructions:  The following survey relates to your GENERAL views on the relationship between 
supervisors and employees.  Several questions are related SPECIFICALLY to your employment with the 
U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization.  Please circle the correct response for each 
item. 
 
Questions about your general views on management/supervision 
 
1.  Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
2.  It is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with 
subordinates. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
3.  Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
4.  Managers should avoid off-the-job social contacts with employees. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
5.  Employees should not disagree with management decisions. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
6.  Managers should not delegate important tasks to employees. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
Questions about your employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government 
organization 
 
7.  I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this 
organization be successful. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
8.  I talk favorably about this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
9.  I feel very little loyalty to this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
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10.  I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
11.  I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
12.  I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
13.  I would be just as happy working for a different organization as long as the type of work was 
similar. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
14.  This organization really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
15.  It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
16.  I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over other organizations. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
17.  There's not too much to be gained by staying with this organization over time. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
18.  Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization's policies on important matters relating to 
its employees. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
19.  I really care about the fate of this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
20.  For me, this is the best of all possible organizations to work for. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
21.  Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
22. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
23.  I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
24.  I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own. 
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Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
25.  I think that I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
26.  I do not feel like ‘part of the family’ in my organization.  
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree   
 
27.  I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
28.  This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
29.  I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization.  
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree 
 
General Questions  
 
30.  How long have you been employed by the State Department or other U.S. Government 
organization? 
 
0-3 years 4-6 years 7-9 years More than 9 years 
 
31.  How often do you have contact with American officers in the course of your duties? 
 
Almost Never 1 2 3 4 5 Very Frequently 
 
32.  Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on management/supervision, your 
employment with the U.S. State Department or other U.S. Government organization, or your opinions 
in relation to any question in this survey: 
 
 
As noted, the survey (identical in content) was also distributed electronically via the 
State Department’s online service for FSN training and support.  Due to the formatting 
of the survey online and the need to inform online responders (who necessarily cannot 
ask clarification questions), minor (non-significant) changes were made to design and 
instructions  The company Zip Survey (www.zipsurvey.com) logged and stored each 
individual’s survey responses, while ensuring the anonymity of the responder.  No 
statistically significant differences were found between responses to the paper survey 
and the online verion.  
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APPENDIX 2: Narrative Responses 
 
Full text of survey of all responses given to the open survey question.  Please note 
that the grammar, style, and punctuation of respondents were generally 
maintained to fully preserve the authenticity of survey responses.  Copy editing 
and editorial changes to clarify statements were made in quotations from this 
material in previous sections of the research. 
 
Please write any follow-up information regarding your views on 
management/supervision, your employment with the U.S. State Department or other 
U.S. Government organization, or your opinions in relation to any question in this 
survey: 
1. I get the respect I am looking for, happy with salary, emotionally stable in my job 
2. I have always felt like there are "us" (LES) and "them" (American officers)  
3. 
Given that I work in the public affairs, most of the management (or 
mismanagement) issues stem from the reality that the USIA was folded in to the 
State Department ushering in a variety of changes to the way the U.S. conducts 
public affairs outreach abroad. 
4. 
Would recommend that ALL U.S. supervisors be more attentive to problems 
regarding ALL their LES employees and be more fair in the treatment reserved 
to them in matter of evaluation, consideration and respect. 
5. 
American supervision is very poor.The Department of state has no feeling to deal 
with FSNs and the main policy is " WE DO NOT CARE". There is very less 
long term planning. The longest period is 11/2 years. No views, no long term 
decisions. No American officer cares what happens after his 3 year tour.  
6. The survey confuses the organization and local US managers. The organization 
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has excellent goals and is an excellent one. The problem areas are the local US 
staff who are most of the time focus on, empire building, lifestyle management 
and advancement of the individual career and not the US Government long term 
interests! 
7. 
I started working for the U.S. Mission right after I finished my education 29 
years ago. I just don't have an idea what it might be like to have a different 
employer. The relationship with our American supervisors relies heavily on the 
personality and work style of our supervisors and is therefore subject to change 
every three years. Some of them do involve the FSNs and some of them don't. 
Each of them has a personal work style. Accordingly, the flow of communication 
is at times really good sometimes there are periods when it is not. These are the 
results of having watched American officers come and go over many years. 
8. 
I like the fact that team spirit is encouraged in our organization. I think that in 
organization supervision it is important to involve subordinates in the decision 
making process. At the same time there are cases when decisions should be made 
in authoritative manner.  
9. 
My time with the State Department has generally been positive. But in recent 
years there have been incidents of dishonesty (skimming funds for personal use), 
turning a blind eye to bad practices (such as putting mail of departed officers in 
the garbage instead of taking time to forward), and the policy has been to ignore 
these practices. One apalling incident was giving a high-calibre award to a very 
bad officer to help (him/her) get a new posting when (he/she) has had no 
responses to new-post applications. This person hardly shows up at work. That 
made everyone in the local organization feel extremely disillusioned and cynical. 
Fortunately the OIG visited post and semi-addressed some of these issues. I see 
the value of the OIG after witnessing events in the past few years. At least it 
offers SOME safeguards but if management policy is to ignore wrongdoings the 
attitude among FSNs is that FSOs will do anything, ignore everything, to protect 
their own. This does not foster a good workplace. 
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10. 
It is very difficult to project your stay where there is very little room for growth. 
Good supervisors come and go and so do their recognition of your job. There 
should be some plan for professional advancement for FSN's.  
11. 
Since I have been with the Embassy (a little less than 5 years), I have noticed the 
huge gap between Americans and Foreign Service Nationals. FSNs tend to serve 
in the missions for many years, so there is a lot of loyalty, and in the past, there 
was a greater prestige to working with the Mission. In the recent years, at our 
Post, FSNs have become increasingly displeased with the poor salary 
adjustments that we have been given. They have not reached to half of the annual 
inflation rates. Morale among the FSN population is very low. And Management 
can't seem to do much to improve it. I have heard it over and over again from the 
FSNs who have been here for more than 15 years - things are very different now, 
and not for the better. Management is always telling the FSNs that we are the 
glue that hold things together for the Missions abroad, and that we are the ones 
that keep things running. I don't think FSNs at our Post feel that we are being 
appreciated as such. I am involved in the local FSN association. I have noticed 
how different management styles can make a difference in employee relations. In 
dealing with upper Management, the management style of the Joint Management 
Officer is a key factor. We are very fortunate to have an exceptional JMO 
currently at our Post. But at the same time, we are also very aware that he is 
exceptional - he is not the "rule". Within the Mission, the people that work with 
USAID are, in general, more motivated than those of us working for the 
Department of State. On a personal note, I am a US citizen hired as an FSN. Of 
places to work (after many years of managing my own business), the Embassy 
was my first choice, and I was fortunate enough to get a job offer after my third 
attempt. I was overqualified for the job I got, but I chose to place a foot in the 
door, knowing that you can make a career out of working for the Embassy. Once 
you are in, you realize that there really isn't much room for growth - or at least, 
that is the case at our Post. I think that finding the motivation to outdo yourself in 
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your job depends a lot on your supervisors. We can't really look at it as an 
opportunity for promotion because there really aren't promotions here. You can 
compete for a job opening with everybody within and outside the Mission. There 
is no sense of community at our Post. Americans don't really associate much 
with FSNs, and we have also learned to keep our distance. Truth be told, FSNs 
are like third class citizens among the community. First the American officers, 
then the officer family members and then the FSNs. 
12. 
State Department is a huge bureaucratic organization. Being at post we do 
sometimes feel like part of the family but when certain regulations come from 
DC this feeling is usually gone. This happens due to the different realities in DC 
and at posts.  
13. 
Some of the answers are related to my feelings towards the current 
Administration. The answers would have been different if you had asked the 
questions 8 years ago. Pls also appreciate the fact that we (even as FSNs) are not 
encouraged to discuss too much about this organization and our job with people 
outside due to security concern. This actually has a subtle impact on how 
emotionally/personally attached we can be to this organization. 
14. 
as an FSN /w more than 9 years working for DoS, sometimes it's really hard to 
work with many types of bosses, since they just come and go every 2 or 3-4 
years. We have to start everything all over again. Everyone (new managers) 
wants to show their power, their skills, but sometimes it just does not make any 
sense. 
15. I like this survey because I send my views.  
16. 
I've really enjoyed doing the public affairs work for the U.S. Government for the 
past 16 years, and I hope to continue working at the current post during the rest 
of my career until the mandatory retirement age.  
17. Despite the congenial environment the organization offers, there should be more 
scopes for promotions and recognition. FSO often lose sight of the consistent 
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high quality output of the FSNs. Awards, incentives should be offered 
generously to deserving FSNs. Otherwise it will generate work fatigue and 
frustration among FSNs. 
18. 
As we know two persons can never be of the same disposition or mentality, or of 
the same caliber, so it's natural that the relation between the supervisor and the 
employee can never be the same. Every supervisor does have his own style of 
works. We the employees have to act accordingly. Sometimes we enjoy such 
change of taste, but sometimes it hurts us. Close friendly relationship with 
supervisors engenders enthusism to perform better and job satisfaction in 
employees' hearts leading to better atmosphere of works. But it does not always 
happen. 
19. 
My answers to some of the questions depends. For instance, when asked if I feel 
like family to this organization, sometimes I do and other times I don't. I've had 
some rough experience with a very few Americans and that was mainly 
personality issue of the individuals. Generally speaking, I enjoy my work in the 
Public Affairs Section. 
20. 
In most of the questions I marked neither agree or disagree because it depends on 
the administration at the time. Here I mean the Exo - what the Ambassador wants 
is what PAO will tell us to do and also it will depend if PAO is not strong 
enough to challenge and guide the Ambassador we end up doing things we 
shouldn't be doing. Aslo age of PAO/supervisors matters - young officers care 
for their promotions - whereas old supervisors guide the ambo and care for the 
welfare of their staff. 
21. 
I like working at this institution because they give us a space to be creative, and 
be supportive to any innovative ideas to enhance the quality of the "product" we 
are manufacturing within the regulations and laws spectrum and to achieve 
mission objectives.  
22. Management/Supervision style change every three years with the change of 
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officers in the Embassy. Local employees have to adapt to these changes. Not 
many DOS officers are really good managers as many of them aspire for 
promotion during their three-year assignments and will do only things which 
they think will help them get promoted. All managers should undergo a people 
skills course, especially those who supervise local employees, such as those in 
General Services and Public Diplomacy. Cultural Diplomacy begins at the 
workplace such as an Embassy. What works in one country will not necessarily 
work in another. Cultural sensitivity is very important. Bad managers result in 
the Ugly American image. 
23. 
In my 8-year career with 3 organisations, the State Department is the only 
organisation that rewards innovation, and hard work through various incentives. I 
value competition and this is the most ideal work environment for me. The 
organisational values are also ideal for my country and supervisors appreciate 
any kind of interventions that reflect these values.  
24. 
The nature of FSN employment is such that long-term career opportunities are 
not readily availible and as such, employees should be encouraged to grow and 
develop to both benefit DoS but also in order to have skilled workers that move 
to new careers after a few years. I have had the opportunity to do both as I have 
been fortunate to have great management that has also given me the opportunity 
to train and develop and then supported me when I wanted to serve in Iraq, 
where I was given even greater opportunities. When I came home, that was 
recognized and I have been able to move into a much more senior position. For 
most FSN's, working for the DoS means doing one position for life or leaving. 
When I leave, it will not be from lack of loyalty, but beacause at some point, the 
work has been accomplished and it is time to move on. Realizing that FSNs like 
FSOs want career development and the ability to develop and move on, is an 
integral part in reqruiting and maintaining the very best, while keeping the 
organization vibrant, creative and flexible to changing needs and world 
developments. I saw this particularly in Iraq were 'long-serving' means that you 
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have been there for more than a year, and that is not always a bad thing. I am 
critical of the CAJE as it emphasizes the abstract work and not the individual 
performing it which means that a mediocre-performing staff may, possibly, 
receive a greater reward simply by reason of that position description than 
someone who performs outstanding. Places were labor is cheap will have higher-
ranked FSNs than places were skill, independence and responsibility are key 
individual requirements. Overall, the DoS is an excellent employer, often paying 
more than market-comparative salaries and with many benefits, it is rewarding 
and challenging and for me, it is an opportunity do something no private 
company could do or offer. I believe that, without change or growth, an ideal 
time to stay in a position is no more than 3-5 years depending on the skill 
required to perform it, similar to a posting. In some countries, the DoS may be a 
life-long service and some people will stay all life, but for most of today's 
workforce, the ideal is to come in, do a great job and move on when the 
maximum has been reached, and I am very thankful for having this opportunity 
to hopefully do so for something I believe in. Also, thank you for the opportunity 
to submit some of my views on this matter.  
25. 
I think this organization provides a good example of the US democracy and, 
above all, of what 'you can do for your country'. I share many points of view in 
way it is managed (strict control over the way money is spent, for example). 
Obviously, there are also things that after 25 years I have learned and which are 
not completely positive. Sometimes personnel/managing problems tend to be 
postponed indefinitely as the American officer in charge knows s/he will be 
leaving soon and is not willing to take on the burden of difficult decisions.  
26. 
A lot depends on a particular supervisor and/or higher management of the 
mission. The overall feeling is that at present general interest in keeping good 
employees is going down as compared with the situation a decade ago. 
27. Most of the time supervisors do not care about CAJE. Either they don't have time 
to review/work on it, or they just ignore it. Supervisors sometimes make a big 
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difference between FSNs while they should treat them equally. Most of the 
supervisors do not have knowledge of the language and culture of the host 
country which make it difficult to deal with FSNs and the mission contacts.  
28. 
It is kind of tricky to give realistic views on management as everything depends 
on the american officers. Some are effective and have good management skills 
whereas some are completely out of the scheme and would not integrated their 
environment. So the morale or the loyalty of a local employee depends on who is 
in control. There are also situations where officers are too weak to manage a 
deficient employee. This lack of authority is seen by hard working FSNs as a 
sign of mismanagement.  
29. 
In general the management/supervision is fine. But sometimes, a "strong/wrong 
character" can make the difference. It is great if a boss is a normal person, with 
challenging requests, but if the boss is not sure of what he wants, then it is a 
completely different situation. And what bothers me most is micro-management, 
and moody bosses. We know our job, contacts, and we are loyal. My basic motto 
is to present America in the best possible light whenever, wherever, and I am 
proud to be able to do this in normal circumstances.  
30. 
This survey reflects views from the FSN point of view. Some equestions seemed 
even irrelevant to me, due to way hierarchy organized within the embassy 
system.  
31. 
US diplomats come here and have very limited managerial skills, and even more, 
they lack the willingness to take decisions that might have a negative impact on 
FSNs. But this "all and each of you are the best" does damage morale of high 
performers. 
32. 
1. The first 6 questions are especially interesting. 2. Questions 7-29 focused on 
employee loyalty/attachment to the organization is little too much. 3. Working 
with the State department in the Field is very interesting and exiting but FSNs 
some time encounter huge challenges due to working with American Officers 
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who lack some managerial skills in handling work/people or sometimes not 
culturally sensitive/informed or misinformed. 4. In relation to question 4, 99 
percent of American Officers/managers at the post where I belong avoid off-the-
job social contact with employees which make is incomplete experience.  
33. 
Working for the PA section of the DoS is unlike working for most other 
organizations. Only employment in the diplomatic service of one's own country 
or in a multi-national organization like the UN would be comparable. In my view 
working in PA for the DoS offers a wide range of professional and personal 
opportunities which one needs to seize and not to allow some of the 
administrative, management,ideological and hierarchical constraints to limit 
one's possibilities of what in my experience has been an extraordinarily 
interesting and varied job.  
34. 
The down fall of working as LES in this organization is the continuous change of 
officers every one or two years. LES have difficult time in transition periods. 
However, good officers/managers keep their marks and lasting memories, and 
memories of not so good ones are often forgotten. 
35. 
In Embassies, American officers stay generally for 2 to three years. This means 
that management styles change every 2 or three years. Management involves 
science (objective aspects) and personality (subjective aspects) and the challenge 
for the LES is to have the intelligence to adapt to every management style. This 
is like human life. It is not easy all the time.  
36. 
There should be more training opportunities both for FSNs and Supervisors. As 
much as possible, FSNs and Supervisors should jointly participate in traiing 
sessions on critical issues relating to their job.  
37. I haven`t had many officers who cares about FSN. I am under a FSN supervision 
and I do feel anoyed by it. My supervisor does not care about the job I do. 
38. The locally employed staff in my post has been so distressed by the humiliation 
and discrimination from management and American Officers. Newly appointed 
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American Officers do not value the long experience of the local staff; they ignore 
the knowledge provided to them and treat them with superiority. As for the 
questions, the answers should have included other options.  
39. 
As employees of this organization we feel that we are discriminated and 
humiliated by some of our supervisors and managers and not treated well. I'd like 
to take this opportunity to suggest that officers before they join the organization 
should receive an intensive management course on how to treat and work with 
their staff in human way and try to learn from them not to attack them and 
benefit from their experience, also to ask their opinion and share with them their 
thoughts and plans. We are working here for the benefit of the U.S. government, 
therefore, we need our performance to be appreciated and rewarded. Not to be 
humiliated.  
40. 
My management and supervision views depend on the managers and the 
supervisors themseilves....I am cannot talk in terms of organization but in terms 
of human relations, the relation to the organization depends on your relation to 
the people you work with. Moreover, the fact that supervisors and managers 
change frequently makes it difficult to be attached to the organization. In 
addition other businesses mainly oil companies offer much better job 
opportunities in my area, the fact that makes me think about leaving the embassy 
for another better salary, in an international environment and training 
opportunities.  
41. There are very very limited opportunities for the career development. The longer 
you work, the less they are. Loyalty is not appreciated here. 
42. 
I worked for a french embassy for about 3 years. When i compare the two 
systems, I prefer the American way of doing things: employees are given the 
trust and oppotunity to perform their duties the best way they think it should be 
done.  
43. American officers do not seek guidance from FSN supervisors or employees, 
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they tend to believe that by being who they are they do not have to request 
information from a local national. They act rude to their fellow FSNs and 
sometime discriminatory behavior is perceived. The statement "if it comes from 
an FSN employee does not count" is very common in this atmosphere.  
44. FSN's should become more training. FSN's should be able to take the FSI online 
language courses. 
45. 
Most of them really do not care about you. if it is in there best interest or to keep 
other people happy they can and will either make or break you Often they do not 
follow up promises and do not do anything about situations among fsn,s  
46. 
Supervisors often lack good management/people skills. Local hires are treated as 
staff more often than as colleagues. Sometimes FSO supervisors try too hard to 
be "friends" with subordinates. Credit is too often claimed for work completed 
by or initiated by a subordinate. 
47. 
While FSOs have superb analytical and drafting skills, management and 
leadership can be a challenge for some. The State Department should do more to 
assist senior FSOs to grow in their managerial capabilities and move up from 
being team members to becoming team leaders. 
48. Local practise is not always adhered to. 
49. 
State should remove the word "management" from its org chart and telephone 
book until it implements basic principles. The "kiss up and kick down" culture 
just doesn't work, and our almost complete failure to prioritize goals and 
objectives, coupled with a failure to pursue the necessary resources to 
accomplish even basic tasks, is stifling. 
50. 
I have currently served 12 years with the State dept and they have all been 
enjoyable in the most part. However, I feel that the lack of money at certain posts 
to enhance employees capabilities to perform in their roles is now becoming 
increasingly obvious. I travel frequently as part of my employment and seeing 
other regions and their spending capabilities due to more funding from State than 
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what is received in EUR is extremely frustrating. Training budgets should be 
more uniform across the globe. We have not had any money in our Embassy 
training budget for two years now - this is really unacceptable for any 
organisation, if they expext to get the best from their employees - extremely 
short sighted! 
51. all good - happy Christmas and a happy new Year R 
52. 
I work for 27+ years with the Department of State, 22+ years in a supervisory 
position, I'm dealing with the public day by day representing the Department of 
State - I'm proud to be a member and know that my work and how I perform has 
a little influence on the overall Austrian/U.S. relations.  
53. 
The one downside with working at the State Department is that some officers 
believe that they are superior than FSNs, or at least treat us in a condescending 
way that makes us feel that. 
54. 
I feel that it is extremely important that American officers talk to their employees 
to check not only how but also why they perfom their duties in a certain way. 
Empathy is really important as  
55. 
I was sexually touched in a humiliating and public way by a supervisor. Two 
American Officers were there when this happened. They said nothing and only 
joked about it when I brought it up later. I think they know this totally, 
completely is harassment but they want no involvement.  If there is an 
investigation, it could go against their records and hurt their chance for a 
promotion or better post. They think “the stupid FSN will keep her mouth shut 
and make no problems…” This happens A LOT on many issues.  They don’t 
care about us- only their careers.  I have an advanced university diploma- do they 
ever treat me like I have something to offer? NO! The day I leave this place with 
my pride will be one of the best days of my life. 
56. Thank you for the survey. 
57. If to compare with previous years now the embassy has lost its "good public 
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image". Although it is widely known that many issues depend on personalities, 
their management style and behavior in public, current supervisors neither have 
skills nor wish to better know the country. In such situation when there are "We 
Americans, and you FSNs", it is really hard to work and compete with EU 
funding and their programs. 
58. 
Americans usually talk down to locally employed staff and have an arrogant 
view towards the host country. The Ambassador is very distant at my post and 
has old values and ways of managing. It says a lot that she can call me by my 
nickname even if I never gave her permission for that but I have to call her by 
her title and stand up for her every time she enters a room, everyday for three 
years. I believe you earn respect but nobody not even the Ambassador gets it for 
having people stand up for her. 
59. 
I personally feel that over the years our embassy has been miss managed. Due to 
management decision the communication/understanding between American and 
local employees has become very distant. communication, understanding and 
mutual benefit is key to building the bridges and I hope that management 
becomes more aware of this. Although my values are equal to those of 
Americans and I take proud in the work that I do and how I do it, management 
decision "sometimes" lead me to thing "what am I doing here". Thank you for 
your efforts and I wish you all the success.  
60. 
It is very difficult to work with Ambassadors who are political appointees. In 
some cases they do not realise what position they carry and that they did not 
come for touring a beautiful country only but to represent the United States of 
America. The staff sees very clearly who is who. 
61. 
I strongly believe that there should be a continuity line when officers are 
transferred. I mean that many times when a new officer is assigned at post, all the 
work done by his/her predecessor was wrong and everything starts over again 
every two or three years. I understand that changes are good when they mean 
improvement, not just for the sake of changing or doing things your own way. 
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This is many times the cause of frustration to LES employees (together with the 
saying "in my previous post")and why organizations can't grow on a solid base. 
Thank you for valuing our opinion.  
62. 
I feel that Teamwork is a strong method of work it has been practiced within this 
organization along these years. Likewise, leadership shown by the current and 
former American Direct Hired Staff has strongly joined the sense of belonging to 
this organization as a family. Congrats on this initiative of providing more 
training in professional development skills to the U.S. Government employees 
that will certainly improve the U.S. Mission towards to a high performance 
organization. 
63. I am happy to work with U.S. State Department and hope to continue so. Still 
there is a family after the working hours to enjoy.  
64. 
Supervisors and their management styles change in the course of the years. But 
lately, communication and being informed of what is going on has become more 
of a problem despite all information and communication technologies in place. 
65. 
The breach between U.S. direct hire employees and LES is very wide and I do 
not see a serious effort on the part of management to improve the situation. LES 
seem to be an after-thought or a necessary evil to most American managers who 
pay lip service to the idea of employee integration. As an AMCIT LES, I feel the 
situation is even more difficult as I am considered "neither here nor there". In 
addition, the fact that, as an American citizen working for the State Department, 
I am subject to full U.S. taxes, but my status as LES also requires me to pay full 
local taxes means that my net income after taxes is around 40% of my gross--a 
situation that I was NOT apprised of when I was offered the position. I feel that I 
am somehow being punished for working for my own government. My direct 
supervisor and the MO at mission are sympathetic to my situation, but are unable 
to really help. When I presented the issue to the Director General's office, the 
response I eventually got was less than satisfying (yes, you are liable for both 
taxes and, as the country you reside doesn't have a tax treaty with the U.S., 
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nothing can be done. Needless to say, the situation doesn't make my current 
position my "dream job". That being said, while I'm here, I try to do the best job 
I can. 
66. 
The management situation varies extremely with turnover. Characters, styles and 
opinions can be very different, which sometimes makes it hard, since the 
direction the mission/department was heading is changing along - sometimes 
with extreme consequence. 
67. 
After 9 year working for the Embassy, I know, that our supervisors do not know 
in detail, what the people are duing. To get a higher salary, "is important to sell 
my self", instead to work as best as I know. In general, I enjoy my work, I am 
happy to work for the Embassy, but I think that the salary system is not fair. 
68. 
It is sometimes frustrating to get new boss every 2 years, especially since your 
knowledge base is really huge and bosses are juniors. However it is great when 
your boss is not the best one and when he/she is due to leave. Also 
micromanagement in this organization is difficult to deal with since normally 
micromanagers do not know much about process and they slow it down.. 
69. 
I feel a great gratitude with the US Embassy in Bogota. My work performance in 
these 31 years has been outstanding and I have been very lucky with the 
American Supervisors I have worked with. Unfortunately my grade was frozen 
around 15 years ago and I have not had an step increase during all these years 
and the salary increase has been very low in the last 3 years, so my salary has 
become lower in terms of the annual salary necessary for living in Colombia. I 
hope my next supervisor will help me next year.  
70. 
I don't agree with the actual management/supervision in my Section. 
Unfortunately I don't feel respected and much appreciated, it hurts and it's very 
disappointing. This affects my morale and my view of the Embassy which I've 
always idealized. 
71. Being a part of the consular section staff for over 13 years, having started with 
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one American officer and 2 LES I have enjoyed my employment basically due to 
the management/supervision attitudes. Now there are 3 American officers and 3 
LES (plus one frozen position) at the consular section which adds to the 
management issue and provides a different perspective. We have been blessed by 
the consular officers during all this time and I have always valued the respect, 
trust and friendly working relationships we have been and are in. I still believe 
that basic decisions have to be made by the supervisors but different opinions 
might help to make the right decision. Most of the job requirements cannot be 
questioned and are set very clearly but there are many things which can be 
decided inside the section with everybody involved.  
72. 
I am working about 24 years for my Embassy and I had bad/regular opinion 
about the attitude of two direct supervisors, they made my working life very 
unhappy.  
73. 
All in all I'm very satisfied with DOS organization and employer/employee 
relations, however, there's always an issue of personalities - good or bad - as in 
any other organization. At times DOS policies do not "protect" subordinates 
from bad managers. Yet I have been lucky thus far with mostly good managers. 
In my 17-year career I only once had a bad manager. Also, to my opinion, DOS 
would benefit more if junior officers instead of supervising senior FSN's were 
peers to them. 
74. I'd wish to have more responsibilities as a Senior FSN who worked 20 years for 
the American Embassy  
75. 
I used to be a happy, full of energy and devoted to work employee. Some people 
need "a carrot" some people need a "stick" to work well. I only expected a "thank 
you" sometimes, but even this frequently seemed too much. Within almost 16 
years of working for US Dept of State I went to training twice, once to a 
conference and once I received an individual award. So my energy kind of 
diminished. I still work as perfectly as I can, but the energy is different. Sad, 
what else can I say...  
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76. 
Officers have their own agenda to pursuit on how they can please their managers 
in order to get good EERs for their onward assignment or carrier. Every three 
years in a way we reinvent the wheel although in the absence of officers 
(elapsing time between two supervisors) the work continues efficiently and 
flawlessly. The span of the American officers attention is limited to the three 
years they spend in a post and they do no really care what will happen in the 
Embassy after their time. I work for the Embassy for 31 years I am 53 years old 
and although I tried very hard to change this mentality around I have finally 
become cynical and I just do my job the best way I can under the circumstances 
hoping for a retirement at 55.  
77. 
Sometimes lack of communication is a real barrier between supervisor and 
subordinates. Training as a key tool should be always available for FSNs. 
Cultural understanding is important and respect to those differences. I will gladly 
share working and relationship experience of 21 years with the USG.  
78. This is the best organization. 
79. 
Below are what I think to be key factors for good management: effective 
communication; continually seeking to improve work method; show interest in 
training subordinates and listening to them. Most managers I have worked with 
in the State Department have demonstrated these skills. 
80. 
If you would have given me this survey just a couple of years ago, I would have 
answered the questions very differently: I used to really feel part of this 
organization, even emotionally attached. Unfortunately, over the last couple of 
years, I am afraid the American officers we have in our office have shown poor 
judgment and poor management, especially when it comes to their relationships 
with other employees. I sincerely regret that. I remember the time when 
everybody, American officers and FSN's alike, were one big family. These days, 
the American officers really show that you are inferior to them. I have been 
working for this organization for almost 14 years and a half, 7 years of which in 
my current office. This is the 2nd office I work in. 
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81. I don't think any of my views/opinions matter or are considered. 
82. 
I believe that if Management officers were given an extra 3 years of 
responsibility after they have left post for things done during their time, they 
would think twice about many of their decisions. Many decisions are made with 
their carriers in mind not the mission. It is very easy to write up a report to 
Washington about how great the idea is and getting a reward, but at Post we see 
the bad effects of these decisions and are left to deal with the bad outcome of 
these decisions. I have been with the Embassy for 11 years now and I must admit 
it is getting worse. 
83. 
Working with U.S. Government would be better if they implement a retirement 
plan for FSNs, or do like U.N is doing for their employees. Due to inflation FSN 
are loosing because they are paid in local currency while the local (African) 
government is lowering intentionally the inflation rate. 
84. Even though I like working with the USG, security issues I don't feel 
comfortable to talk to much about my employer outside of the compound. 
85. 
Management is totally subjective. A new boss can have a 180 degree difference 
in his / her vision of how the job should be done, compared to their predecessor. 
And we have to obey regardless of their competence level, knowledge or 
experience. On the other hand the rotation of FSOs is the oxygen needed to stop 
FSNs becoming too deeply rooted in old practices.  
86. 
Some questions are difficult to answer as your link to your supervisor might 
completely change the perception of the organization. Supervisors move 
frequently and you can have up and downs and extremely different styles of 
management. I am a senior FSN at Public Affairs. What I am doing depend on 
my supervisor as well as U.S. policies. So there might be many reasons why you 
feel very comfortable and proud of your organization or not willing to tell others 
for whom you work. I think the quality of our supervisors is going down - more 
and more often lack of European culture and understanding of European 
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specifities -- and that makes the relationship more difficult; moreover, they have 
never been good managers, even if we enjoyed working with some of them. Why 
I like very much my job: it's very interesting and multifaceted; I have a lot of 
autonomy (which is possible due the work I do) and we are a good team of FSN 
colleagues 
87. The fact that employees are assessed based on what they do and not on what they 
are is already a great asset.  
88. 
I'm working for the US government for more than twenty years. Of course it is 
very boring to work for the same organization for so many years, but I couldn't 
find any other better organization in Alexandria. We are over-populated and it's 
not easy to find a good work environment. On my part I always ask the new 
supervisor every three years to look at my job description, to change it by adding 
new duties that would be useful to my career or to move duties that can be 
performed by other colleagues. I think that the supervisor should work on 
making his staff happy with their duties. I really have one thing that annoys me 
and my colleagues as well, when the supervisor shows his/her surprise to hear 
that most of the FSNs are working for the organization for more than ten years - 
the supervisor may not understand the reasons that cause our long stay in the 
organization. Anyway, I happy to work for the US government at the American 
Center or Consulate in Alexandria. 
89. 
Despite the fact that I am very willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond 
normally expected to make this organization more successful, there is no 
motivation. The performance criteria solely depends on the number of years 
worked. They can't differentiate between good or bad employees in terms of 
efficiency and even if they do, they do not do anything to look bad as they only 
stay for a limited number of years and they do not want to look bad. There is no 
management and or performance tool that is being used to turn inefficient 
employees to efficient ones. The upward mobility is also very much limited as 
the turnover rates are very low which is also a great dissatisfaction factor. 
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90. 
I have been working with the mission for over 28 years. During this period, I 
notice changes in the way managers are working. They have less confidence in 
employees and with the computer age, they tend to work alone, not involving 
subordinates. Sometimes, I feel that the managers do not have the necessary 
training before coming to post and they often have no clue about the culture of 
the country. I personally think that managers should be more aware of the 
country's culture and give their chance to subordinates to see what they can do.  
91. 
If an American supervisor exhibits abusive behavior and creates a hostile 
workplace, it doesn’t work to report this and discuss it with the HR manager. 
Because, an American supervisor is always right; it is her/his way, or NO way. 
There is no control mechanism for FSOs if they are eligible to supervise. There is 
also no room to go if an FSN having difficulties with his/her supervisor or in 
case favoritism, workplace harassment, mobbing, and discrimination. On the 
other hand, as we heard from the Embassy management both personally and at 
the town hall meetings many times; don’t even try to complain or discuss on 
anything because there are a lot of unemployed people waiting for a job in front 
of the Embassy!... Empowering LES in many aspects will be helpful not only to 
create more productive workplace but also to reduce personnel budget 
92. working for the government is a great duty. 
93. 
Dealing with US Officers is the best part, the worse part is dealing with FSN 
supervisors.. They just acting as "super chief" sometimes with no consideration 
of your job and this is why i strongly prefer to work under a direct supervisory of 
an US officer and that i wish I could stay in this organization as long as I can. 
Local supervisors considers only how if you are fake with them and I'm not like 
that.. With US supervisors i feel like i can give more than 100% of myself cause 
they really supports you not only as a worker but also as a person. So I use to 
work much better under a US supervision because then I really feel like i'm 
working for the State department. I always wanted to live to the US so I'm glad 
i'm working at the Embassy, it's the must for me! 
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94. 
It varies from office to office. But the one thing i dislike is that fsn's are 
sometimes considered as second class citizens with second class opinions. Also, 
the lack of continuity and consistency in officers attitudes is a little depressing, 
more so when you are trusted and asked to deal with responsibility and then 
suddenly you are PNGd because personalities changed. Also, I was disappointed 
to find that in my office it is not a meritocracy but rather we are all equal, 
regardless of the effort we put into things. Equality is great when you are born. 
The moment you build yourself up and prove yourself, merit is importance. 
Otherwise, why should i make more effort if i get the same treatment as one who 
doesn't?  
95. 
Training remains the problem area. I do this job (FMC) for over 4 years now, and 
am still waiting for the specific training to increase my productivity. Same 
happened with GSO (I was there for 17 years) where after 13 years of service, I 
finally got to go see how I should do my work!! Not investing in training is like 
going backwards... 
96. 
Personally I feel very grateful for having worked in this institution for over 30 
years. However, there are good and bad things as in all the places. One of the 
most important things: Officers must bear in mind that without LES they would 
be able to perform their work in a timely and efficient way and be able to trust 
LES ' work. 
97. Question 5: You can disagree with a supervisor's decision but still accept it and 
work with it. 
98. 
For all the questions that I've chosen "Neither Agree nor Disagree" - this answer 
doesn't reflect my indecision in making a statement. It rather refers to the 
management decisions and work style of the Management Counsellor/Officer 
present at post within a certain time frame. I've been employed for 13 years now 
and I've seen many Management Counsellor succeeding one another, and it was 
proven a lot that the decisions of the current one were not a progress but a 
regress of the previous one. 
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99. 
The survey will not show accuracy in results because leadership in FSO changes 
so often (every 2/3 years, FSO at times are not on the same sheet of music and 
personalities and billets are in conflict....State needs to define leadership, 
management and implement people skills in their initial traing seminars and 
followed up often. 
100. 
Comment: I feel as a negative fact of the system of this organization is that due 
to the fact that our American Supervisors change every 2 or 3 years, sometimes 
we have to deal with new Supervisors that do not recognize and/or have respect 
for the loyal service we have always given to the organization, as well as the vast 
experience and knowledge most of us have (in my case 26 years of service). We 
have to prove almost every time that we perform our jobs with all our best efforts 
and we are always willing/trying to improve the image of the US Government 
and to try to make our Section and our jobs more efficient and effective and, 
open to help them in every way we can. 
101. 
I bet that if FSNs and Supervisors were all aware of the importance of the subject 
of this survey, their relationships will improve drastically, since they all will 
agree that they are part of the same team. 
102. 
Newly assigned FSOs should read the position descriptions of their staff in order 
to know with accuracy what to request and to expect from each employee. I 
would also recommend that they familiarize themselves with the host county's 
labour laws and labour culture, which might differ greatly from that in the U.S.  
103. 
For question number 2: "It is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority 
and power when dealing with subordinates." The answer is that a manager must 
control and verify employees work. It is not an issue of frequency, but of 
consistency and quality. Management sometimes takes credit for projects 
initiated by LES or work carried out by LES. More credit should be given to 
employees. LES supervisors are superflous, sometimes jealous and do not always 
provide the best supervision or guidance for LES employees. All LES should be 
supervised by FSOs. The CAJE should be totally revised. Jobs should be given 
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based on competence and past experience, not on a job description. We are 
people not numbers. Salaries should follow this rule as well. Some LES have 
very high salaries and are not at all competent for the position. For HR: An 
American LES or FSO should always interview a potential candidate before any 
testing is done. Some LES HR personnel are not apt in the decision making 
process for hiring Embassy staff. Watch out for nepotism and insider references. 
LES should receive more training on America's system of government and 
History and learn how to write business letters in English.  
104. I am happy with everything about my employer except the for the criteria for the 
awards program. 
105. 
I am an Amcit local hire rather than a classic FSN, and my opinions that are of a 
negatie quality reflect my dissatisfaction with my compensation and being 
double-taxed, not my dissatisfaction with my job itself. 
106. More communication and training programme for FSN in order to have a very 
good performance and help to develop the all the type of work. 
107. 
I have come to dislike the "them" and "us" attitude that exists between FSN and 
USDH personnel and which only developed over the last 6 or 7 years. There 
doesn't seem to be much trust anymore. I used to socialise a lot with the 
American community but have completely stopped when it became obvious that 
new USDH staff arriving at Post were no longer interested. It's a shame as it used 
to be so good.  
108. 
I BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN LOCAL ENGAGED STAFF SHOULD BE 
DELEGATED WITH ADDITIONAL DUTIES IN ORDER TO ENABLE 
OFFICERS TO DEDICATE MORE TIME TO IMPORTANT ISSUES. 
OFFICERS SHOULD ALWAYS BE PROFESSIONAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN 
DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC AND REMEMBER THAT THEY 
REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.  
109. in past we have more chance to help, support and give ideas. now for fsn's is 
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harder and more diff to communicate with American supervisors. in past i felt as 
a part of family and now i am just employee. thanks! 
110. not a clear position descriptions written to cover all major tasks/responsibilities. 
111. 
I think US diplomats are not prepared to be managers. Strategies are never 
designed and evaluation of results never takes place. Local personnel, who do 
most of the work, is seldom taken into consideration and there are no career 
plans for them. When I enter the U.S. Government, i never expected to remain in 
the same category for the rest of my life.  
112. 
I am very proud to work for the US government. My family and I always had 
strong ties to the US culture. Working for the Dept State has been a true pleasure 
but lately also a true frustration. The new officers coming in ... are just soooo 
different and distant and then the 'old guard'. Often some have no manners. How 
about a good morning and not a good morning fsn's! Hellooo...what's this for an 
attitude. Supervisors need to remember that they are only as good as their staff. 
That said, I am a supervisor and strongly believe in that saying.  
113. 
i realize that as an FSN, I am in a difficult position working for a foreign 
government whose policies I may not agree with but who offers a good salary, 
honest work and certain securities. I have chosen to focus on the charitable work 
that this government offers to my country and accept the rest as a means to that 
end. Additionally, I have learned new skills from good managers and I have 
learned patience from bad ones. 
114. 
Most of the American Officers that come to post do not regard the locals; they 
see us as sub-standards. Awards are presently selectively to Americans. Only 
Americans get high honors, and FSNs get trivial honor. This attitude doesn't 
reflect the American Government philosophy of equality. 
115. 
I have been working with the U.S. Embassy Nouakchott for a little over 2 years. 
I joined the mission as a telephone operator, then got promoted last year after 16 
months, as consular assistant, and it's been a wonderful experience so far. i have 
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been blessed with very professional and knowledgeable supervisors and head of 
sections who have really inspired the very best in me in the way of job 
performance: hard work, team effort, integrity, loyalty, communication, dialogue 
and mutual respect. During these 2 years, i have also been able to take several 
online courses and attend trainings which helped me develop new skills. The job 
might be very challenging and stressful at times, but our good and positive work 
environment keeps me motivated and makes me want to try harder everyday and 
achieve higher goals for the mission. Having lived in the United States for 5 
years, i have been able to accomodate to the mission's values pretty quickly. For 
me, serving this mission,gives me a sense of belonging to this great nation and its 
culture that i really love, even if i am not its own citizen! i think that's what 
makes America unique: diversity and equal opportunities for all! thank you all 
for this opportunity. 
116. 
I enjoy my work and my colleagues, but because of recent management 
structural changes I feel that the organization does a poor job of making me feel 
like a part of the team. It's almost like a caste system with the Direct Hires on 
one side and the LESs on the other.  
117. 
I have been working with the US Embassy Ouagadougou for 24 years and I am 
proud of the management tools and concepts that DOS has given me throughout 
my career. As a result, I feel confident with this knowledge I acquired, given this 
opportunity I did take advantage, I can be relocated anywhere and to serve with 
professionalism in any company with ease. I have been highly trainable in 
expendable and non-expendable stocks managing using the updated automated 
software what make me so confident. Thank you DOS. 
118. 
In addition to all the questions, I would like to emphize that every post has 
different problems and should not be treated the same. Most of the time post do 
what Embassy proposes and probably will not fit in post needs. Officers can 
learn from FNS with experience but most of the times they refuse to learn 
thinking that they know everything. I have seen it a lot!! 
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119. It would help if less micro managing is done. 
120. 
Perhaps it would be useful for the LES to evaluate their American officers. It 
would even help the State Department to assign them to other Posts in 
accordance with their evaluations. Thank you. 
121. 
Due to the fact that this is a very small post if the FSNs are not kept in the loop, 
Post will be to a disadvantage. The FSNs are the ones who best know the country 
and the day to day running of Post so it would be best to communicate with 
them. 
122. 
- I am at PA. Based on 10 years of experience after consolidation, working with 
American officers who are not belonging to PA cone is much difficult making 
them understand PA operations. Sometimes lack of understanding causes 
problems on daily public diplomacy work, especially relationship with host 
country contacts. FSNs often obey their orders and instructions, but not quite 
accept their authority in mind. - I hope to see as many PA senior officers become 
the head of the mission. It seems POL officers got greater chances to move up to 
COM or DCM than PA officers. Good PA senior officers will do really well on 
the Ambassador job, because they had greater chances to understand more 
thoroughly about public opinion, public attitude, public relations of the host 
country. - FSNs generally accept American management's authority when they 
made decision without consulting with FSNs, but if they consult beforehand, that 
would be very appreciative. - I feel lucky working for State Department, but I 
also feel old USIS days were happier than post-1999 consolidation) 
123. 
Greetings and congratulations on an excellent survey you have organized to 
inquire the sentiments in the field. The US Embassy is a first rate employer but 
there are many flaws nonetheless. I am very attached to this organization and 
have input more than 30 years already. I am now attached to the organization 
because of the important values it upholds or tries to uphold, and mostly because 
of the principal goal: to bolster bilateral relationships. Plus, there are many good 
management factors that attract me to stay within the employ of the U.S. 
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Embassy here and they include but are not limited to: -participative decision-
making, -the somewhat flat organization in terms of "power-distance" between 
ranking officials and LES employees (compared with Malaysian society and 
organizations outside the US Embassy) -the "informality" with which we may 
work internally (for example, we don't need to dress formally except if we are 
receiving visitors or representing the Embassy at events off-site, -the excellent 
drive to achieve Mission goals via top management's periodic reminder's about 
this and including LES in the process, -the first rate tools provided by the 
Embassy to get our jobs done, for example: vehicles to get to off-site events and 
programs, travel and perdiem out-of-town for TDY, GSO support, etc -
comfortable and functional offices (not just pretty!) and conducive physical 
environment (airconditioning, etc) -access into the chancery for the physically 
disabled (parking, ramps, elevators, etc). But now for some disquieting trends 
which is presented with very good intentions and not to criticize without charity: 
-I don't feel as a member of the Embassy "family" as I used to before (there is 
greater feeling of "Americans" and "LES" as separate entities while we work for 
the same goals and aspirations (but it was excellent many years ago) -The 
vocabulary LES is itself not appropriate. We tend to feel "LESSER" now than 
before when we were referred to as "FSNs". -LES no longer park inside the 
Embassy proper but in a separate lot -We are not entitled to sick leave when 
"family members" are sick -We are not entitled to R&R when environmental 
situations are deteriorating (example when the Air Pollutant Index is considered 
seriously unhealthy--but American officers get such privileges) -We are not 
entitled to purchase Commissary goods -LES supervisors are not respected the 
way American supervisors are respected -The compensation package for senior 
LES are not comparable to similar positions outside the Embassy -The rewards 
for long-term service for LES are mere tokenisms -There is less mingling of 
American and Malaysian employees today compared with what we had enjoyed 
several years ago. It could be because of the 9-11 aftermath and Americans have 
become more "careful" (and they should not be blamed for that "carefulness") 
  
 248
but more inter-mingling events sponsored by the Embassy is probably the way to 
move forward. It could also be because we are doing more with less resources 
today and have less time to do other social events--but then we forget that the 
most important element in any organization is human capital and human capital 
is founded upon human interdependence and relationship building. Thank you 
for the opportunity you have given me to share my candid, sincere opinions. I 
wish you every success in your good work because it affects America, Malaysia, 
and all participants in our global village. God bless America and the world.  
124. 
When I first came to work in this organization, I was proud of it. But now, after 
10 years, I feel disappointed. I am not proud to tell my friends about my 
employer anymore. The most essential reason is the payment, especially in my 
country, Vietnam. I don't know what the U.S. State Department salary scales is 
based on, the annual salary for the ordinarily resident is much much lower than it 
is for the not-ordinarily resident (who is holding diplomatic passport). For 
example, the annual salary of FSN-6 position grade for ordinarily resident is 
US$5,672 which is equivalent to US$29,379 of the FP-8 position grade for not-
ordinarily resident. This is obviously unfair. Additionally, the salary the U.S. 
Government pays us, the local employees, is much much lower (and becomes 
lower and lower) than other organizations pay for their local employees. Finally, 
if there is a chance I (and many of my colleagues) will take a job in another 
organization to get more decent earnings. 
125. The American Officers with whom I have worked have been extremely good and 
always gave me a sense of belonging to this organization. 
126. 
I strongly feel about the review of the present salary structure, which allows 
minimal increase after step 14. Once an employee reaches the last steps he/she 
after some years starts feeling stagnated and demoralized.  
127. No comments  
128. Something serious needs to be done about the DoS' high/idealistic goals. They 
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seized to exist, being replaced by the practical modern objectives. In the field of 
diplomacy idealism is something that motivates, gives sense to one's work and 
keeps the team together. 
129. 
Since I'm the FSNI with the RSO's office and here we discuss everything with 
subordinates as no one is 100% perfect, one can get better ideas from 
subordinates too. We earn respect for what we do for the organization in order to 
keep everyone safe. Managers should be open to their subordinates so that the 
sense of being "part of the family" remain intact. Being in the security we can't 
discuss much out of the office about the organization due to operational security 
reasons. I really love my job and enjoy working with the organization. 
130. 
I would make changes on question #23 so it sounds differently. I try NOT 
discussing my organization issues with people outside for the SECURITY 
reasons, but always keep informed people on various opportunities the U.S. 
Government provides to local citizens in my country. Diplomats whom I used to 
work with had good management skills, were really good supervisers, nice and 
kind people, fair at work, and friendly colleagues. I would also recommend 
mainly young diplomats to not hesitate using local FSN's experience and be more 
helpful to FSNs in their everyday activity. It should be really team work in order 
to reach better cooperation and achievements.  
131. Management should include LE Staff in decision making process.  
132. 
having worked here for a long time, I can say that I am among the luckiest 
people. My job and what it entails as services are what I love. But it makes one 
feel frustrated when the work one does is not recognized or ignored in some way. 
There are instances when credit for work done is given to someone who has just 
put 10% of all the efforts to carry out successfully one project. But when you just 
love the job, you just say maybe the next US boss will be fairer than this one, 
and this happens, until another one takes over and treats you like nothing. 
Fortunately, one person does not represent the whole community. It also happen 
that US boss will give more attention to some section's projects and will make 
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nothing of other section's project - how important the subject or audience might 
be.  
133. 
The rules and regulations are quite fair when it comes to management and 
supervision. Two very strong points of the Department of State: 1) Access to 
information on policies and regulations, including on management/supervision 
issues is being made easily available to LES. 2) The Department's ongoing 
concern to improve its handling of LES employees is commendable. 
134. Management doesn't care about locally employed stuff. They listen to FSN 
problems but do nothing to help. 
135. 
Majority of the decisions are based on personal likeness or dislikeness. FSN staff 
gets the same kind of treatment as the general public. There is no distinction 
between a local employee and an outsider. The organization does not own its 
locally engaged employees and they work with a sense of insecurity. The level of 
trust and respect (from the American staff) between the two communities; the 
FSN and the American staff is diminishing. No wage increase is also creating a 
problem for the local staff and they have started to seek employment in other 
organizations which pay more and have more benefits. 
136. 
Since India is so different from the U.S., there is often an adjustment time needed 
when a new FSO comes, in as the FSO who comes in with perceptions based on 
what he/she are used to in the U.S., finds that those might not work in local 
conditions. Also, since India was till recently was regarded as a "third-world 
developing" country rather than a "developed" one (imagines in the West tend to 
show India more as a land of snake charmers and Rajahs, rather than one with an 
IT revolution, etc.), many FSOs, tend to be more cautious in the beginning when 
delegating responsibility to LES.  
137. 
The biggest career challenges these days are perceptual...psychological. Not 
technical. Not even skills-based. The major adjustments we need to make are 
mental. 
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138. 
Managers' style is very important - working together equals success to the 
manager to the FSN and to the organization. Not that many American officers 
are capable of following that style but whoever does, enjoys the respect and 
support of the FSNs.  
139. 
Management quality strongly depends on the personality and education level of 
supervisor. During 12 years of my employment with the Embassy, I have seen 
both superb and very poor supervision. I got an impression that supervisors are 
designated by the State Department without proper consideration.  
140. 
It is an honor working for the US Government however, truth be told, our 
salaries and benefits quite frankly do not match what our local market is paying 
for similar positions. Although we do not pay taxes in Kuwait, as expatriates we 
do not enroll in social security; we do not have a retirement plan or pension plan 
and our low salaries make it difficult to cope with rising inflation. Most of us 
have sent their families back to their home country to cut down on expenses. 
141. 
It has been pleasure working for my program, (I work for INL office in Tbilisi), 
my supervisors both here and in Washington are professionals and very good 
persons. I appreciate the attitude they treat subordinates. I never felt I was one :) 
G.S. 
142. 
The present Management seams not to know it's duties well. We have endless 
meetings about Service standards, process mapping and CMI, which seams to be 
too much. Our Chief stated that we(our section in particular) meet and exceed the 
standards at our Post, never the less time and again we are having meetings in the 
shape of "school lessons"- where our boss is a teacher- which really takes a lot 
work time off- and since our boss recently arrived to Post he does not understand 
a lot of things related to the job performance. Also there is no motivation for 
work- due to the high inflation that happened in our country during the past 4 
years the current salary is not enough for the normal life. However we are always 
reminded that we work for the Department of State and should be proud of this 
fact! How can we be proud if due to the security regulations we are NOT 
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recommended to tell anyone that we work for the American Embassy! Salary is 
not that good as it was 4 years back- and there is constant pressing from the 
Management that really brings stress to the local staff. I like my job and enjoy 
working for this Embassy, however started thinking about finding some other - 
well-paid job. ( Just FYI- about 25 staff members left job here for the last year- 
one of the main reasons for their departure was a salary issue). Also our 
Management has very "interesting" approach to the trainings for LES 
provided/offered by the State Department-it's very-very difficult to get a needed 
training - training is presented as a gift, followed by the words: Citation:" You 
are so lucky that you got it this time! Please, value what we are doing for you!" 
well, there is much more can be said but I have go back to work. Hope the 
information wopuld help in you dissertation. Thank you. 
143. 
I was very attached to the organization and I loved being a member of the US 
Embassy team until my former boss allowed and even encouraged a colleague to 
take over a program that I had created and developed; that's when I no longer felt 
part of the family, although I did not complain. Since then, I have felt that I don't 
want a lifetime career as an Embassy employee. 
144. 
I used to be very happy working for this organization... I've been working for 
over almost 13 years, I have a daily contact with the American officers and I 
have come to the conclusion that the lower quality of the human resources (in 
terms of instruction, experience, etc) is very well reflected by the employees' 
performance.  
145. 
In many occasion managers do not take into consideration the opinion of the 
employees, and they just have to accept the decisions, over the years the 
employees will do not argue or will want to have a discussion regarding a 
decision being made that will impact their work environment, is like they 
become submissive. 
146. The thing that irks me most is that FSNs are treated like second class citizens. 
We are just numbers, expendable and anonymous and have no rights or avenues 
  
 253
of redress. We are told that we are valued employees but actions speak louder 
than words. 
147. 
Within years of employment we have got used to the fact that every 2-3 years 
officers change, and the new supervisors arrive with their own vision and 
management styles. Quite often they tend to ignore the best practices established 
at post and force the changes. In spite of competitiveness of our current salaries 
in the labor market people tend to stay, since they realize that the benefits they 
get are valuable. I am pleased to have been working for the State Department 
overseas and find my job interesting and enjoyable.  
148. 
The management style seems to be crisis management. In other words, let's deal 
with this crisis and then move to the next crisis. They seem to be eager to change 
things for the sake of change and when change does actually seem warranted, no 
action is taken. Each mission is different but the overall way in which the 
organization is run leaves much to be desired. The greatest complaint I have as 
an FSN is that there is no incentive to improve yourself. We have a retention 
problem at this post. We live in an economy that despite the crisis that is doing 
well and jobs are easy enough to get if you have the right qualifications. Most 
companies here have programs through which employees can further their 
education. I am not talking about online courses which only the State Department 
recognizes, but university education - recognized degrees which the company 
pays and which, in the long run, benefit the company. I already have a BA but 
very much would like my MA, but can't afford the fees. Would the "company" 
benefit from me receiving my MA? Of course, they would. FSI courses do not 
provide you with skills that translate beyond the embassy environment. 
Retention will continue to be a problem at this post and other posts like it if 
something is not done to make it more attractive to stay. Increasing salaries is not 
the answer either. In a country where most people can pay 61% of their salary 
taxes, any raise we get goes straight to the tax man.  
149. In my work it is extremely important what kind of personality will be my next 
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boss. People (management) change every 2-3 years and its a pure luck (or 
unfortunate) who will you get next, because the atmosphere and everything in the 
office strongly depends almost only to the State Department Officer's skills 
(personality). I was lucky in my carrier so far and I had good managers, and even 
when one crazy person came and made horrible atmosphere in the office by 
yelling, throwing office supplies from the desk, I was on maternity leave. But 
right now salaries are no more attractive as they were before and if I get some 
nasty person for my next boss, I may be ready to leave my job and find better 
paid one. So, we have very little contact, or no contact at all with any other 
American but our own Section Chief and if he is O.K. person, everything works 
fine. If he is grumpy, nasty, nervous, unhappy - the whole section will suffer for 
the next few years.  
150. 
It seems that the U.S. Dept. of State doesn't put much emphasis on employees' 
experiences these days. New hires from outside get higher grades immediately. 
It's getting more and more difficult to find respectful managers among American 
officers. 
151. 
The questions are very ambiguous. The answers would have been different if the 
Management would show some interest in changing an obsolete system of 
evaluation and promotion of personnel. 
152. 
Overall Embassy management doesn't do much to improve FSN's employment. 
They're coming to post for a year or two so no need to worry what will happened 
after departure. The same situation for 16 years here. 
153. 
Management style is very open and allows employees to talk freely with their 
supervisors. However, the management style is largely dependent on the FSOs, 
as different officers use different styles.  
154. 
In general, LES that are employed by USG do feel strongly attached to the 
organization and feel proud to be a member of such an organization. However, 
some views expressed above are not directed at the organization itself but at the 
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people that comprise management in the organization. People are the 
organization and if the management doesn’t appreciate and value LES, it is only 
normal for them to become detached, lose morale and finally leave the 
organization.  
155. Nothing to add but what is there... 
156. 
Based on my length of service, I would really recommend having senior FSN's to 
join the "training team" (FSN CORE) to give some trainings to other colleagues 
in other posts so we feel like we are also committed to make a positive change in 
this organization and that we are also a real team players who can reach the same 
goal ..on time. 
157. When "neither agree nor disagree" is marked this means that the answer depends 
on situations and circumstances 
158. 
I feel lucky and blessed to work for US Embassy at my country. It was a dream 
since childhood to become an interpreter and work for international organization, 
but never could imagine that i will be little bit more then just interpreter, i 
worked as assistant and now as coordinator. And not in a simple internat. 
organization but US EMBASSY! I am very proud of it and very thankful to those 
people who trusted me and chose me to vacant position at the Embassy over 6 
years ago.  
159. 
Officers rotate every 2-3 years. Each time FSN needs to prove him/herself before 
the new officers. This is healthy somehow to do our best, but in some cases 
officers would not recognize FSN exerted efforts. FSN needs to resign once SIV 
is granted. Would not be better should FSN stays serving the Embassy? 
160. 
We see various types of managerial styles since Americans tour posts every two 
years or so. Generally, most of them are good managers but sometimes we see 
bad managers to extent that local staff resign or leave after working so many 
years at the state department. Managers should be know in detail cultures, 
attitudes and other factors of people of the assigned country. 
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161. 
Being a Foreign Service National, American supervisors who come and go every 
two or three years have to consult with me regarding any local issue. FSNs 
usually have the institutional knowledge that the Americans lack. However, 
sometimes American officers feel lax about duties that they have to do, or learn 
to do, rather than relying on us all the time. In addition, although we support our 
offices so vigorously and rigorously, we are often frustrated by the lack of 
support from our supervisors. 
162. 
There should be a total review of policies pertaining to American 
FSNs/American direct hire . We have no rights or privileges. No APO mail, No 
access to commissary, no parking on the compound etc.......We fee like "nor fish 
nor fowl". Why?  
163. 
In my perception, the local staff is underestimated and very often ignored 
specifically because of their qualifications and high level of professionalism. 
Many FSNs are overqualified and their abilities are lost or misused - the 
organization is focused mostly on the happiness of FSOs and EFMs. Other 
international organizations in the country treat their local staff as the institutional 
memory and back bone of the organization. At the embassy this concept is 
unheard of.  
164. 
I really feel proud for being working for American Embassy in Cairo for almost 
20 years. i think i've learnt alot from the way my American supervisors manage 
the work. I love American style especially when i visited U.S couple of times for 
training purposes. I have great respect for America because when i was there i 
felt real freedom, respect law, supervisory training that i took was really 
productive and changed my way in many ways i supervise my team. One thing i 
told my colleagues and my friends from my last visit to America for FACT 
training before i go to Baghdad that if you didn't visit America so you did not see 
the world, America is the world that i love. Thanks for giving me the chance to 
express my thoughts and feeling in here. Ahmed  
165. It is somehow frustrating when people do not trust FSNs enough just because 
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they are not American.  
166. 
To achieve good management requires time. The 2-year-tour basis at state is the 
very weakness of the system. By the time you establish a good work relationship 
your partner, supervisor, is leaving. You cannot build up that expertise with your 
American partner. A good example of that is with Americans who stay four 
years. Performance is far better than with people who stay 2 years. In other 
words the big looser is the organization. 
167. All right with this organization and with supervisors of it 
168. Nothing to add to your information... 
169. 
If some of my replies seem inconsistent, it is because I have seen vastly varying 
situations here - it all depends on the American officer on top.In recent years, 
unfortunately, despite what we are told at FSI, there is a dangerous - I would say 
suicidal - move to disempower FSNs who are the backbone, the continuity of the 
Mission.  
170. American Officers especially the JOs are not so friendly to LES. Separate 
treatment for American verses LES Employees. 
171. No comment. 
172. 
as a non us citizen there is no room to make decisions or to work independently. 
carrier is not possible. if this is clear from the start, this is a great organization to 
work for, especially as a working mother. 
173. 
"13. I would be just as happy working for a different organization as long as the 
type of work was similar" and may be rewards are similar or even better... "23. I 
enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it" - I do not discuss my 
organization with people outside it - this is security...  
174. Thank you for taking the time to consider our views and all the best in 2009! 
175. Thank you for this opportunity.  
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176. 
In the beginning of my 10+ years at the State Dept. the atmosphere was fairly 
good, however within 2 years, that deteriorated sharply. Generally one is very 
aware of the strong dividing line between the 2 cultures and that an FSN/LES 
will always be considered an inferior... which is reflected in the way that requests 
are given. One point though is that from time to time a genuinely caring Officer 
comes along who isn't pretending to purport the "FSNs are important to us" 
directive... that is when local staff actually give their best. 
177. 
I think most of USG organizations should give management training to all 
managers quite often, either on site or abroad to reinforce their capacities. Most 
flaws derive from poor magt qualifications from supervisors. This will help give 
a better profile to USG organizations outside the US. Hope to see changes occur; 
thanks a lot.  
178. 
Thank you for this opportunity. One of the issues that I have taken up with 
several other FSN colleagues is the lack of social skills of American officers 
towards foreign employees in the sense that there is no inclusion within their 
circles. An example, during social gatherings it is very obvious that American 
officers will mingle and socialize with their own and leave FSN's off to their own 
too, there is no effort to socialize and socially a lack of acknowledgment on a 
daily basis starting from the basic response to a "Good morning". There is a 
strong sense among the consulate, this is we and this is you, we're not the same. 
179. 
Training programs are not very often equally distributed. Certain sections are 
given much priority over others. Funds are almost always available for certain 
section whiles to others there is always the same music; "There is no money". 
180. 
I have been with this consular office for 45 years, and obviously enjoy the work 
and in most cases, the people! Sometimes the handling of LES matters, such as 
salaries, leaves a little to be desired, but obviously is controlled from far above! 
181. The morale of the department can be boosted or destroyed by one American with 
a bad attitude towards FSNs 
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182. 
My views on management/supervision : Trainings for Managers / Supervisors : I 
believe that the SAME training should be mandatory for USDH Managers, for 
Senior LES and for relevant HR staff. This will enable the HR to understand how 
you (the employer) require the managers/senior staff to perform in this 
organization. In cases where a problem exists and HR exclusively supports the 
employee, thus leaving the supervisor unprotected, then it is the supervisor who 
has to bear the future consequences of a ‘problematic relationship’ between the 
supervisor/subordinate. I can understand that HR office is a ‘shelter’ for the 
employees who need guidance to their problems, but do not forget that the 
supervisor needs this guidance and protection, too. My employment with the 
U.S. State Department : When the organization is clear with the guidance as to 
the values to be considered by ALL employees, then the promotion of these, by 
the Management/Supervisors/Employees would be successful, therefore 
advancing the level of job satisfaction. My opinion in relation to questions in this 
survey : questions are very good – survey could be done more frequently.  
183. For me, management is a team work. 
184. 
The best management practice that the State Dept people in London do is a) 
listen to their FSN employees and b) often do what these employees suggest! 
The ability to take on-board criticisms is a very useful one and indicative, in my 
personal opinion, of the liberal views of the State Dept. I still wouldn't 
recommend to anyone new staying here for more than 3-4 years but I don't regret 
my USIS or IM experience nor working with colleagues. But I'm still looking to 
quit as there is no useful training, no salary incentives, no promotion 
opportunities and our technology roadmap appears dissociated from any needs 
by technical professionals such as myself :-)  
185. local Cultural reality should be taken into account in Management's decision 
regarding benefits. 
186. Thank you. 
  
 260
187. 
There is need to spread equal training opportunities to every staffs especially 
when it is outside the country because it will encourage better knowledge 
impastation, exposure, confidence and skill evaluation/understanding across 
posts. The essence of training is for empowerment so it should not be done out of 
favouritism. Some have spent more than five years without any training 
opportunity outside the country even when training courses have been submitted 
over and over which is relevant to the person's job. 
188. I believe the Department needs to put more effort and resources into bettering the 
working conditions and benefits of its LES.  
189. Management's EER should include a review by FSNs as well. 
190. 
When a manager, such as an ISO or IMO, when sent to post should be 
interviewed by IT people in Washington and only be assigned the job upon their 
knowledge, skills and experience. Must be Microsoft certified in order to run a 
Computer Center. It is impossible to run an office of that nature only by "pushing 
rank" and have absolutely no idea of what a Network is. 
191. 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help this organization be successful - also depending on the way the 
supervisors management of the office treat us employees, manage to motivate the 
team, appreciate the efforts. 
192. 
#8, 12 We are told not to discuss our employment with outsiders for security 
reasons. #14 This is dependent on who is in charge at the time you ask it. I have 
personal experience with those who use LES as stepping stones without regard 
for our input; those who believe they can be rude and inconsiderate to 
subordinates; and I have worked for those who show their appreciation for us in 
ways that do not cost the USG money or loss of productivity -- all dependent 
upon the person at the top at the time on the national and local level. My 
productivity and job satisfaction are dependent on the whims of management -- I 
do my best work when I know what I do matters to management, and not just 
  
 261
what makes them look good to their superiors or guests or inspectors. 
Interpersonal skills are as important as knowledge of the work required for 
managers and supervisors at all levels. 
193. 
The American officer need to learn a basic culture in country they work in order 
to understand the they employee. Work as a team not as a boss. Humble but firm 
on decision making but please listen what the FSN need inform you first. Minor 
mistake can cause a lot of dissatisfaction on FSN. 
194. 
Managers should not simply make most decisions without consulting 
subordinates. Managers should not verbally over use authority and power when 
dealing with subordinates. 
195. 
Most FSNS have put in many years of work, like 25, 30 years and their salaries 
have reached the max. And they have another 8 to 12 years more to go. There 
should be some form of incentives for these employees. Also FSN supervisors 
sometimes face difficulty handling FSN employees. The American should listen 
to FSN Supervisors grievances and help them to resolve such issues. Thank you. 
196. I am happy to work with US Government.  
197. 
Locally employed staff or FSNs are the backbone of the organization and they 
always try to give out their best during their association. But problems erupt 
when American officers during their usually short tenures try to show off, or are 
guided by their whims and egos, that often results in disruption in harmony in an 
otherwise smooth teamwork. Some of the officers, being vindictive in character, 
will even like to go to their extremes but that spells disaster. If the vindictiveness 
is coupled with very strong personal likes and dislikes, the consequences become 
dangerous. In present day's globalized management style, egotists are never 
welcome and they should be trained to win over their traits of throwing personal 
tantrums such as thinking I am the best before they assume new positions. The 
stint is short. So why not work with FSNs with a smiling face and judicious and 
impartial dealings! After all, only the memory of one's own behavior lingers. 
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There are, of course, always exceptions. Thanks for giving us the opportunity to 
share our feelings.  
198. 
I think the Department of State is a good organization to work for, but no-one 
should spend his or hers whole career only in one organization. American 
colleagues have a huge impact on FSN's opinion about their jobs and 
organization itself. As Americans change after a certain period, then the job 
satisfaction is also a subject for change. 
199. LES salaries should be raised. Stop enforcement of EFT system for FSNs 
salaries due to the low credibility to local banks.  
200. 
The work load is lopsided at times due to seasonal occurrence: one person may 
have a whole lot, and other FSN colleagues aren't too busy. When you complain 
nothing happens. All managers have a different style, but it is often repetitive and 
everything changes back to what it once was after a few years. In general, all 
American supervisors are very friendly. The word passes from top to bottom 
well. I don't think careers for FSN's get developed for individuals, but if you are 
lucky you get put into a higher paid position. I think they should not have the 
awards program. 
201. 
For my position at this organization accessibility for outside publics is very 
important. I think that the closing-down of the American Centers, where much of 
our programming was done and where we could interact with our publics on a 
regular basis, was not a forward-looking or very wise decision overall. 
202. 
The state department system is unique because the management staff is on a 
permanent rotational basis. Most Supervisors spend only two to three years at 
post. There are therefore only a few who really get attached to their workers to 
the point of wanting to see their personal development over time. career options 
are limited by the very nature of the mission of the Embassies. I have heard of 
how a technician rose to the rank of General manager in some private US firms 
which is something that can never happen in the Missions as this high level posts 
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are reserved. Coupled with the fact that personal achievement in the form of 
learning and experience over the years in a post does not alter your grade, the 
only option for some very hard working LES is to look for work outside. On the 
job Training in your field of work at state department facilities does not 
guarantee a grade or step increase. Even the proposed Meritorious Increase does 
not seem to address this problem. What are the motivating factors at work in a 
mission? Would realisation of the self be a consideration? yes I believe it should. 
According to Marslow, this is very high level is his pyramidal scale and the state 
department should consider this as more and more LES take self development 
courses.  
203. 
I have to say that I am lucky my supervisor and the supervisor of the section are 
very good people, with very good manner and very supportive to the staff. Thank 
you 
204. 
Public diplomacy is sometimes conducted non-diplomatically, when supervisers 
are "occasional diplomats", in other words, have great dedication, but are not 
experienced or without natural diplomatic talent and flexibility. Achievement of 
the mission goal may turn into disaster when local conditions are not considered 
and the mission goals are blindly cherished - particularly, opinions of local 
employees who know the target audiences better, are not considered when 
planning/evaluating activities; needs of target audiences are not considered 
either. Results: damage of what was existing (and trust as well), without 
replacement; conducting activities for the sake of activities (and reports); target 
audience does not understand and value the activities; level of distrust in general 
public grows; most qualified local staff resigns. It is needless to speak about staff 
morale at such conditions.  
205. 
It is a shame that sometimes various negative characteristic traits of various 
american employees have such a negative influence and portray the institution in 
a completely obstructive light. 
206. Would be nice that FSNs be treated with more consideration. It is a strong 
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possibility that other nations have alos valuable individuals. Have heard so many 
occasions that FSNs are the most important link in the Embassy. Would be nice 
that behind those words be some facts to sustain these claims. It would also be 
nice for the American staff to recall that they represent the Ameriacn nation and 
make this goal prevail over their personal issues. At the end of the day it is an 
interseting experience, from many points of view. I for example, despite many 
challanges I was put through, still maintain a solid dedication for the 
organisation, hoping that better times and persons will come. 
207. 
The Management here treats local FSNs fairly well. We get some say how 
projects should be run. Good work is appreciated. Recently, upon request by a 
senior FSN(myself) for the first time FSNs in my PA department can have 
meetings every week same time as the US officers to discuss issues and improve 
the workflow esp great for team spirit. 
208. The above opinions are in relation to the current management. As the 
management changes after a few years, my opinions might also change. 
209. 
In 27. I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this organization. (Answer: I have 
not answered this question, as I believe in any professional capacity or role, one 
has to be emotionally unattached to perform objectively your role. I am attached 
but would like to have a detached attachment to act objectively. This helps us 
manage well.) 
210. Thanks for this survey! 
211. those who listen cannot do anything; those who can do not listen. so what's the 
point?  
212. 
Management not respecting LES. LES not treated equally. Performance of LES 
are often ignored. American's most often less experienced and work-knowledge 
than the LES ill-treat LES by taking advantage of the economical condition of 
the host country.  
213. Like many around the world, I have had some difficult times relating to the 
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current administration but I really feel that "I belong" to the state department and 
American supervisors are usually making LES feel "part of the team". The recent 
elections in the U.S. made me very proud again to work for the best example of a 
great democracy and a great country. The recent freeze on LES salaries however, 
I felt unjust as it was not applied to everyone. 
214. 
It would be a great welcome if the LES are treated as the GS. For eg. the GS has 
an increase every year plus the COLA whereas the LES in Paris do no even have 
a GSI when compared to the LES in Belgium, Luxembourg or Holland. Even if 
we have an increase of 3% ( few years Back ) it was cut down to 1.5%. Also we 
do not have any bonus salary ( as in Belgium where they have a months salary as 
a bonus )or vacation pay or bonus salary as in Holland or in Luxembourg. Also 
when comparing the salary between Luxembourg and Paris the Grade 3 in 
Luxembourg is equivalent to Grade 6 in Paris. Plus in Luxembourg they get paid 
for other bonus. I this we need to have a set rule also for the LES that we get a 
GSI every year. 
215. 
I am glad to be a part of the OSC Algeria and help the Algerian Military to be 
more professional, and also help people through the Humanitarian Assistance 
Program. I can sign for the rest of my career with this organization if I have a 
decent pay raise every year. 
216. 
In the course of the years that I have been in this employment it seems to me that 
the loyalty to the employer and personal devotion to the job have been losing 
appreciation. No one views it as a value anymore. It is very demotivating. On the 
contrary, some managers indicated on several occasions that it is "trendy" to 
change employment often. For some people who do not prefer changing 
relationships often it also is demotivating. I appreciate this survey as it seems 
that this issue is being given some attention now. 
217. 
Things have changed tremendously regarding th quality of officers employed by 
the U.S. government. Years ago there were more care from the administration to 
the foreign nationals and considered them part of their own family. Now we can 
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see the difference and that we are only LES, which for many of us translated it as 
(Less) We seldom achieve anything with management which is less responsive 
than before. FSNs who spent more than 25 years serving the US feel more caring 
about the future than the Americans themselves, but now you here the word "we 
need new blood" disregarding the expertise factor. Good Luck 
218. 
I have always felt as part of this organization/team. Manager(s) I have been 
working for (2/3) have being supportive and assisted in a professional manner 
during my 7 yrs of employment, they had a great communication, organizational 
and leadership skills. Having one exception only, I'd give the highest grade for 
communication style, level of support, organizational level, as well as for 
delegating to people style.  
219. 
The only serious morale issue for FSNs at our post is our compensation plan 
which is not adequate at all (Kyiv, Ukraine). Most people that quit are those who 
find better jobs elsewhere. If I quit, that would be only for a better job offer in 
terms of salary. Other than that, we do not really have any management related 
issues.  
220. 
In the Embassy I am working we have had great management officers. I know 
not all Embassies are so lucky. I am convinced that managers should consult 
with their subordinates before making decisions, but they need to make decisions 
themselves and sometimes use their power if needed.  
221. 
Theory wise, the policies or disciplines are good, but most of the time they get 
away with it, bending the rules to accommodate them. Many a times too, their 
decisions are penny wise and pound foolish (no different from other countries 
attitude). 'Government mentality'. And to be fair, they certainly are good 
managers but sad to say they are overpowered. 
222. 
i gave been working with the State Department as FSN for more then 25 yrs, the 
fact that i able to work so many years in an organizations speaks volume about 
my working place. I like two ways communication we are able to solve an issue 
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together, and also agreed to disagreed to keep the peace with our officers. Of 
course there are times i when i met with difficult bosses but i tell myself they 
come and go, but i can stay as long as i am needed and i enjoy the working 
environment of office. They new group of young FSOs are not so diplomatic 
when it comes to deal with people, i have a junior officer who asked me to do 
something i should not do but when i pointed it out, still insist that there is 
nothing wrong but quietly make no changes on the issue. 
223. i enjoy to work with this organization, thanks very much 
224. The "Them & US" attitude of American Direct Hires and Locally Employed 
Staff is nothing short of discrimination. 
225. 
Advantage for officers to know the local customary practices and be people 
friendly. When dealing with employees, best to use a soft approach before 
sending a strong message. Despite the number of sick leave allowed, the pattern 
should be monitored to cut abuse. Employees should be trained to handle the job 
and customer oriented.  
226. I am completely happy to work with this organization as it full fill my dream of 
becoming a better and well organize man.  
227. Managers should treat their subordinates with respect, and seek other outlets for 
their bad tempers rather than taking pleasure in being mean and nasty. 
228. 
Because I had a good local supervisor, I learned a lot from the organization. So, 
it's not the organization that inspired me, it's my former supervisor. If you really 
mean the organization, the organization doesn't have a personal meaning for me 
or emotionally attached, it's more about my colleagues and how a good team 
work we are. However, American officers sometimes ruin that. Some of them 
don't understand that good relationships are important in order to get work done 
smoothly. And about the discussion about the organization with contacts, if you 
mean discussion with friends, I'd say that I don't because most of local people 
don't like one section in my organization, which is visa section. Visa section has 
  
 268
a bad reputation here. So, I avoid to tell others that I work for the US Embassy. 
But, if you mean whether I talk to my contacts proudly about my section, which 
is Information Resource Center, I'm proud to tell others that I'm part of the 
section and I feel like I'm part of my section in the organization, but not the 
whole organization. 
229. 
At times the management/supervisor should understand the local culture and 
qualification level of a employee, before he be given another persons task(s) 
which the employee may feel he is over worked for less pay.  
230. More local culture understanding! 
231. LES need more training on job. 
232. 
Managers and supervisors must keep an open mind and keep abreast with the 
latest development and trends in their own field in order to embrace changing 
needs and trends without fear plus to be able to manage thier department 
effectively.  
233. Thank you for pushing me to work on this survey. 
234. 
Management and supervisory practices could be strengthened in USAID. Often, 
supervisors raise to their positions based on professional merit, lacking the 
requisite skills and practices to motivate people and reward good performance 
not to mention creating team cohesion. Supervisors in some cases are not strong 
enough in providing prompt feedback. This particularly applies to my field, 
Contracting in the Office of Acquisition and Assistance.  
235. 
It is my personal opinion that we suffer from an "us and them" mentality 
between the American direct hire staff and FSN staff at post, I personally feel 
that this is terrible for morale when American staff cannot even say "hello" in the 
corridors within the office. It is also my personal feeling that this mentality of 
"us and them" starts and the very top and works its way down. I also feel that the 
management and supervision styles by my current management team are far from 
professional. One instance that comes to mind, was when a member of staff 
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received a pay increase after gaining a promotion and the management officer 
decided to tell the whole GSO office of the salary increase before informing the 
member of staff who was to receive the increase. I also find that my current 
direct American supervisor (GSO) is far too emotional and looses composure far 
too easily when members of staff disagree with certain situations or have an 
opinion on situations and decisions, screaming and shouting at staff is not going 
to make FSN members of staff change their opinion and any respect she may 
have had will only decrease. At the time of writing I am yet to see her behave in 
this manner in front of a fellow American member of staff. Her style of 
management is not one I am familiar with. I also have a feeling that if some 
members of the FSN staff are under performing, some, not all, American 
supervisor staff seem have a "oh well I'm out of here in a few years, I'll let the 
next person deal with it' kind of attitude and do not seem to want the hassle of 
having to discipline the staff members who are underperforming. I feel this is not 
good for staff morale, especially for the members of staff who have to work 
alongside the underperforming member of staff. It is a feeling of total 
mismanagement by direct American supervisors. All of this is of course my own 
perception and is not a representation of all of my direct American colleagues or 
my fellow FSN colleagues. I will also point out that we work in a first world 
English speaking country and city.  
236. 
New officers, entry level or senior, should be trained about local culture and 
sensitiveness. Do not assign someone without any supervisory skill or any other 
job experience unless s/he knows how to respect people. 
237. 
Over the years, I have found that the American officers have become 
increasingly distant in their interaction with LES. Unfriendly and uncomfortable 
with communicating - sometimes to point of being insulting. I find that to be a 
serious mistake as many LES have much to contribute to professional events and 
relationships in their area of expertise. At the same time, there is a failure to 
understand that LES are citizens of that country and such insensitive behavior 
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creates a unsuccessful working environment. 
238. I am proud to be part of an organization that defends freedom and respects self 
determination. 
239. I hope this organization improves for the better. 
240. it all depends on the type of officer at post. But most of the officers are always 
kind , gentle, friendly and in short its a pleasure to work with Americans! 
241. 
Overall, the management in our organization has been very good. I have worked 
with several MOs, DCMs, and GSOs and can attest to their high leadership 
skills, ability to motivate employees, and involve them effectively in the working 
process. 
242. 
FSN's Supervisors should be better trained and make them understating the 
importance of team work! Culture differences often play a key role on 
this..however, during training emphasize the importance of sharing information, 
treating all the subordinates equally and rewarding even with a thank you the 
good work that the subordinates do. In my short experience working for this 
organization I found not many FSN’s managers understanding this part of their 
duty. FNS’s Supervisors often are chosen as a reward for their loyalty of working 
for so many years for the organization but this DOES not always mean that they 
are capable to handle that role. i.e. an employee who has very good technical 
skills does not mean he also has management or customer service skills... even if 
he has been working for 25 years in the same section … 
243. 
Working with the American Officers is always challenging, specially as they 
change between 2/3 years, some officers bring a wealth of knowledge, others 
don't. Overall it is very interesting. 
244. 
FSOs are often doing everything to make us not feel as a "part of the family". 
Your reference to the organization or to the system doesn't mean a lot for FSNs. 
Unfortunately, for an FSN organization is his/her supervisor. There is no 
efficient system that would protect an FSN or control an FSO. There is no 
  
 271
"punishment" for being a bad FSO. There is no institution behind the Embassy, 
there is only a supervisor. If he/she is good manager you adore the place you 
work and vice versa. Working in the U.S Embassy and being proud is a myth. In 
21st century it is all about how much you are paid, how much things can you 
learn and how much your supervisor respects you and assists you in your 
development. I doubt that the FSOs know what the notion of emotional relation 
to their work is, unless in the contexts of promotion, salary and respect. And why 
it would be different for an FSN?  
245. 
Since 2001, the working climate has changed, presumably due to the fear of 
terrorists, this is especially noticed by the locally employed NON-American 
staff. Most American officers keep more distance to the non Americans, as if the 
LES's are not to be trusted anymore. The decreased funding is also showing 
effects, since various needs, ea. training, new equipment, pay raises, etc. is being 
denied.  
246. 
I feel grateful for the chance to work with the American community. I don't 
spend a great deal of time with them but they are always gracious and thankful 
for my work. 
247. 
There's a big difference between Americans and LES Staff. A bad example is the 
medical benefits available to local staff. The U.S. Government can improve how 
LES Staff are treated in terms of medical care. 
248. The State Department should better look at the RESULTS of FSN work. 
249. The relationship is good in terms of management and supervision. 
250. 
I have the impression that there are policies that are not flexible. They are 
dictated on U.S. Missions overseas with no room for discussion. This is a big 
organization that should take the lead in al matters related to the welfare its 
employees. Sometimes the organization does not respond to the needs of 
employees in a timely manner and this is probably caused by too much 
"centralization" in Washington offices who are not aware of the realities in the 
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field. 
251. 
State Department has great amount of supervisory skills training. I wish every 
new officer coming to post would take one of these courses and follow its 
recommendations (concerning communication, feedback, conflict resolution and 
delegation) while dealing with subordinates. 
252. 
There are some officer's who would like to terrorize the employee by saying, 
"you will be fired" this makes the employee feel insecure. Especially in African 
country like us, they believe that they can get employees easily. the good things 
is that he/she will be replaced by others every two or three years. 
253. I like working with the Americans since the treat me very friendly. I sometimes 
tell my compatriots they are kinder than my own compatriots. 
254. 
My embassy is structured in such a way that it appears teh hierarchy is more 
important than any good idea or project because it gets lost in the many layers it 
has to go through to reach a decision-making level. American officers appear to 
be too reluctant to be pro-active or to recommend ideas from FSN's to 
management. Too often, they see FSN's as mere tools for realizing their ideas 
and executing their orders. That can be tiring! 
255. 
FSO's should understand that in order to produce worthwhile results they must 
partner with their FSN's. There has been a strong change against this in recent 
years. 
256. 
Our last manager/Consul General and the CAO in the Embassy micro-manage a 
lot, causing great frustration. I don't have any issue with supervision, this is okay. 
On many occasions, when it comes to advising I don't offer my opinion because I 
know the managers have already made up their minds. Although I like my 
organization and love Americans, I can't speak highly of my job because there 
are many policy issues that are considered to be hostile for my country and the 
general new population is very anti-american when it comes to involvement in 
the area. 
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257. 
The relationship between the American officers and the FSN's is often quite 
difficult. FSN's usually know their local circumstances and programs better, but 
for the Americans (supervisor) this often difficult to admit. On the other hand, 
without the strong leadership qualities of the American supervisors, FSN's often 
don't feel responsible for anything nor do they have initiative, and the team spirit 
suffers. I my opinion this is due to the hierarchical structure of the State 
Department. FSN's are not getting the feeling that they are seen as equally 
important and are not given major responsibilities. For FSN's there is no 
possibility in the system to gain higher positions and advance their careers. After 
10 years they have reached the max. pay level. That is why many really good 
people leave after a couple of years. Most American officer's top priority on the 
job is their own profession, their next evaluation and to achieve the next grade. 
Therefore, sometimes the programs suffer from the reluctance to really fight for 
something because it could harm their career.  
258. FSO should be smarter and better trained. In addition, they should also develop a 
greater sense for the local culture because American culture is not paramount. 
259. 
I want it to be known that I care as much as the Americans about the fate of this 
organization, if not more since I am the institutional memory of the organization- 
not them. I wish the State department would read the outcome of this research 
and improve the human relationship at posts. 
260. I have noted a sharp decline in morale post-wide in the last five years that affects 
performance and motivation. 
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